SECRET
SENIOR REVIEW GROUP
PAKISTAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS** A
REASSESSMENT
April
16, 1971
SECRET
PAKISTAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS** A
REASSESSMENT
BACKGROUND
The developments leading up to and flowing from the military
takeover of East
Pakistan on
the night of March 25-26 may represent a watershed in the history of South Asia and of Pakistani-American relations
as significant as that which resulted from the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The Government of Pakistan's decision to resort
to force to suppress a popularly elected movement has fundamentally altered the
political, economic, and psychological situation there. The following paper
analyzes the situation which now prevails, assesses U.S. and other external interests in South Asia and indicates the major policy
strategies which the United States might pursue in these changed
circumstances.
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION
*
A. Military: After three weeks of military
operations against the Bengali separatists, a civil war continues in East Pakistan. Although the Bengalis are seriously
disadvantaged by a lack of arms, there is little indication that they have
acquiesced in the military takeover despite the bombing of several cities,
raids against selected villages, and arrests of the separatist leadership. The
separatists are, however, largely unorganized, and their only significant
source of arms is India. The Provisional Government announced on April 14 controls no major population centers.
If the GOP continues to reinforce its military units and solves the complicated
problems arising from dangerously extended supply lines which will soon be
aggravated by monsoon conditions, the army will have a capability to hold the
province in subjugation for an extended period. The separatists, however, will
retain a significant sabotage and civil disobedience capability. Only the
Indians have an existing capability in the area to intervene decisively on the
side of the separatists, and they now seem reluctant to take a step which could
lead to a major escalation of the war in South Asia with the attendant danger of direct
Chinese involvement. Without this intervention, a prolonged period of
inconclusive military activity may occur. While the army may be able to
maintain an uneasy control over the major population centers in East Pakistan
for months and conceivably years, political and economic pressures may be such
as to force a change in strategy by the military leadership.
B. Political: From all evidence available to us,
the vast majority of Bengalis now reject the concept of a united Pakistan ruled by West Pakistanis. The
Bengalis made this clear in the overwhelming vote of confidence which they gave
to the Awami League in the December election. This
support was reiterated in massive demonstrations of public loyalty Mujibur Rahman during the period
of his negotiations with President Yahya for an
autonomist or confederal solution
to the constitutional problem. The military's subsequent actions against the Awami League leadership ha; apparently converted what was
once only autonomist sentiment into a widespread demand for independence. Those
killed on the days following March 25 are already viewed as martyrs to that
demand.
Psychologically the concept of a united Pakistan is dead in Bengal. We see no way in which President Yahya can establish a civilian government based on am,
significant degree of popular support. There are, however, signs that some of
the non-Awami League political leaders in East
Pakistan, motivated either by fear o hatred of India, concern for the suffering
of the Bengali people or by persona ambition, will come forward to re-establish
a civilian administration in cooperation with President Yahya.
They may be joined by some Awami Leaguers who are
unwilling to adopt a revolutionary posture. The GOP will probably attempt to
transfer: some power to them to give the military administration a facade of
legitimacy. It ma} even concede most of the Awami
League's six point autonomies program. Eventually} in its search for
legitimacy, the GOP might hold controlled elections or perhaps
, constitutional referendum in East Pakistan under a franchise excluding Hindus
an( dissident groups. The only alternative would seem to be direct negotiations
with the Awami League leadership. Such negotiations
would in present circumstances probably have only one issue to resolve--the
terms of independence, though a solution such a: confederation remains an
outside possibility. For the present, negotiations
seen unlikely and, because of the bitterness and mistrust engendered by the
civil wars could probably only take place if Yahya
himself were to offer to step down.
