Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

 

SECRET 358

 

 

ISLAMA 03337 01 OF 03 131308 Z

42

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

013892

O 1316502 APR 71

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7884

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 3337

EXDIS

SUBJ : US POSTURE TOWARD PAKISTAN

REF : ISLAMABAD 3228, DACCA 1265

DEPARTMENT REPEAT DACCA AND OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED

 

1. Islamabad Reftel provided analysis of mission's current view of how situation may develop in Pakistan. This message deals with policy implications of West Pak military action and proposes broad outlines of US posture for meeting emergent situation. Separate messages deal with specific action recommendations regarding military sales and economic assistance programs and proposed USG press statement.

 

2. In line with US policy goals for South Asia, as enunciated in President's 1971 foreign policy message, our first aim should be an early end to the violence in East and introduction of a working govt. under civilian leadership. Prolonged fighting in East Pakistan would vastly increase the costs of the struggle both in terms human suffering and economic disruption. Similarly, a lengthly civil war would heighten the chances for internationalization of the conflict. Active involvement of China and the USSR, now publicly aligned on opposing sides, could, in addition to exacerbating crisis, permit further expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence in South Asia. Active Indian involvement could lead to major confrontation with Pakistan, as in 1965, with additional setback to US goals of orderly economic development and subcontinental stability.

 

3. To date the USG has pursued a policy of non-intervention. We have stated that the situation in East Pakistan is an internal Pak affair, but have also expressed our concern over developments. Before March 25, USG doubted that US pressure on Yahya or Mujib (to say nothing of Bhutto) would have been effective in bringing about a political settlement and averting the army's intervention, and Washington decided against making any direct effort to exert influence to that end. We now aware that Soviets did play an active behind-scenes role, with little to show for their effort.

 

4. We continue to believe that correct posture for the US is one of official non­involvement and not taking sides between East and West. We believe that having decided on force, Yahya and generals are not going shift gears merely because of US (or other foreign) reaction or actions. MAL leaders could not admit intervention is mistake, without accepting tremendous loss of prestige for themselves and for army as whole. However, fact and size of our economic assistance and military sales program with Pakistan involve US in country's affairs whether we like it or not. What we do with these programs, as well as what USG says publicly and privately, may affect long-term situation and will certainly affect our continuing relationship with GOP and with an independent East Pakistan as well as with the some 130 million people of Pakistan. We have longer-term objective of providing defensible basis for continued and hopefully satisfactory dealings between United States and people of Pakistan, in both East and West, regardless of outcome of current conflict between Pak military and Bengali nationalists. As reported in Islamabad 3228, it is mission's conclusion that independent East Pakistan in time is likely to emerge. In seeking attain our goal we see three alternative postures US can adopt.

 

5. Course One: Business As Usual Approach. First alternative would be to continue a "business as usual" approach. In public, we could associate ourselves, as we have already done, with humanitarian appeals for relief, such as that made by UN SecGen U Thant. In private, we might point out the advisability of the GOP's accepting offers of humanitarian aid but would not urge specific courses of action on GOP re East Pakistan. We would make no modifications in our ongoing military sales program, which now runs about $20 million annually. We would similarly carry on our economic assistance program, making only such changes as are necessitated by physical impossibility of implementing programs in East. Total level of assistance taking into account implementability in East Pakistan would remain basically unaltered.

 

6. Comment: This posture is clearly that which GOP would like us to adopt. Its adoption would permit US at least hold own and probably register some gains with GOP and West Pakistan. At the same time, position would be extremely unpopular with East Pakistanis and would create serious residual problems for US with an independent East Pakistan. It would be charged that we were, to large extent, financing Pakistan's civil war.

 

7. Course Two: Sanctions Against West Paks. Second alternative would be to follow course along lines as advocated in Dacca's 1265 (which deals with economic assistance question). This would include USG public condemnation of MLA action and imposition of what GOP would regard as punitive USG sanctions. In private, we would tell Yahya bluntly we think his present course is tatamount to national suicide. We would urge him promptly to resume the political dialogue with popularly elected reps, and could urge Mujib's early release. To back up our words, we would suspend all military sales, including implementation of the one-time exception. We would also suspend unobligated ongoing US FY 70 economic commitments, and postpone an discussion of new US aid commitments pending MLA modification of its policy toward East Pakistan. As recommended by Dacca 1265, USG would limit further economic aid strictly to humanitarian assistance, presumably PL 480 foodgrains, that is physically feasible under current conditions.