Department of State
AIRGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL A-45
DATE
TO : Department of State
INFO :
FROM :
AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
SUB : Political Assessment: Status Report on
Election Campaign - Double, Double
Toil and Trouble
REF :
12 1969;
Summary
Bearing in mind hard issues unresolved by President
Yahya's progressive decisions announced November 28, it is not surprising that
first raucous weeks of political campaigning which began January 1 give
impression of considerable disarray. All Constituent Posts report evidence of
concern that October 5 elections might be aborted, but some hopeful signs are
perceivable.
In East Wing, Mujib (Awami League) is running strong
on Six (autonomy) Points, Bhashani's (NAP (L) party is faction-ridden, and mood
of peasantry remains unclear.
In
On Northwest Frontier, Wali Khan's NAP (R) seems to
be weathering virulent attacks by Qaiyum Khan.
"Islam versus Socialism" issue
increasingly dominates campaign in most areas. Everyone is for Islam, but most
political leaders also favor some "nationalization."
Interrelated deadlocks apparently persist with
regard critical question of provincial autonomy. Bengali/Punjabi antagonism
surfacing more. Mujib's
Considerable chatter, particularly on far left,
about alleged U.S. intervention, but foreign policy has not emerged as major
campaign issue although Mujib has suggested need to resolve some Indo/Pak
problems.
Major unknown is attitude of Punjabi-dominated
military toward possibility of near-autonomous
While there much unease about prospects. we know
some politicians (and assume most other politicians) are stri\ in`~ to a\ old
quite obvious pitfalls. A Mujib/Daultana/ Wall Khan combination might prove x
-]able.
Since our last major assessment three months ago,
President Yahya in a November 28 speech (1) decreed general elections for a
National (Constituent) Assembly next October 5, on the one inan-one vote basis,
with the resultant East Pakistan-dominated Assembly having 120 days to produce
a constitution acceptable to the President; (2) promised to evolve by March 31
a provisional legal framework for the elections; (3) decided to dissolve One
Unit West Pakistan into (four) separate provinces; and (4) allowed full
political activity as of January I. The thorniest issue, that of the division
of powers between the center and provinces, was set aside for consideration of
the Assembly. Thee raucous early campaigning throughout the country, now in its
fifth week, amply confirms Yahya's November conclusion that no "generally
accepted" resolution of the provincial autonomy question had been found.
Meanwhile, the registration of' Noters has been
completed without apparent graft; corruption or other charges have been made
against 303 senior civil servants; the new Industrial Relations Ordinance ~~as
issued, but its effect remains to be determined (Karachi A-19, January 27); gut
economic issues received sustained high-level consideration, and Yahya has
sacked "'est Pakistan Governor Air Marshal Nur Khan (Rawalpindi 927). The
pleasant winter air is frequently rent by the cacophonous histrionics of
politicians feeling their first oats in a decade.
The four excellent enclosures contributed by
Constituent Posts, at Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar, merit the careful
attention of those desiring to comprehend the political dynamics of Pakistan's
current election-cum-constitutional issues. Especially given the regional
motivation of much that is happening in this difficult transition period, each
of the four analyses is essential for an appreciation of the yet uncertain
picture as a whole.
In barest summary, the Constituent Posts report
that:
In
In Karachi and the Sind, there is serious if
not clearly warranted fear that the October elections might be deferred.
Regional/communal differences have assumed great importance, as demonstrated in
the violent
In the
On the Frontier, Wall Khan's Zealous
organizational effort seem not to be much impaired by Qaiyum's strident charges
of Red Shirt conspiracies with
Looking at the confused political scene from
Another countrywide phenomenon is the
intensification of "Islam vs Socialism" sloganeering, which was
treated in Rawalpindi A-670 of December 30. While all parties and particularly
Bhutto's PPP now must constantly stress their faith in the Koran and Sunnah,
this does not mean that they are shifting to the right in their stated economic
objectives. To the contrary, the public's demand for a more equitable
distribution of' incomee is so obviously strong that even
"conservative" leaders (e.g., Qaiyum Khan and the CML's Shaukat
Hayat) speak out, with varying degrees of specificity, for nationalization.