The Pakistan Government will not only have to maintain itself
in power by force in the East but will have to deal with complicated
constitutional problems in the West. The four regions of West Pakistan have also been seeking enhanced
autonomy Pressures for constitutional change from the constituent units,
notably the Northwest Frontier and the Sind, are likely to increase. These may
place added strains on the political viability of the Yahya
government. While we do not anticipate demands for independence from the units
of West Pakistan, there will be growing demands for z
transfer of power to elected representatives. In the case of the Punjab and Sind, the radical and militantly
anti-Indian People's Party of Z. A. Bhutto would be the immediate beneficiary
of a return to parliamentary government. If these pressures are not met, there
could be violence and disturbances of the severity which brought down the Ayub government in 1969.
In both East and West Pakistan, but particularly in Bengal, a failure to reach a political
accommodation is likely to result in a radicalization of political activity in
which extreme leftist parties and policies gain in influence and violent
methods replace the relatively moderate methods of
the past. In East
Pakistan
this could well be the extreme Maoist/Naxalite form
which has appeared in West Bengal. The development of such a movement with substantial popular
support could lead to a virtually permanent destabilization of East Pakistan and of the adjacent regions of India.
C. Economic: The economic costs of a civil war are
high. Pakistan's limited shipping and commercial air
facilities are already diverted to the supplying of the army. In East Pakistan much of the communications
infrastructure has been destroyed; goods will get to market with difficulty,
and development works will be set back. There will be significant losses of
foreign exchange for the central government because of the disruption of jute
exports. Pakistan's foreign exchange resources were
declining before the crisis. Taking into account the losses in foreign exchange
earnings from the current suspension of East Pakistan's exports and a falling off in
private remittances, these resources could be exhausted within a few months
unless international relief is forthcoming or imports are sharply cut back. The
latter step would contribute to a downward economic spiral, to an industrial
slowdown, and potentially to large-scale unemployment, which in turn could
create serious political pressures, particularly in West Pakistan. Nonetheless, the economy can
probably survive these pressures for longer than the actual foreign exchange
balances would suggest. Almost irrespective of the political outcome Pakistan's overall development effort has been
severely set back in West as well as in East Pakistan. The momentum in both wings can only
be recovered with substantial external resource inputs.
D. Conclusion: The Government of Pakistan will be
faced in the future with numerous problems arising from a continuing insurgency
situation, the political alienation of the mass of the population in East Pakistan, and deteriorating economic
conditions. All of these factors will produce growing pressures on
Islamabad for a political accommodation with
the Bengalis. Nonetheless, even in the absence of an accommodation, the
military can undoubtedly maintain its control over the cities for an extended
period unless India should invade East Pakistan with regular forces. The ferocity
with which it has already fought to preserve a united Pakistan suggests that it will not give in
over the short term barring a coup in Islamabad, greater separatist military
successes or a major economic crisis. None of these are immediately likely, and
we must be prepared to face a situation in which the present stalemate lasts
for many months. In this period, while the political situation is sorting
itself out, our actions or inaction will affect, to a limited degree, the
outcome and the timing of that outcome. If the stalemate continues over a much
longer term, the West Pakistani's will become increasingly dependent on the U.
S. and other Western nations for economic aid and military equipment, and how
we aid our friends in the consortium will have an important impact on the hard
political and economic decisions which the
Government of Pakistan will have to take.
II. EXTERNAL INTERESTS
A. U. S. Interests: The United States has no vital security interest in South Asia as a whole. We do, however, have
important interests involving:
(a) The peace and stability of the region;
(b) The prevention of either the Soviet Union or China from becoming dominant in the region
or in any country of the region;
(c) The prevention of the development of radical or militantly
nationalistic regimes inimical to the United States;
(d) Effective use of economic assistance funds and the
development of economically self-reliant states;
(e) The protection of U. S. citizens and of U. S. commercial and investment interests.
