Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume
E-7, South Asia, 1969-1972
Released by the Office of the Historian
Central Intelligence Agency
12 April 1971
Subject: SNIE 32-17:
Prospects for Pakistan
NOTE
This estimate assesses the
present and prospective state of the Pakistani civil war, the role of India and
other powers, and the outlook for Pakistan's two components -- if the Bengali
uprising should be put down, and if it should succeed.
THE ESTIMATE
I. THE CONFLICT IN BENGAL
1. When they launched their
campaign on 25 March, the West Pakistani military leaders probably expected --
or at least hoped -- to destroy the Awami League (AL) and regain effective
control of East Bengal in
a matter of days, if not hours. They clearly miscalculated; most of the top
AL
leaders have been arrested, but lower level party leaders continue to be active
throughout much of the countryside. While no precise figures are available,
substantial elements of the 13,000-man East Pakistani Rifles (the provincial
paramilitary force) remain in being, as do a few of the Bengali units of the
Pakistani Army. Although beset by serious logistic and leadership problems,
these armed cadres continue to resist the West Pakistani units in East Bengal;
they are able to move fairly easily through most of the countryside.
2. Islamabad's
forces are in command of the two principal cities, Dacca
and Chittagong,
and a few of the lesser ones. Even there, the Army's hold is maintained by
severely repressive measures and rigid curfews. Most economic activity
has halted; the ports are virtually closed and most transport is disrupted. A
number of bridges have been destroyed, ferry boats sunk, and rail lines
(including that between Dacca
and Chittagong)
cut. Nonetheless, regular army forces can move through the region at will,
except where inhibited by transport difficulties.
3. The prospects are poor
that the 30,000-odd West Pakistani troops can substantially improve their
position, much less reassert control over 75 million rebellious Bengalis. This
is likely to be the case even if the expeditionary forces is
augmented. For most of East Pakistan's
residents, the time has come for a separate Bengali nation. Many years of
economic discrimination and political repression by the west wing had made an
autonomous Bangla Desh the choice of over 75 percent of Bengali voters in the
December 1970 elections. The refusal of Pakistan's
military leaders to honor that choice and their attempt to terrorize the
Bengalis into submission have alomst certianly ended any general desire in East
Bengal to see the Pakistani union continue.
4. Whether the army is to
face widespread non-cooperation or continued active resistance will depend in
part on how much help India
gives the Bengalis. All but a few miles of East
Bengal's land frontiers are with India,
and the movement of arms and guerrillas across these very extensive borders
cannot be prevented. There is considerable evidence that some arms
shipments have already taken place.* The Indian Government's support for
the Bengali's will be determined by a mix of response to domestic popular
pressures -- which are quite strong -- and of an assessment of India's own
national interests. Statements of support in parliament and the press
have been very strong. West Pakistan,
with its military forcess, has long been a principal
enemy of India. A
successful Bengali insurgency would serve to weaken and discredit West
Pakistan. The East Wing, basically uninterested in
the Kashmir
dispute and never the scene of major Indo-Pakistani fighting, poses no military
threat to New Delhi.
To the contrary, its leaders -- particularly Mujibur Rahman of the
AL --
have advocated cordial relations with India.
Hence, we estimate that India will continue and increase its arms aid to
the Bengalis and this will enable them to develope at
a minimum the kind of insurgency capability which the army cannot
entirely supress. In so doing, India is
accepting the risk that some of its arms may fall into extremist hands. In the
time the Bengalis may prove more than a match for the army except where the
latter is consentrated in a few strong points.