Banks and insurance companies are the leading targets, with heavy industry a
close third.
Our third, and most important, general observation
is that a number of interrelated deadlocks continue to obtain with regard to
the crucial question of provincial autonomy. Mutual antipathy between Punjabis
and Bengalis, and between Punjabis and the
control over the center, and far-reaching provincial
autonomy. (It occurs to us that less powerful pro-autonomy advocates such as
Wali Khan might have mixed feelings on the strong vs. weak center question. If
the center's ability to marshal and dispense funds is seriously impaired, who
will finance the development of the Frontier?)
Now some politicians are urging Yahya to settle the
autonomy issue before the elections. For Bhashani and other
***
Foreign affairs still play no major role in the
campaign. No one advocates any significant shift in
Predictably, anti-Indian tirades are indulged in by
many
***
Having recorded some of the factors we know or
surmise, we must stress that we do not know much about certain possibly very
important factors. Chief among these is the attitude, or attitudes of the
military.
It is a safe assumption that some in the
Punjabi-dominated army hierarchy would
be willing to move extra-legally against the
implementation of Mujib's Six Points. We have heard reports of Army
dissatisfaction over Yahya's "coddoling", until recently, of
violators of Martial Law regulations. Assuming that the armed forces takeover
last March was motivated primarily by a determination to prevent the transfer
of power from the ruling oligarchy to a reformist, provincial
autonomy-oriented, civilian-dominated successor government (
As noted above, we lack also a sure feel for the
mood of the Bengali peasantry. With regard to West Pakistani rural sentiment,
our present estimate is that the traditional (conservative) voting patterns
will generally hold, but here too we cannot be certain.
***
Thus, a feeling of unease is about, as
Moreover, if foreign observers are aware of the
problems outlined in this paper, it would be presumptuous to assume that the
leading Pakistani politicians, none of whom are unambitious, are unaware of the
pitfalls they must avoid in order to achieve participation in a representative
government. They want to be elected to the Constituent Assembly. If the
Assembly succeeds in devising a constitution acceptable to Yahya, it will
furnish the prime and other ministers of the next government.
More than a year ago there began to take shape the
kind of a political coalition that might provide post-Martial Law
Farland
SUMMARY
In interval since our last assessment of current
scene in
suspicion of MLA intentions re
END SUMMARY
POLITICAL ASSESSMENT
A. Chronology: November 3 to January I. Period under review
commenced with bitter linguistic riots (summarized in Dacca 3104) and was
marked among other things by admirable statesmanship displayed by Governor
Ahsan as a conciliator between civilians and MLA, dramatic return of AL's Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman from London sojourn November 8, and general political malaise
vividly exemplified by Mujib's despair (Dacca 3215). Yahya's November 28 speech
attenuated political forebodings and met reactions of "subdued
satisfaction" (
B. Post-January 1: Political New year in East Pakistan got
under way in predictable manner as various parties began electioneering in
earnest and their affiliated student, labor, and (in case of NAP (L)) peasant
organizations entered frantic political arena
(
industrial sites (
C. PARTIES
1. Awami League: Non-resolution of provincial autonomy
question by Yahya left
2. National Awami Party (NAP-P): By contrast with Mujib's
Awami League Juggernaut, EPNAP (L) as "umbrella party" for extreme
leftists threatens to split as under due to intensifying factional
controversies over question of electoral and other doctrinal and leadership
questions, despite Maulana Bhashani's valiant efforts maintain facade of unity
within party (see Dacca 3260, 3349, 080, and 195). Although preoccupation with
internal problems undoubtedly diminished party's overall political
effectiveness, NAP (L) - sponsored labor, peasant and student rallies were
impressive (
3. Jamaat-i-Islami: Jamaat as vociferous and
fanatic party presents major enigma in attempt analyze
present, however, Jamaat and student affiliate
Islami Chhatra Sangha (ICS) remain significant mainly in context Socialism
versus Islam controversy, in which Jamaat activities have more than once
incited bloodshed.