These interests apply for India as well as Pakistan, but our ability to support them in Pakistan has materially diminished as a result
of recent developments:
(a) The relative peace and stability of the pre-March 25
period has given way to civil
war and political instability;
(b) The prestige and influence of the Soviet Union in India and of China in Pakistan may have increased, at least in the
short run;
(c) The prospects for a democratic political system in East Pakistan have receded; (d) Conditions in which
economic development can take place in East Pakistan have for the present largely
disappeared;
(e) We have been able to protect our citizens in East Pakistan, but many citizens in West Pakistan remain vulnerable to popular
xenophobia. The prospects for our investment and trade are uncertain.
These developments in East Pakistan have reinforced the relative priority
of our interests in India which was already apparent by virtue
of India's greater size, resources, and
political, strategic, and economic potential. In contrast to the deteriorating
situation in Pakistan, India seems to be moving into a period of
new political stability with enhanced prospects for economic development and
with a renewed willingness to develop a cooperative relationship with the United States.
Nonetheless, our concern for regional stability and
equilibrium makes it incumbent on us to work for a viable relationship with
either a united or divided Pakistan. Historically we have assumed that
our interest in regional stability was best served by a united Pakistan. That assumption now requires
reexamination.
If there is a possibility that through a loose confederation
the political aspirations of the Bengalis could be met and the beneficial
features of a united country preserved, it would seem to be in our interest to
support such a solution. However, on the basis of our analysis of the situation
in Pakistan, we have concluded it can remain
united only through military force with dwindling development prospects and
continued potential for growing political radicalization and instability. A Pakistan divided into two viable and politically
stable states would be almost as acceptable from the point of view of U. S. interests. An independent East Pakistan in which moderate Bengali forces were
in control would be less vulnerable to radical internal pressures, would be
more likely to work for an accommodation with India and for regional cooperation, and
would have a political mandate within which development activity could be
resumed.
There is no assurance, of course, that our choice is simply
between a Pakistan united only at gun point and one
divided into two viable and politically stable states. One or both of the new
states might well be non-viable, politically unstable, and/or controlled by an
extreme left-wing leadership, in which case-over the medium term at least-even
a militarily unified Pakistan might serve some of our interests in the area.
B. Indian Interests:
India has traditionally perceived a united Pakistan to be in its interests. It has always
hoped that the Bengali majority would ultimately become
dominant and would moderate the traditional
West Pakistani hostility toward India. It has feared that an independent East Pakistan would come increasingly under radical
Chinese domination and, by offering a focus for West Bengal's dissatisfaction, would undermine India's own national unity. India's perception of its interests,
however, has changed in recent weeks. It now appears to believe that the
Bengalis would never be allowed to control Pakistan and that the only way to preserve a
moderate Bengali orientation towards India is by supporting the aspirations of
the Awami Leauge. India has consequently publicly announced
its sympathy, solidarity, and support for the Bengali separatists. It has
provided material assistance including arms. To date, Indian support has
stopped short of direct military intervention, which the Indians recognize
could lead to war with Pakistan, perhaps on two fronts, and Chinese
intervention on the side of Pakistan. The limited assistance given by India is, in effect, an investment made in
the hope that, if the Awami League comes to power it
will be repaid in a cooperative, mutually beneficial Indo-Bengali relationship.
C. Soviet Interests: For geo-political reasons alone, the Soviet Union has a greater interest in South Asia than the United States. The Soviet Union has a primary interest in limiting
Chinese influence in the area and has concluded that India represents a significant political,
military, and economic counterweight to China. Having given fundamental priority to
its interests in India, the USSR does not wish to disassociate itself
from the Indian position with respect to Pakistan. The Podgorny
message to President Yahya not only serves to support
the Indian position but also contributes to the other major Soviet interest in South Asia that it be an area of relative peace
and stability. The Soviets see their interest, as at the time of
Tashkent, in bringing hostilities to an end
and in creating political conditions which contribute to regional stability and
minimize Chinese involvement. They are likely
to continue to work in this direction. Because of fears of a radicalization of East Pakistan, the USSR has also concluded that it must adopt
a positive attitude towards Bengali aspirations, while keeping open its options
should Yahya succeed in keeping the country united.