_________________________
* The evidence for this includes observation of
weapons being trucked into East Bengal
from the Indian border [text not declassified]
5. New
Delhi has an additional incentive to aid the
Bengalis -- and sooner rather then later. It is probably concerned that a
rebellion lasting for a considerable period could throuw
up a new, extremist leadership (as opposed to the relatively moderate
AL
one) which would eventually take over the new country. The advent of a radical
regime in East Bengal
would create very severe problems for India,
especially in the neighboring Indian state of West
Begal. The latter, a very
important industrial center, is badly troubled in its own right. Several
extremist Communist groups are major political parties there. Social and
economic conditions in its capital of Calcutta
are exceptionally grim, and its residents would be quite susceptible to
disruptive or even secessionist appeals from a radical East
Begal regime. Accordingly, the
Indians are likely nor a merely to work for the liberation of Bengla Desh from West Pakistan,
but also to seek to assure the advent there of a new government satisfactory to
them.
6. India
would prefer to aid the Bengalis bt
more or less clandestine means --e.g. non-official "advisors", covert
arms support, and sanctuaries. It could also indertake
various forms of pressure, including troop movements towards
either of its frontiers with Pakistan.
If a rebellion dragged on or if India
saw significant chance of a radical leadership emerging, it would probably give
more direct support. These actions could lead to deeper and deeper Indian
involvement and to armed clashes with Pakistani forces; even open military
intervention by India
could not be ruled out. India
has sufficient forces to defeat Pakistani forces in East
Bengal without drawing down heavily on its troops
on its other frontiers.
7. India of
course runs the risk in supporting or intervening in a Bengali rebellion. To do
so could provoke Islamabad
into launching an attack on Western India.
However, in the 1965 war the Indian military showed itself more then a match
for the Pakistanis. The Indians are now much better equipped than in 1965, and
face forces weakened by transfer of Pakistani units to East
Bengal.
8. In addition to
clandestine support, India
has been applying diplomatic pressure in aid of Bengla
Desh. It has urged the UN and major powers to express humanitarian concern and
had pressured Ceylon --
with only limited resources -- to withdraw landing rights of Pakistani military
flights to East Pakistan.
In addition, India
would probably extend diplomatic recognition to a government of Bengla Desh if and when one satisfactory to India
could demonstrate effective control of even a moderate portion of East
Bengal.
9. Whatever the extent of
Indian support to the Bengalis, the West Pakistanis will face increasingly
serious difficulties in East Bengal.
The area is principally riverine.
With the advent of the monsoon in late May or early June, there will be
extensive flooding which will further isolate the Pakistani Army in a few urban
strong-points. Given the army's lack of complete control of water transport, it
will probably be forced to abandon a number of bases in the region, and limit
its presence to those half dozen or so places which can be reached by air
(helicopters are scarce) and those which can be reached by sea – principally
Chittagong. Even supplying these will not be easy. Transport of
troops and supplies would be made more difficult if Ceylon
terminated the landing rights it is now extending to Pakistani aircraft.
The bulk of the arms and ammunition must be transported by sea from the west
wing at a pace likely to strain Pakistani shipping capacities, and may result
in the shortage of such items in the expeditionary force. Nonetheless,
West Pakistani forces could probably, if they so chose, hang on to these
selected bases for some time and conduct occasional forays into nearby areas.
But if the Bengalis acquire greater military capabilities and develop something
approaching a new national political leadership, the West Pakistanis’ days in Bengal
would be numbered, though the date and manner of their departure cannot now be
forecast.
10. A good deal would
probably depend on outside pressures, particularly by the great powers, and on
developments in the west wing itself. In West
Pakistan, the army’s move against the Bengalis
appears to have been generally popular at first. Support is likely to dwindle,
however, if the cause appears to be a losing one and as adverse economic
consequences become apparent. Further, however much they wish to keep the
east wing, the westerners know they would pay a very high price if they
alienated the US,
the USSR, and
the West European countries. All these powers figure importantly, one way
or another, in assuring a continued flow of trade and foreign aid necessary to
the west wing’s economy, in getting acceptance in the international community,
and – ultimately – in helping provide protection against the threat believed to
be posed by its large and hostile Indian neighbor.
11. So far, with the
qualified exception of China,
none of the major powers have shown any support for the central government’s
efforts in Bengal.