4. Other parties: NAP (R) remains prominent on local political
scene, but like other parties its prospects largely tied to possible election
alliances. NAP (R)'s overstures to Awami League were brusquely rebuffed by
Mujib (
been quite active, with leaders barnstorming
province and receiving considerable press coverage, its image has suffered due
bailout of former Air Marshall Asghar Khan who quite popular in East Wing. Its
underlying base of support also remains suspect, but like Jamaat it might
benefit from votes of a "silent majority," if such exists. CML and
two factions of former PML at present do not appear have much East Wing
following although last two have devoted more effort to internal organizational
matters than to active politicking. Some form of alliance or electoral
coalitions between two or more centrist or right wing parties quite possible as
electioneering pace increases, and may thereby enhance popular following. Appeal
of Bhutto's PPP in
D. PREVAILING MOODS
1. Politicians: Moods of politicians difficult assess due
ideological diversity and fundamental differences in outlook. Removal by MLA of
restrictions on public meetings, etc., well received, and guidelines remaining
apparently considered tolerable in practice. Non-Awami League politicos appear
unanimous in voicing concern over failure Yahya settle all-popular autonomy
question, which Mujib has pre-empted. Due vested interest in elections, most
politicos have been outspoken in warning "anti-election forces" not
to impede elections and in urging maintenance peace during election campaign.
2. Students: Turmoil many expected to occur when students
returned to school following Ramzan recesses failed materialize, largely due
Yahya November 28 announcements. Students however remain highly politicized as
is traditional in
3. Peasants: Mood of peasantry, which in long run may be key to
election outcome in
whether both mutually exclusive, Another unknown
factor is whether Mujib's charisma and support of provincial autonomy will
capture minds of peasantry.
4. Labor: Labor's mood also difficult to grasp, although like
students, workers being exploited by parties for political ends, and hence
highly politicized. Labormanagement problems have been overshadowed to some
extent by clashes between labor-arms of various political parties (
5. Businessmen: On whole, business appears apprehensive
toward prospect of elections, seeing in such potential instability as well as
spectre of nationalization. On
other hand, Congen continues receive reports various
industrialists attempting "cover bets" through contributions to one
or several parties.
6. Intellectuals: Intellectuals also appear obsessed with
prospect of elections. Although attitudes of intellectuals toward MLA considerably
better than prior to Yahya's speech, sensitivities remain as typified by recent
protest against book bannings and demand for repeal of government press and
publications ordinance (
7. Military: Mood of Pakistan Army cannot be easily ascertained
from
Going back to last August when Islami students
association (Islami Chhatra Sangha) President Abdul Malek was killed in clash
with more clerically-minded students, Army was reliably reported as anxious to
use force on defiant Dacca University students. Governor Ahsan's statesmanship
prevented violent clash at that time but MLA's General Yakub Khan reportedly
cursed Ahsan for "a fool" for "coddling" Bengalis. During
language riots of last November, Army clearly showed its bias for immigrant
Muslims as against Bengalis. A further indicator of the Army's unease may be
the intermittent rumors heard in
Tempering those Army activists who would be tempted
to intervene and prevent elections is question of whether Army could continue
to maintain its control of
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
Little change in economic situation East Wing since
previous assessment. New import policy viewed essentially same as previous and
Bengali adverse reaction continuation bonus voucher system overshadows positive
reaction certain portions policy.
A. Foodgrains: With arrival imported foodgrains alleviate
East Wing shortfall and appearance aman crop in markets, price declined
seasonally. Aman crop was originally estimated by GOEP Agriculture Department
at seven million tons, which 100 thousand tons above last year's officially
announced production and 100 thousand below target. However, GOP estimate crop
may be one million tons lower. An encouraging measure taken by GOP/GOEP toward
long-term solution of foodgrain deficit is approval import 800 tons irri-20.
According to current GOEP plans, new seed will be multiplied on special farms
this year and available aman crop next year. GOEP also pushing pump
distribution program for upcoming boro crop but has not improved rural credit
situation.