The Soviet Union would see it in its interest to have good relations with both
successor states in order to counter potential Chinese and U. S. influence, and
it would not lightly throw away the influence it has obtained through its limited
past military and economic assistance to West Pakistan. It also probably
assumes that West
Pakistan
will continue to need the Soviet Union, and its assumption may have been reinforced by President Yahya's relatively restrained response to President Podgorny's message.
D. Chinese Interests: China's major interest in South Asia is that there be
no major military threat on its borders. It also has an interest that India not emerge
independently or in combination with any other country as a threat to China's position in Asia. The Chinese have, therefore, worked
to keep India weak, divided, and politically
unstable and have supported Pakistan as India's principal enemy and rival in South Asia. China still regards Pakistan as the most effective counterforce to
India and apparently does not wish to see that force reduced by the
break-up of Pakistan. It probably also believes that
ultimately the instability which the civil war creates will radicalize the East Pakistan masses and provide opportunities for
Maoist-oriented indigenous revolutionaries.
China probably does not want to take any risks which could
lead to war with India, particularly in view of the Indo-Soviet relationship;
and China is, therefore, not likely to pursue its interests to the point of
military involvement unless the crisis escalates, and West Pakistan is faced
with the prospect of total defeat by the Indians.
III U. S. INVOLVEMENT
Since the events of March 25, the United States Government has
taken the position that the crisis is essentially an internal affair of Pakistan. We have tried to avoid any direct
involvement in the events in East Pakistan except as required to bring about the thinning out of our
dependents and personnel. Nonetheless, because of our many on-going programs
and the political discussions which have taken place, a degree of involvement
has been and will be inevitable.
A. Political:
1. Although our thin-out was fundamentally a measure to
protect our citizens, it has obvious political ramifications since it implied a
degree of skepticism that conditions could be returned to normal as quickly as
the martial law authorities asserted.
2. All foreign newsmen were expelled from East Pakistan, and their film and notebooks were
confiscated. We protested this action to the Government in Islamabad.
3. In our public statements in Washington, we have expressed concern for the
loss of life, damage, and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan and have called for an end to the conflict and
a peaceful accommodation.
4. In private we have reiterated these concerns and indicated
our added concern that American arms were used.
5. We have responed negatively to
Indian efforts to stimulate UN Security Council discussion of the issue.
6. We have continued to broadcast extensively on VOA, particularly
on medium wave to East Bengal, information about the crisis and U. S. policy towards it.
B. Economic:
1. We have indicated our willingness to participate in an
international relief effort if asked by the Government of Pakistan and, as
conditions permit the distribution of relief throughout the province, and have
urged the GOP to accept international offers of assistance.
2. We have delayed signature of a PL-480 agreement for 150,000
tons of food grains for the cyclone affected areas of East Pakistan and have delayed shipment of another
150,000 tons of PL-480 food grains.
3. We have postponed consideration of the FY- 1971 $70 million
program loan.
4. We have questioned the GOP about the equitable nationwide
use of U. S. program funds already committed but
not yet allocated.
5. We have diverted one of several
grain ships in Chittagong to Korea. We have concurred in a GOP request
to divert to Karachi a number of other grain ships in Chittagong which have been unable to discharge
their cargoes.
C. Military:
1. Arms supplied under our pre-1965 MAP have been used
extensively by the army in East Pakistan. These include Chafee M-24 tanks and F-86 fighters.
2. We have not responed to a
Pakistani request for an extension of the letter of offer for maritime patrol aircraft under the 1970
one-time exception.
3. We have expressed concern to the GOP about the use of arms.
In almost all of these situations we have taken interim
decisions which will require formal reaffirmation.
To date our actions have signaled to the GOP and to the world
at large that we are concerned about the welfare of our own people, the use of
our arms in East
Pakistan,
and the sufferings and hardships of the East Pakistanis. We have indicated that
we do not intend to interfere directly to affect the outcome of the civil war.
