Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

 

SECRET 370

 

 

 

ISLAMA 03337 02 OF 03 131327Z

42

ACTION : SS-45

INFO         : OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 / 046 W

014068

0 131150Z APR 71

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7885

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 3337

EXDIS

 

8. Comment: This approach would be welcome news in East Pakistan and would stand US well with independent Bangla Desh. GOP would, however, read proposed USG action as proof of deep-felt suspicions of anti-Pakistan axis by US/USR/India. Action would reduce to minimum, if not eliminate entirely, our influence with GOP for foreseeable future and would doubtless result in sharp cutback of US presence in Pakistan as well as decreased Pak inclination to go easy on criticism of unpopular US policy positions as on Near East and Vietnam. Further effect would be to push Paks into establishing even closer relationship with China than now.

 

9. While economic impact of loss of aid would be considerable, in time limiting GOP's ability continue military operations in East, we are dubious approach of this nature would have desired short-term political effect. Recent history replete with failures of economic sanctions to achieve political-military objectives and we have no reason to believe we would prove more effective with Paks than with Rhodesians, South Africans, etc. US role in Islamabad would become difficult at best and possibly untenable.

 

10. Such approach would align US with the Indian and Soviet position. While there ample moral grounds to deplore Pak military intervention, neither India nor Soviet Union in fact presumed to be acting mainly or even largely on moral grounds. Their public position of moral concern cloak pragmatic pursuit of what both regard as their national interest. Indians view events in context their continuing dispute with Pakistan. Soviets regard events both in light their special ties with India and their tensions with China.

 

11. Course Three: Maintaining Options In Both East And West. Third alternative is to seek maintain holding operation, continuing those programs with Pakistan which we can justify to ourselves and which will hopefully provide basis for a satisfactory future relationship between US and people of Pakistan-both Bengalis and West Pakistanis. In our public stance, department would take somewhat firmer line than it has so far adopted, although sticking to official "non-interference". US would express concern for human suffering and loss of life in East. Our desire for end to fighting and return of civilian government would be underscored. We would make clear our continuing concern about use of American arms to suppress East Pakistanis. We would reiterate our willingness to provide humanitarian assistance.

 

12. In our private discussions, both in Washington and is Islamabad, we would tell the Paks, without threatening or lecturing, that we do not believe force will provide lasting solution to problem of East Pakistan. We would visualize President Nixon’s response to Yahya's letter as providing first exchange in extended dialogue at a variety of levels by which we would hope to influence Yahya toward modification of policy towards East Pakistan.

 

13. In economic assistance field, we would continue current programs (i.e. PL 480, Technical Assistance, and Selected Project Assistance) but probably with substantil overall reduction in our assistance activities and levels as required by difficulties we now face in implementing normal development program. In addition to PK 480 assistance, we would maintain activities we can now justify on developmental criteria and ones which would not be seen as directly supporting Pak military action against Bengalis. In dealing with Paks on aid matters, we would explain our inability proceed as previously planned not in terms of any US distaste for Pak actions in East, but rather in terms of present inability to carry on many activities, especially those in East Pakistan. We would hold out continuing hope that US will be able to resume full range of program activities (including commodity import program) in near future, i.e., as soon as conditions permit and GOP able prepare revised development plans.

 

14. On question military sales program, we do not wish put end to ongoing sales program under existing arms policy or to suspend on-time exception to 1965 arms embargo. At same time, we favor internal actions on USG part such as "Technical delays" which would have effect of suspending shipments of most sensitive items under program such as ammunition. This approach would provide basis to meet criticism in US without having to find specific grounds to justify ourselves to GOP. On one-time exception, we would propose we enter into bureaucratic waltz without RPT without taking any formal action to suspend exception. In any event, delivery of armored personnel carriers, only item on which agreement so far reached, is not scheduled to begin for another 18 months. Most recent exchange in which GOP again asked for credit on APCs suggest this item now in possible doubt. (Septel follows on APC).

 

15. Comment: Holding operation of type envisaged under third course is doubtless harder alternative to implement and runs risk of off ending both GOP and Bengalis and satisfying neither. Nonetheless, we have concluded that under present difficult circumstances it provides soundest basis on which we can try to build future relationship with people of Pakistan, both East and West. We therefore urge its adoption.

 

16. West Pakistanis will be unhappy with this approach. Their unhappiness may be mitigated by fact we would be continuing at least some economic aid and military sales programs and would not engage in public moralizing of sort likely to enrage GOP. We recognize that GOP may choose to slam.