B. Jute: Jute board price support actions increased December
price levels from low September-November levels; however, December average for
loose Jute approximately Rs. 8 per mound lower than previous year (probably
because approximately 1.2 million sales greater production this year). Jute
trade received boost from recent State Bank move make over Rs. I billion
available for financing which help offset price depressing effects of continued
foreign hand-to-mouth buying by providing inventory support. In absence of new
GOP politics or new programs sponsored by Jute trade groups long term prospects
remain dismal. Raw Jute production likely to decline as growers switch to rice
in face of continued low Jute prices and Jute manufacturing continue to lose
ground to synthetics. Some older, respected firms considering disengagement
(Ralli already has).
C. Industrial Activity: Private sector has
evidenced little or no increased investment or expansion activities and
generally still adhering to "wait and see" attitude. Little evidence
"massive" capital transfer from East to West Wing, but apprehensive
attitude private sector (particularly non-Bengali group) not encouraging.
Public sector, especially EPIDC, has been more active over this period, in
spite of top level shakeup (Chairman, one director on 303 list). Several EPIDC
projects (Squib Pharmaceutical Plant among them) moving ahead and EPFIDC has
recently signed agreement with German-Austrian group for pulp and paper mill.
D. Economic Outlook: As stated in previous
assessment, long term outlook depends on decisions made
sector. They continue cite collapse 4th Plan
discussions over
expressions of good intentions.
SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION
Since our last general assessment (Karachi 2745),
Karachi Consular District has passed through three distinct phases: (a)
relatively substantial uncertainty preceding President Yahya's November 28
address, much of which described in last assessment; (b) quiet but not
uncritical satisfaction resulting from address; and (c) substantial turmoil
and, more recently, considerable apprehension following resumption of political
activity January 1. Phase a marked by growing demand for resolution of such
issues as One Unit, scheduling of elections and indications of manner in which
constitution-framing would be undertaken. Phase b characterized by speculations
centered on consequences of President's address and by increased activity on
part of parties and individual politicos seeking to forge alliances and
alignments. Phase c has so far been marked by growing fears that incidents such
as that at
END OF SUMMARY/ INTRODUCTION
With commentators and politicians more or less
agreed regarding constitutional issues (they must necessarily differ regarding
programs), there are two main issues presently at play in the Karachi Consular
District. First are regional-cum-communal differences which have assumed
substantial, possibly commanding importance. Second, and of almost equal
prominence, is "Islam versus Socialism" controversy. Both have
emerged as far more important at this point in time than other, seemingly equally
important questions, largely because of their great emotive content.
Regional/ Communal issue most clearly demonstrated
in recent
includes retention substantial powers by central
government protecting position of minorities.
Similar tensions are merging in
"Islam versus Socialism" remains central
factor but its prevalence, significance and character sufficiently well-known
to require no special comment here. Rather it will be touched upon in the
following discussion of various groups at work.
President's address and revival of political
activity have brought politicians and their parties more fully into limelight.
All are extremely active. First, they are busy trying demonstrate their special
character and suitability for power. Prior to January I they were engaged in
preparing for political activity and, since that time, they have been preaching
their particular gospel. Second, and much more importantly, they have been
organizing for campaign. Much of this activity has centered around establishing
offices and recruiting workers. For some, however, much effort has gone into
developing alliances and arrangement which will either bring into fold
important local figures who, in "rotten borough" context, can deliver
votes. Where this not possible, electoral (i.e., "no-contest")
arrangements are being sought.