Although we hope for an early peaceful accommodation, our public and private
statements that current programs are under review have indicated to the GOP
that we are not prepared to carry on exactly as before as long as our programs
can not operate, our disaster relief can not be provided, and resource
transfers can not take place on the equitable basis we had originally assumed
in making our loans to the Government of Pakistan.
IV. PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS AND U. S. LEVERAGE
Over the years since 1952, Pakistan has been a major recipient of U. S. assistance. In FY-1968 Pakistan
received $357.6 million in loans, grants, and PL-480 assistance. In FY-1970,
despite a substantial reduction in PL-480, the total was $215 million. These
inputs have been a vital ingredient of the Pakistani development program
representing about 18% of Pakistan's annual imports of goods and
services. For the coming year, the Pakistanis have been expecting at least $70
million in new loan commitments. About $120 million is in the pipeline from
previous loans, and a substantial portion of the $87 million November 1970
PL-480 Title I Agreement has not yet been shipped. In the military assistance
field, the one-time exception of armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol
craft, and fighter and bomber aircraft remains in abeyance. The total value of
this equipment and of spare parts on previously supplied equipment which Pakistan needs could amount to as much as $70
million if the sales go through.
These unfulfilled agreements and Pakistan's desire for continued political ties
indicate a substantial Pakistani interest in its relations with the U. S. They
may not provide us with the leverage to achieve a major reorientation of
Pakistani policy. But if used with discretion, they can probably affect the
course, direction, and pace of political negotiations. The importance
of U. S, economic assistance and thus the potential U. S. leverage at this
time are enhanced
in view of Pakistan's currently low level of foreign exchange
reserves. We have preliminary indications that the IBRD and the IMF may be
reluctant to provide fresh assistance to the GOP in the present circumstances,
and what we do will obviously affect the whole tenor of consortium decisions.
(We have little specific information on likely reactions of other consortium
members although the preliminary position of Britain and Germany is not to provide new aid at this
time.) Total external aid excluding Chinese assistance
amounts to about $500 million annually or about 50 percent of Pakistan's merchandise
imports.
West Pakistan also needs the Soviet Union for the $200 million Karachi steel mill which the Soviets are
committed to construct. The Chinese for their part are also committed to $200
million of aid, much of which was to have gone for East Pakistan, including the proposed Brahmaputra bridge. No
one external power can fully make up the gaps if the others were to withdraw
and Pakistan continues to remain dependent on the maintenance of its traingular tightrope foreign policy to obtain the
resources, both military and economic, which it requires. In considering
alternate strategies, we should, therefore, keep in mind that Pakistan needs us more than we need it.
While the Chinese could replace in part assistance withheld by
the U.S. and other donors, they do not have
the capability and probably not the willingness to assume full responsibility
for the defense and development of Pakistan. In addition, because of the
Indo-Soviet relationship, Pakistan is unlikely to turn to the USSR to meet gaps and will, therefore,
continue to look to us for help even in the event we adopt a more positive
attitude toward Bengali aspirations.
VI. POLICY STRATEGIES
AND OPTIONS
A. The Dilemma: Although it is our assessment that Pakistan as a unitary state cannot survive, it
is possible that the military may be able to hang on in East Pakistan for months and conceivably for years.
We face the problem of what policy to adopt over the short and medium term
until the ultimate denouement takes place, and how to maintain a constructive
relationship with Islamabad which will survive the breakup of Pakistan and which will simultaneously make it
possible for us to work cooperatively with the Bengalis. Our dilemma is
increased by press and Congressional criticism of our past policy, particularly
the use of American tanks and aircraft in the military operations in Bengal. We also face the continuing dilemma
of how to support our relatively greater interest in India while maintaining a relationship with
Pakistan which, if it remains united for years rather than
months, will continue to be a major Asian nation with important development
potential.
