Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

SECRET 933

 

 

STATE 062078

52

ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-O1 /O11 R

66608

DRAFTED BY: 10: SNHNSON

APPROVED BY: S/S-0: MR. HOLLY

NEA/MR. BOYATT

016935

R 131758Z APR 71

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 062078

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE ON 12 APR FROM NEW DELHI. QUOTE :

NEW DELHI 5311

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT ISLAMABAD AND DACCA AT ITS DISCRETION

SUBJECT: SOUTH ASIAN REALITIES AND UNITED STATES INTERESTS

 

1. It may be helpful for me to outline the essential situation in South Asia, as I see it. Fundamental power relationships are shifting detisively as a result of the abortion of democracy in Pakistan, the eloquent reaffirmation of political maturity in India, and the military repression and national resistance in East Bengal. Some home truths are apparent: Pakistan is probably finished as a unified state; India is clearly the predominant actual and potential power in this area of the world; Bangla Desh with limited potential and massive problems is probably emerging. There is much the United States can do to promote its interests in South Asia and beyond by timely accommodation to these new realities.

 

2. East Pakistan is the forcing factor and the likely prospects, as I see them, are: (a) In East Pakistan: protracted struggle, wasting of resources, left extremist advantage; (b) in West Pakistan: belated acknowledgment of costs and futility of repression, eventual withdrawal, perhaps coupled with coup and under cover of alleged Indian intervention; (c) in INBCSC full moral and covert arms support without direct military intervention, with diplomatic recognition as soon as a provisional Bangla Desh government with territory and some defense capability emerges.

 

3. The longer the hostilities continue, the more United States interests will be adversely affected: (a) by radicalization of Bangla Desh movement; (b) by continuing US vulnerability to criticism for arms supply and economic support to Pakistan; (c) by diversion of Pakistan resources to support and resist repression, and by destruction and dislocation of East Pakistan economic index-structure; (d) by mounting East Pakistan relief requirements and demands for humanitarian response in face of GOP opposition; and (e) by danger of escalation through external intervention or irrational Pakistan reactions against India.

 

4. The above list could be extended but suffices to demonstrate that the US interest lies in an early end of hostilities. If this cannot be achieved by present Pakistan policy of military repression, as I believe it cannot, then the only sound position for the United States to encourage the GOP to change that policy. There are limitations, but as in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, a clear statement of United States disquietude at the effects of GOP policy, of displeasure at the use of American arms and materiel, of concern for the fate of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other Awami League leaders, and of hope for an early political settlement would, if coupled with the termination of American military supply and suspension of economic assistance, have a useful sobering effect. Moreover, such a course of United States action would be consistent with realities of Pakistan's deterioration, India's predominance, and Bangla Desh's emergence.

 

5. Conversely, it is futile and harmful to seek to put India on notice concerning intervention. India has no intention of direct military intervention and every intention of covert arms supply (New Delhi 4861). The GOP can only be irritated but not deterred by a warning from the US on arms supply, because it seeks thereby to contribute to a quick end to the Bangla Desh struggle, to gain leverage with that movement's leaders, to underscore the credibility of Indian support elsewhere, e.g., Bhutan, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon; to facilitate the termination of Indo-Pakistan confrontation in the East, and to contain internal pressures, particularly in West Bengal, for more direct action. In this regard, it is important to recognize that India is not the cause of East Pakistan dissidence, and there is no comparison between Pakistan's oppression and repression of East Bengal and India's opportunistic response to the current Bengal national outburst. The United States need not support covert arms supply but we should recognize that Indian objectives in the present case are largely consistent with our own. Moreover, we should resist the GOP effort to involve US in condemning India.

 

6. I question if it is in US interest to continue to refer in official communications and public statements to events in East Pakistan as an "internal affair". "Internal affair" in this context has become a code phrase in India and Pakistan for acquiescence in the military repression. Also, that phrase overlooks the murky question of legitimacy in a situation where a self-appointed military clique has set out to destroy the duly elected national majority representation. Then, too, it is perhaps relevant that we already are involved in this "internal affair" to the extent of having provided much of the military means to Pakistan. I do not cite these points as arguments but to illustrate that the United States has more to lose than to gain by reiteration of the "internal affairs" formulation.

 

7. I believe for humanitarian and political reasons that it is very much in the United States' interests to continue to express our sympathy for the victims in East Pakistan and to take whatever steps may be possible to demonstrate that sympathy by generous relief assistance. The Department's statement of April 7 and the Secretary's instruction to develop emergency assistance planning were gratifyingly responsive and will, I trust, be further developed to anticipate large-scale reconstruction and development efforts as well, I continue to believe for reasons reported New Delhi 5091 that it is unwise to condition our willingness to assist by such formulations as "if requested by the government of Pakistan".

 

8. I believe it is only prudent to assume that classified correspondence with the GOP will be published if suits either Yahya's or his successor's purposes. Accordingly, I would regret to see the United States on record at this time with language suggesting any acceptance of Yahya's alleged commitment to democratic process or sincerity in negotiations with Mujibur Rehman. For the same reason, we should eschew the "internal affair", "external involvement", and "if requested by the GOP" formulations, be firm and candid about our opposition to the misbegotten policy of military repression in East Pakistan, and in general address ourselves to influencing the GOP to change that policy with an eye on the historical record which surely will not deal kindly with the present Pakistan military regime.

 

9. I assume that the Department is giving close attention to the recognition question which is likely to arise sooner than later if the Pakistan military forces fail in their current effort to crush the Bangla Desh movement before the monsoon sets in next month. I have no recommendations to make at this time. Presumably, the GOI will move first. Thereafter, it will be up to us in the light of the circumstances obtaining at the time to decide if we wish to hold back and permit the USSR to score big again on the subcontinent as it did with the Podgorny letter to Yahya. I would hope at that time that we would weigh against our natural desire not to offend West Pakistan, the opportunity that timely recognition would offer to establish our credentials with Bangla Desh and to strengthen our relations with the major power in South Asia-India.

 

10. In sum, the United States has interests in India, West Pakistan, and "Bangla Desh" which probably cannot be equally well served. Where the necessity for choice arises we should be guided by the new power realities in South Asia which fortunately in the present case largely parallel the moral realities as well.

 

11. This frank expression of my views is intended to be genuinely helpful in the formulation of Washington policies, the soundness and efficacy of which I deem a major importance to the present and future United States standing particularly in this part of the world.

 

GP-3

Keating

UNQUOTE. Irwin