Moscow
ahs put itself firmly on the record in opposition to the West Pakistani
military suppression of East Pakistani; its choice was no doubt heavily
influenced by the Indian attitude. It has called for a political
settlement, and probably does not believe Soviet interests would be served by
prolongation of the conflict. The Soviets have probably concluded that
the odds favor a separatist solution or at least that Islamabad
has little chance of imposing its will on East
Bengal in any lasting and effective way.
12. Communist China,
circumspect at first in its reactions to Pakistani developments, has recently
sent a note to the Indian Government accusing it of interfering in Pakistani
affairs. Peking,
particularly if strongly urged to do so by the Islamabad
government, will probably undertake other measures to assist. These may
include an increase in deliveries of military equipment to West Pakistani,
sharper threatening words to the Indians, and even a maneuvering of Chinese
troops near the Indian border. Chinese military intervention in support
of the West Pakistanis does not now seem likely. Further, the Indians,
pleased with Soviet condemnations of Islamabad’s
repression of the Bengalis, probably see Moscow
serving as a strong inhibition on Chinese moves in the subcontinent. Such
an assessment is probably correct; the Chinese leadership is not likely to risk
a major conflagration in an effort to bail out beleaguered West Pakistanis
trying to repress a popular uprising. The Chinese may in time face a
dilemma should an extremist group come to the fore in East
Bengal and seek Peking’s
support.
13. Stories of atrocities
in Dacca
and elsewhere have been widely circulated in the Western world, and West
Pakistani actions have been condemned by a number of private citizens and
groups. No single Western country has much influence on the situation, but
general Western disapproval may make the government in Islamabad
less certain of the wisdom of present policies and more amenable to pressures
for change.
II. PROSPECTS FOR EAST
BENGAL
A. As a Part of a United Pakistan
14. In the unlikely event
that the West Pakistanis did succeed in reasserting military control over the
Bengalis, they would almost certainly find it impossible to develop a new
political system based on anything approaching a consensus of opinion in the
two wings. In the December 1970 elections, the Bengalis gave an overwhelming
mandate for political and economic autonomy: opinions have since hardened. The
best the West Pakistanis could hope to achieve would be something like a
restoration of conditions which existed under Ayub
(and which were ended by mass public uprisings in 1968-1969). Routine and
low-level administrative duties would be in the hands of Bengalis loyal to
Islamabad
(and such individuals do remain, though they are in a minority); ultimate
authority would continue to be in the hands of West Pakistani authorities, and
the army would remain the final arbiter of power. The two areas would remain
one economic unit, and the central government would make some effort to cope
with the formidable economic problems of East
Bengal. But a substantial majority of the
population would continue to be strongly disaffected, probably tot he point of launching sporadic uprisings. The Pakistani
Government's talk about enlisting loyalist Bengalis in any significant numbers
is wishful thinking.
B. As an Independent Nation
15. The political
complexion and outlook of an independent Bangla Desh are extremely difficult to
forecast. If it came into being rather soon, and if Mujib and the principal
AL
leaders were still alive and permitted to return, they would quickly take over.
Mujib's political and economic philosophies are
essentially moderate ones; he wishes to develop good relations with India
and adopt a generally balanced and neutralist international posture. In
domestic affairs he advocates a mild type of socialism, emphasizing an
improvement in the living standards of the Bengali people and a concerted
attack on the many economic problems of the area. On the other hand, the longer
the fighting goes on, the more the prospects for a takeover by an extremist and
radical leadership could be enhanced. We know almost nothing about such
radicals; in recent years the politics of East Bengali protest have focused
almost exclusively on the issue of autonomy. Nonetheless, given the large
number of Bengali extremists in India
and the ease of interchange of ideas and people between the two regions,
radical movements could develop extremely rapidly.
16. Whatever its
government, and independent Bangla Desh would, in the short term, have some
things going for it. Relatively speaking for an underdeveloped country, its
balance of payments problems would not be bad, thanks to its large current
exports of jute. It would almost certainly repudiate the large debts to West
Pakistan and the outside world incurred in its name.