We are already faced with the further problem of how to deal
with a provisional East Bengali government, which controls a portion of East Pakistan and enjoys the support, though not
the formal recognition, of India. Such a government will actively seek
bilateral and UN support. The resolution of these dilemmas is particularly
difficult in this period of transition when emotions are running high
throughout South
Asia.
B. U.S. Objectives: Subsidiary to our general concern for
the peace and stability of South Asia, there are several specific objectives which we are pursuing:
(a) the prevention of the escalation
of the civil war into an international conflict.
(b) the creation of conditions which
would reduce political instability and permit
economic development to proceed.
(c) the preservation of a
relationship with both East and West Pakistan in
circumstances either of a united or divided Pakistan.
(d) the prevention of any major
external power from achieving a decisive advantage in South Asia as a result of the crisis.
As the statement of our involvement makes clear, we have
already gone beyond the point where we can adopt a posture of inaction. The
sections which follow address the broad strategies we might pursue and the
specific policy decisions which we must take under present circumstances. An
additional section indicates steps we might have to take if the situation were
to get out of control and lead to a major conflict between India and Pakistan and China.
Although, as indicated in Section I above, the Pakistan
Government may be able to maintain a degree of military control over the major
population centers in East Pakistan for some time to come, the policies we
adopt in support of our objectives have an important time factor because it is
likely that the longer the conflict continues:
(a) the more the dangers of
escalation through direct Indian and/or Chinese
involvement increase.
(b) the more extremists in both East
and West
Pakistan are
likely to again in popular support.
(c) the greater the likelihood of a
major food distribution problem in East Pakistan perhaps leading to famine conditions.
(d) the greater the probability of
accelerating economic decline in both wings. (e) the
greater the stress on West Pakistan's political structure and unity.
C. Policy Strategies: Taking into account the dilemmas
which we face and the objectives we are pursuing, there are three basic
strategies which we might adopt in present circumstances:
1. Relative Hands-off Policy which would seek to
continue existing programs as far as possible given Congressional objections
and the situation in East Pakistan.
Advantages
- Would support our objective of maintaining a constructive
political
relationship with the Government of Pakistan.
- Would slow the deterioration of the West Pakistan economic situation and
permit continuation to a limited extent of a
coordinated development effort. - Would keep the Chinese from significantly
increasing their influence in
Pakistan.
Disadvantages
- Would adversely affect our relations with India and would allow the Soviet
Union to strengthen its
relationship with India.
- Would create no immediate basics for a constructive
relationship with the
Bengalis.
- Could lead to a prolongation of the conflict and to a
long-term deterioration of the political and economic situation in the country
as a whole.
2. The Use of Selective Influence combining support for
programs which are consonant with our development objectives, but holding off
from programs which would contribute directly to a prolongation of the civil
war. We would maintain a degree of public disassociation from West Pakistan in order to facilitate a relationship
with the East
Bengalis at
a later date.
Advantages
- Would create a degree of public distance between ourselves
and the policies of the Government of Pakistan, while keeping open a
relationship with it which would be required either if GOP rule in the East is
more protracted than we now anticipate or in the event that Pakistan splits.
- Would minimize Chinese and Soviet ability to capitalize on
the crisis.
- Would be consistent with the policy being adopted by other
consortium members and the USSR.
Disadvantages
-- Would give us limited influence over the outcome of the
civil war and hence would risk the further radicalization of East Pakistan, and some continued economic
deterioration.
-- Would be seen in India and East Pakistan as only a. partial commitment to
self-determination for the people of East Pakistan.
3. All out effort to
bring an early end to hostilities, by using our available leverage to prevent
escalation and to achieve a peaceful political settlement.
Advantages.
- Would give relative priority to our interest in relations
with East
Pakistan. --
Would reduce the prospects for a protracted war and the consequent dangers
of escalation and of success for
Maoist-oriented groups.
-- Would lay the foundation for a relationship with Bangla Desh and would
contribute positively to our relationship with India.