Most successful in recruiting allies has been CML in
Absorption of much of SUF into CML has simplified
Sindh politics, albeit possibly only for moment. NAP (R), which had hopes of
extending itself into rural areas through SUF has been forced to leave front
following inclusion many landlords in SUF and their key role in bringing SUF
and CML together. NAP (R) now looks to ;oĞ n and cities, and is placing special
emphasis on laborers in
With Awami League existing in name only (and its
arrangement with unpredictable and not overbright Pir Pagaro a seeming dead
letter) and with PML (Whether regular or rump) still moribund, only two other
parties serve comment. They are Z.A. Bhutto's PPP and the Jamaat-i-Islami. Both
are important in their own right but gain added prominence from fact that in
our District they are prime antagonists in "Islam versus Socialism"
controversy. PPP continues to display great, if ill-organized vigor. Observers
of
Jamaat's position is great imponderable. Its
organizational strength and discipline and its ability to finance increasing
activities are said to be growing. In cities, it seems to have gained
significant support but there little indication it can translate this into
backing in rural area where peasantry remains under sway of landlords whose
affinities are with those parties who operate on basis of compromise. There
continuing reports that it has grown in size but these difficult to confirm.
One thing is clear, however: in
Turning to some interest groups: religious leaders
are very much in forefront of "Islam versus Socialism" controversy.
Degree to which they may be assisting Jamaat more than unintentionally is
unknown but it difficult to avoid conclusion that chief beneficiary of their
"anti-Socialism" polemics will be rightist parties.
Students, while non-voters, continue to be force
which must be considered. Their ability to direct event is minimal, although
not to be ignored, and their primary importance may lie in their value as a
weathervane. Drawn in very large part from middle class, students may provide
earliest indication of urban, middle-class attitudes. As last year's events
revealed, students demonstrated most graphically concerns of middle-class. At
that time, its attitude regarding alternatives went little further than
inchoate opposition to Ayub regime which, in its "decade of development,"
did little to benefit middle-class. At that time it was students of radical
bent, moved by ideology, who led. Since then, middle-class has gained greater
awareness of political life and there is reason to conclude-if we accept
attitudes of their children, students, as being indicative - that this has led
them rightward. In recent student union elections Jiziat-ie-Tulba, student
front of Jamaat, scored heavily, besting students of radical left.
Labor too, has revealed a significant shift, and
what it means for labor peace is seriously disturbing. In last several months,
there has been a growing polarization within labor movement, with increasing
numbers of unions being drawn away from center to left or, more particularly,
right. Increasingly lost in an apolitical middle are many of more responsible
economic trade unionists whose desire to keep labor from political involvement
is growing, at least as of moment, more difficult. Even in absence of political
involvement labor scene would inevitably display considerable instability as
unions take advantage of recently-granted "right to strike," as
competing unions seek success in elections to make them sole bargaining agents
and as some unions and/or federations endeavor to move changes in industrial relations
ordinance by agitational means. Add politics, and instability is simply
increased. Thus while degree of instability cannot be laid wholly at feet of
political forces, we must note fact that parties are attempting to establish
labor base, that they are adding significantly to labor unrest by combining
economic with political issues and, in process, Jamaat is displaying an
unexpected success in influencing political attitudes of workers.
Karachi District businessmen continue to express
"wait and see" attitudes toward MLA. Despite Yahya's announced moves
towards election and break-up of One Unit, there is little expression of
reassurance by businessmen that their interests will be safeguarded. Political
calls for "nationalization," the GOP's moving forward with anti-cartel
and fair trade regulatory action all make business community uneasyness perhaps
most unsettling factor has been continued upsurge labor activities including
escalating demands by unions on management. Impact these demands in not repeat
not diminished by managements recognition that these in part result of
intra-union competition.
Despite foregoing views, business activity continues
to be expansionist when clear-cut opportunities available. There is
considerable interest in PICK Mutual Fund and Equity Participation Fund. IDBP's
and PICIC's exim resources, despite mutterious of unattractiveness, are much in
demand and could be utilized many times over. PICK claims that its announcement
willingness accept investment sanction applications for textile mills
oversubscribed many times. Availability of liquid resources continued be
demonstrated by stock market activity which at moment bullish, by 37 times
oversubscription in December Pakistan Burmah Shell public offering and 93 times
public oversubscription in February of Shams Textile Mills.
Despite preoccupation on part potential private
CONCLUSION
Concatenation of several, highly emotive issues and
roles being played by politicians, labor and students have led to substantial
concern over ability of
It our view, at least until this weekend, that
reconciliation of freedom and necessity will simply grow more difficult.