Able to trade freely with India,
as it has not been in the past, it could buy many goods more cheaply.
17. But Bangla Desh would
face serious problems both in the short and long term. The floods and cyclone
of 1970 raised import requirements to about 3 million tons of food grains for
the period until June 1971. Some, though almost certainly not all, of this has
already been met by shipments of PL 480 and West Pakistani food grains. But
Bengali ports have been closed since 25 March, and ships carrying food have
been diverted. The internal transportation network has been disrupted. We have
no information about food conditions throughout East
Bengal now, but severe food shortages are almost
certain and famines in certain areas not out of the question. Beyond this, the
basic economic problems in that region are as severe as those faced by any
country in the world, and they appear unlikely to improve much in the next
several years.
18. Indeed the
formidable and probably insoluble nature of these problems will make East
Bengal – be it East
Pakistan or Bangla Desh – an object of concern to its
people, its neighbors, and the world in general for the foreseeable future.
With 70 to 80 million people packed into an area the size of Florida, unable to
grow enough food to feed itself, almost devoid of natural resources, facing a
decline in the sale of jute (its principle export), periodically subjected to
floods and cyclones, East Bengal will be plagued by economic privation and
political crisis. Were the moderate Mujib to come to power, it is
questionable whether he could do much to improve the lot of his people.
If he did not, the euphoria of independence would likely disappear within a
comparatively short period of time, and there would be an increased interest in
and susceptibility to the radical and extremist ideas and groups which now
exist in West Bengal.
Its government, lacking well-organized security services, might have
difficulties coping with such challenges.
19. This would of
course make Bangla Desh a continuing object of concern to the Indian
Government. East Bengal –
weak but potentially dangerous – is likely to be under constant Indian
scrutiny. It will probably, in the name of national security, be an
object of manipulation and even of open interference on New
Delhi’s part. Indeed, an independent Bangla
Desh is likely to remain very much in the Indian orbit so long as that country
has a government strong and decisive enough to seek to exercise its influence.*
III.
PROSPECTS FOR A SEPARATE WEST PAKISTAN
20. The successful
secession of the east wing would produce a severe psychological shock in West
Pakistan. Indeed, President Yahya may well
either resign or be ousted before the issue is decided in the east.
Separation would also bring on painful economic difficulties, e.g., lower
foreign exchange earnings, the loss of a protected market for its industry,
higher per capita expenses for its armed forces, among others. The region
might experience so severe a crisis that West
Pakistan could itself split into as many as four
separate nations, though this contingency now appears unlikely. Its
relatively large and indigenous army, embittered by the loss of the east wing,
could probably stifle any secessionist or insurgent efforts in the west.
Unlike East Bengal, West
Pakistan’s longer term economic prospects are fairly
promising, though it remains a poor country. It is a net food exporter,
has a modest but growing industrial base, and experiences no severe population
pressures on the land
_________________________
* The Indians have the capability both in terms of contiguity of territory and
numbers of troops to maintain control of both East and West Bengal, however
difficult or unpleasant the task would be.
21. The army is likely to remain a principal political factor in West
Pakistan, though it might eventually turn over formal
political power to some civilian groups whose views are compatible with those
of the military establishment. Whoever takes charge is likely to suffer
from the diminished prestige and stature that comes with being the spokesman of
55 million people as opposed to 130 million. But over time this is likely
to appear less serious. The loss of East
Pakistan, which would probably have become an
increasing economic and political burden, could prove to be a blessing in the
long run.
22. The West
Pakistani military machine’s capabilities would remain – the army would see to
that. West Pakistan would be likely to pursue the same foreign policies
it now does: maintaining an antagonistic posture towards India; seeking
close ties with China, particularly in the field of military supply; and at the
same time trying to achieve the best possible relations with the US, West
Europe, Japan, and the USSR with the object of aiding its economic development
programs and enhancing its international stature.