Disadvantages
-- Would be deeply resented in West Pakistan, and might lead to a fundamental
change in our relations with Islamabad.
- Would accelerate the deterioration of the West Pakistani
economic situation. - Would run counter to established policy of not
interfering in the internal affairs of others.
- Would lead to increased Chinese influence in West Pakistan and enhance the prospects for a
radical military takeover in Islamabad.
D. Policy Decisions
`Within the framework of these broad strategies there are
various specific policy decisions which cannot be delayed. These include
decisions on (1) a response to
President Yahya's letter to
President Nixon, (2) our public posture and the posture of the Voice of America
in its broadcasts to South Asia, (3) contacts with the Provisional Government
of Bangla Desh and at an
appropriate time the recognition of it, (4) the
implementation
of our one-time exception to our military supply policy announced in October
1970, (5) shipments of ammunition and spare parts under the basic 1967 arms
policy, (6) PL-480, (7) the program loan for 1971, (8) relief activities, (9)
ongoing economic assistance, and (10) anticipated request by the GOP for
suspension of debt owed to us in the next three to six months.
As a first step and a precursor to any decisions made with
regard to our economic assistance program, we need to consider re-establishing
regular channels of communications at all levels of the GOP and with other
international aid donors, including a full exploration of current factual
information on Pakistan's economic development situation and
program. The people in West Pakistan are not informed of the situation in East Pakistan, and President Yahya
may not fully understand the seriousness of the country's current economic
conditions. It is important to work closely with other donors in developing an
economic assistance policy toward Pakistan since the US
contribution-
although significant in itself-is only a portion (about 25 percent) of total
external aid. Unless donor actions are coordinated the effects of US action could be neutralized. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the other consortium
donors could seek a full review of Pakistan's development situation, plans, and
prospects. On the basis of information currently available, the World Bank and
IMF do not believe there is now a basis for proceeding with economic support
and development assistance. It is therefore important for the consortium and
the IMF to seek a basis for proceeding with development activities in Pakistan. The burden for making a case for
development rests, of course, with the Government of Pakistan.
1. Relative Hands Off Policy. If we choose a hands off policy we
would
(1) Letter to Yahya: respond
acknowledging his description of the sequence of events leading up to the
crisis-express our sympathy for the sufferings in East Pakistan and our hope for an early resumption
of our development activities and a peaceful resolution of the crisis.
Undertake to raise the issue of Indian intervention with the GOI.
(2) Public Statement: maintenance of our current public
posture of concern and sympathy - avoidance of suggesting that delays in
implementation of policies are anything more than routine - limit our coverage
of Pakistani events on VOA.
(3) Contacts and Recognition: Avoid contact with Bangla Desh representatives -
defer any decision on recognition until the Government of Pakistan had accepted
the division of the country.
(4) One-Time Exception: continue action to implement
the one-time exception including extension of the date for the letter of offer
for maritime patrol aircraft.
(5) Ammunition and Spare Parts: take no overt action to
suspend sales of ammunition and spares for lethal end items permitted under the
1967 policy - delay deliveries of ammunition until situation in East Pakistan clarifies.
(6) PL-480: Sign the 150,000 MT cyclone disaster agreement and as soon as the Government of Pakistan requests,
proceed with shipments from the US of the 150,000 MT cyclone food grain
and the 150,000 MT under an earlier agreement waiting to be loaded - defer
completely to the GOP as to the proper disposition of PL-480 food grain
shipments.
(7) New Development Loans: Indicate we would like to
proceed with the FY 1971 program loan for up to $70 million; however, before
proceeding, we will need information on Pakistan's future development plans and
seek assurances from the GOP that it will be able to implement and achieve the
objectives of its development program and not divert to military purposes
resources intended for economic development-proceed with the outstanding
project loan for West Pakistan ($5 million) and tell the GOP we are prepared to
proceed with a consulting services loan for East Pakistan as soon as conditions
permit.