"Formal" political activity, predicated so heavily on appeals to
essentially actavistic impulses can only contribute to unrest, and its only
cure is display of responsibility by political leaders. Regional-loaded with
stuff of divisiveness and unrest. Added to this, increasingly successful
efforts to politicize labor just at moment which it is testing extent of its
new freedom contain seeds of greater restiveness that might otherwise be the
case and could precipitate much more intense class cleavages. Adding to gloom
are rising prices which could precipitate increased urban middle-class and
labor disenchantment and should there be a shortfall in this coming crop, the
price situation will simply worsen.
Most of these factors will have their primary impact
in urban areas, already scene of restiveness. Insofar as can be determined,
peasantry in
Contributor: DCohn
SUMMARY. Since preparation of last assessment, development
have had both bright and dark side. President Yahya's Nov. 28 speech at least
momentarily cleared air and considerably lowered political temperature. One
important and immediate effect was to remove MLA as target of political heat
that was building up in weeks prior to speech. With calm resumption of
political activity on January 1, outlook for democratic solution looked
brighter than at any time since pre-MLA days. Developments since then, however,
have cast growing shadows of doubt on viability of Yahya's formula for return
to constitutional government and on capacity of politicians to assume
leadership mantle in constructive spirit that will resolve fundamental
political dilemmas and pave way for rational considecation economic and social
problems. Unless something unforeseen happens to cause politicians to
reconsider their present course, possibility growing that (1) elections will
not be held or (2) that if Constituent Assembly should meet, it will not be
able complete constitution that Yahya could accept. In our view, outcome of
failure to hold elections or complete constitution would be military coup
against Yahya, Bengali effort at separation and end for foreseeable future of
movement toward democratic rule. Basic to this view is our assessment that
Bengali and Punjabi interests may prove
irreconcilable. While some political leaders are
themselves prepared for necessary compromises, none appears strong or confident
enough to afford luxury of playing statesmen while demagogues take away their
support. Continuing labor and student
troubles, while not severe enough to threaten
regime, create psychological atmosphere of instability that may sap will of
pubic political leaders and MLA to continue search for political solutions.
POLITICAL SCENE.
Principal characteristics of political scene in
Punjab are: (A) apparent emergence of Daultana and CML in commanding position,
(B) virtual collapse of Pakistan Democratic Party as effective political party
in West Wing following tergiversations of Asghar Khan; (C) emergence of
fledgling group under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (All Pak Muslim League) which may
grow into second power in Punjab after CML; (D) continued dominance of
Socialism vs Islam issue in political debate and (E) hardening of Punjabi
opposition to Bengali demands (see
below). With flurry of political activity following
January 1 resumption, we have yet to note emergence of political leader one
could conceivably describe as inspiring "popular" enthusiasm or
confidence. The Punjabi front-runner, Daultana, is less a party leader than
presiding officer of loose confederation of tribal chieftains and landlord, few
of whom are personally or ideologically committed to Daultana. In circumstances
it is difficult foresee how leadership will adopt and sell to population,
political and economic sacrifices necessary to preserve integrity of
PUBLIC MOOD. Punjabis have been described to us by one political
leader as pragmatic, realistic people, but given to despondency when faced with
difficult political problems. It is despondency, more than anything else that
characterizes present public mood. If people were mildly optimistic at
beginning of year, successive disruptions in
PUNJABIS VERSUS BENGALIS. Politically sophisticated
Punjabis have for at least the past year recognized the need to accommodate
some Bengali demands. However, even among these sophisticates there is general
lack of awareness how much this accommodation ma,. cost them. or if awareness
exists, there is tremendous resistance price to be paid. There is only tiny,
group of political leaders who both recognize cost and express willingness to
pa,. Included among these are Daultana and Shaukat Hayat of CML. but we would
question whether in crunch they could bring their following along. They are of
course banking on Mujib retreating from brink of his Six Points, but we suspect
they have not carefully analyzed viable alternatives to Six Points (which would
almost certainly include substantial transfer of resources from