Memorandum
from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon/1/
/1/ Source:
National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country
Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 71. Secret.
Sent for action.
SUBJECT
Policy Options Toward
I do not
normally bother you with tactical judgments. But in the case of the present
situation in
The
Situation
Three weeks
after the West Pakistani military crackdown, these three judgments seem to
characterize the situation we must deal with:
-The West
Pakistani military seem likely to regain physical control of the main towns and
connecting arteries. The resistance is too poorly organized and equipped to
prevent that now.
-Physical control does not guarantee restoration of essential services like
food distribution and normal economic life because that requires Bengali
cooperation which may be withheld.
-Suppression of the resistance, even if achieved soon, will leave widespread
discontent and hatred in East Pakistan, with all that implies for the
possibility of effective cooperation between the populace and the military, for
eventual emergence of an organized resistance movement and for the unity of
Pakistan.
-Tension between
Those
judgments suggest that there will probably be an interim period, perhaps of
some length, in which (a) the West Pakistanis attempt to reestablish effective
administration but (b) even they may recognize the need to move toward greater
East Pakistani autonomy in order to draw the necessary Bengali cooperation.
What we seem
to face, therefore, is a period of transition to greater East Pakistani
autonomy and, perhaps, eventual independence. How prolonged and how violent
this period is will depend heavily on the judgments made in East and
-In the
East, leaders of the resistance will be faced with the problem of weighing the
political disadvantages of cooperating with a West Pakistani administration
against the need to restore essential services, especially food distribution.
Without that restoration, large-scale starvation seems unavoidable.
-The West Pakistanis, on their part, face serious financial difficulties within
the next several months. They have told us that unless they receive emergency
foreign exchange help they will have to default on outstanding external loan
repayments and restrict imports to the point of stagnating
the economy and possibly bringing on a financial crash. It may well be that, as
these costs become apparent to a wider group in
Outside actors will also play roles of varying significance:
-
-The
-The USSR is concerned that instability will work to China's advantage and has
shown perhaps more inclination in recent years than the US toward trying to
settle disputes in the subcontinent. In the short run, Soviet interests seem to
parallel our own, although they would certainly like to use this situation to
undercut our position in
-Communist China could (a) be
The Options
The options
are most clearly understood in terms of decisions on our ongoing programs.
There are three, each described in terms of concrete actions that would be
taken:
Option 1
would be essentially a posture of supporting whatever political and military
program President Yahya chooses to pursue in the
East. Specifically:
-On economic assistance, we would support debt relief and go on with our full
development aid program as soon as the West Pakistanis could assure us that the
money would go for development purposes, not to financing the war effort. We
would not concern ourselves that most of the aid would go to the West.
-On food assistance, we would proceed with all shipments at the request of the
government and state no conditions about how they distribute or withhold food
from specific areas in
-On military assistance, we would allow all shipments but ammunition to
proceed. We would delay ammunition without taking any formal action.
Option 2
would be to try to maintain a posture of genuine neutrality. Specifically:
-On economic assistance, we would delay all further aid until the IMF and World
Bank were satisfied that
-On food assistance, instead of deferring to the West Pakistani government on
distribution, we would insist before resuming shipments on assurance that food
would be distributed equitably throughout East Pakistan, in the cyclone
disaster area and in the countryside as well as in the army-controlled towns.
-On military assistance, we would have to defer all deliveries of ammunition,
death-dealing equipment and spare parts for it. Non-lethal equipment and spares
might continue.
Option 3
would be to make a serious effort to help Yahya end
the war and establish an arrangement that could be transitional to East
Pakistani autonomy. Such an effort would have to carry with it the understood
possibility that, if the political effort broke down, US aid might have to be
reduced by virtue of our being unable to operate in the East. But our approach
for the time being would be to support emergency help for the Pakistani economy
to tide them over while we work with them in restructuring their development
program in both West and East. We would not withhold aid now for the sake of
applying pressure. We would face that question only after giving the West
Pakistanis every chance to negotiate a settlement in the face of the costs of
not doing so. Specifically:
-On economic
assistance, we would state our willingness to help in the context of a West
Pakistani effort to negotiate a viable settlement. We would have to point out
that it will be beyond US-or World Bank or IMF-financial capacity to help
-On food assistance, we would allow shipments to resume as soon as food could
be unloaded and move into the distribution system. We would not stipulate
destination, except perhaps for that amount committed to the cyclone disaster
area. It would be implicit in our overall approach, however, that our objective
would be the broad distribution that would come with restoring essential
services.
-On military assistance, we would take a line similar to that on economic aid.
In practical terms, this would amount to allowing enough shipments of
non-lethal spares and equipment to continue to avoid giving Yahya
the impression we are cutting off military assistance but holding shipment of
more controversial items in order not to provoke the Congress to force cutting
off all aid.
Comment on
the Options. My own recommendation is to try to work within the range described
by Option 3 above.
-Option 1
would have the advantage of preserving our relationship with
-Option 2 would have the advantage of creating a posture that would be publicly
defensible. The disadvantage would be that the necessary cutback in military
and economic assistance would tend to favor
-Option 3 would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya while engaging in a serious effort to move the
situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests. Its
disadvantage is that it might lead to a situation in which progress toward a
political settlement had broken down, the
If I may
have your guidance on the general approach you wish taken, I shall calibrate
our posture accordingly on other decisions as they come up.
Prefer
Option 1-unqualified backing for West Pakistan
Prefer Option 2-neutrality which in effect leans toward the East
Prefer Option 3-an effort to help Yahya achieve a
negotiated settlement/2/
/2/ Nixon
approved this option and added a handwritten note that reads: "To all
hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time." He
underlined "Don't" three times. A note sent on April 28 from Haig to Nixon, which is attached to another copy of this
memorandum, indicates that Kissinger suggested that in approving an option in
the memorandum, it would be helpful if Nixon included a note to the effect that
he did not want any actions taken which would have the effect of squeezing
Source: Document 36, volume XI,