(8) Relief Activities: Inform the GOP again that we
would participate in an international relief effort and would provide
assistance as soon as Pakistan's requirements can be identified and
we have assurances that commodities can be delivered.
(9) On-going Economic Assistance: Continue all on-going
assistance activities, making only changes that are necessitated by the
physical obstacles to implementation in East Pakistan.
(10) Anticipated Request for Suspension of U.S. Debt: Inform the GOP that the U.S. is prepared for a limited period of
time to suspend U.S. debt service.
2. Selective Influence.
A policy of selective influence would seek to keep open our options with
regard to the two parts of Pakistan, to use a degree of leverage to
shorten the conflict and encourage a political settlement and to encourage
other countries to, lay a constructive role. Specifically it would include:
(1) Letter to Yahya:
emphasize our sympathy for the sufferings of the people of Pakistan - point out
that we have been unable to carry on our development activities and look
forward to a resumption of normal economic activity on the basis of our
established developmental criteria - express our hope
that to avoid famine steps be taken as soon as possible to restore internal
communications - encourage the GOP to accept an international relief effort and
indicate our willingness to participate in it. Point out the growing public and
Congressional concern at the use of American arms in East Pakistan and the need for an early political
accommodation.
(2) Public Statements :
increasingly emphasize our hopes for an early restoration of peaceful
conditions and the resumption of a political dialogue with the elected representatives
of East
Pakistan -
stress this theme in VOA broadcasts to all of Pakistan, possibly adding concern over the use
of US arms.
(3) Contacts and Recognition: Refrain from extending
any de facto or de jure recognition
until the Bengali separatists have effective control over virtually all of East
Bengali maintain discreet official contacts with Bangla
Desh representatives in Calcutta or elsewhere as
appropriate.
(4) One-Tiem exception:
continue to defer effective implementation of the onetime exception,
particularly actions relating to the APCs - authorize
the extension of the letter of offer for maritime patrol aircraft.
(5) Ammunition and spare parts: continue to keep in
abeyance all shipments of ammunition except possibly for equipment which would
not be used in the East Bengal insurgency situation (anti-aircraft ammunition, for example)-keep in abeyance
all orders for spare parts for lethal equipment, particularly F-86 Sabre Jets and M-24 tanks, which have been used or might be
used in East Pakistan-permit the sale of non-lethal equipment and of other
spare parts reviewing each decision on a case-by-case basis.
(6) PL-480: having assured ourselves that steps are
being taken to resume food distribution in the disaster area, sign the 150,000
MT cyclone disaster agreement, and indicate that grain
shipments will be held until there is evidence the food can be unloaded and
distributed. Inform the GOP that we will ship the 150,00 MT (authorized under
an earlier agreement and now at US ports waiting to be loaded) as soon as there
is evidence the food can be unloaded and distributed in East Pakistan. Continue
to urge the GOP to do everything possible to unload and distribute the US food grain now waiting offshore East Pakistan, and to take steps to prepare for the
PL 480 vessels enroute to East Pakistan to handle local food shortages as
they arise.
(7) New Development Loans: Indicate our hope that
conditions would permit an early examination of Pakistan's development loan
requirements - inform the GOP that US economic assistance is for all of
Pakistan and new loans will have to wait until development programs can be
resumed in East Pakistan - examine closely with other consortium members, as
well as the GOP, the developmental case on which Pakistan's future economic
assistance would be based, and accordingly ask the World Bank to call a
consortium meeting as soon as possible to review Pakistan's revised development
programs.
(8) Relief Activities: encouraging the GOP to accept
international relief assistance, expressing US willingness to participate in such an
effort as soon as conditions permit the extension of relief throughout East Pakistan.
(9) On-going Economic Assistance:
maintain on-going technical assistance and loan activities (which total $120
million) that we can now justify as consistent with our overall developmental
objectives, and which can be implemented, including, for example, all current
loan activities in West Pakistan.