Department of State

 

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

 

 

 

TO               : The Acting Secretary

THROUGH : S/S

FROM        : NEA - Christopher Van Hollen

SUBJECT   : Our Discussion of India-Pakistan Relations at 3:00 P.M. MAY 5: Contingency Study

 

 

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

 

I am attaching a draft contingency paper in regard to the possibility of India-Pakistan hostilities which you might like to review before our discussion tomorrow afternoon. This is not a cleared paper and therefore should now be considered as a basics for discussion only. After refining it, however, I should like to send it over to the NSC staff.

 

The contingency paper concludes that as long as (a) no progress is made toward a political settlement in East Bengal, (b) India continues to aid the Bangla Desh forces, and (c) the Indian and Pakistani regular forces confront each other across the East­West Bengal border, the danger of escalation will remain high.

 

Among US actions explored in the paper are suggestions that we might (a) seek to find ways of expressing to the Pakistan Government our great interest in progress toward a political settlement, (b) seek to establish a channel of communication with the Bangla Desh representatives in Calcutta in order to urge them to propose a political compromise, (c) encourage the UN Secretary General to offer his good offices in a political as well as a humanitarian capacity, (d) continue, in our dealings with the Indians and Pakistanis, to stress our interest in restraint, and (e) ask the Canadians to urge restraint on Peking.

 

Attachment:

                                                  Draft Contingency Paper

NEA/INC : DTSchneider:ges 5/4/71

Clearances:

NEA/PAF - Mr. Spengler

 

 

 

CONTINGENCY STUDY FOR INDO-PAKISTANI HOSTILITIES

 

I. Introduction.

The civil war in East Pakistan has now continued for more than five weeks. The Pakistan Army has advanced to the Indian borders and has control over virtually all of the major population centers in East Pakistan. Despite this apparent military success, the prospects for political and military stability are poor and the danger that the civil war will escalate into an international conflict remains. This paper assesses the contingencies under which an escalation might take place and suggests steps which the US should take to prevent further escalation or to terminate hostilities should war break out.

 

II. Danger Signals.

In the last ten days we have received through clandestine reports and journalists' accounts increasing evidence of Indian involvement with the Bengali separatists and of India's own contingency planning in the event of war. The Indian Government has reinforced Border Security Force units and has moved regular Indian Army units to within three kilometers of the border. The BSF has established camps at which 2,000 Bengalis are reportedly receiving training in guerilla and sabotage tactics. Limited quantities of arms and ammunition have been provided to the Bengali separatists and some Indian forces have infiltrated into East Bengal to provide assistance and training to the separatists. There have been several serious border incidents involving Indian and Pakistani border units and at least one violation Indian air space by Pakistani aircraft.

 

These activities on the part of the Indians reflect a GOI decision to give limited support to the Bengali separatists and to encourage them to pursue their struggle for independence in the face of the military successes of the Pakistani Army. The motives of the Indian Government are various. It is responding to strong public and Parliamentary pressure for support to the Bengalis. It fears that unless it supports the moderate Awami League leadership radical elements, particularly the extreme Naxalites, will take over the leadership of the Bengali separatist movement.

While India probably does not seek to provoke a war with Pakistan, it is prepared to take considerable risks in supporting the Bengalis. India may also believe that the Pakistanis will ultimately seek to provoke a conflict to distract international attention from the internal situation in East Pakistan or to convince the East Pakistani people that there is a threat from India sufficiently great to justify the continued unity of Pakistan and the West Pakistani military presence in the East. The possibility that Pakistan will seek to provoke such an incident is a real contingency, as is the danger that India will over-react to events in Pakistan.

 

There are, however, various factors working against escalation. Both Governments with the experience of 1965 in mind are aware that a decisive victory cannot be won and the costs of war are extremely high. On the Indian side, there is added to this perception a fear of China and the possibility that an Indo-Pakistani conflict would result in direct Chinese involvement. However, given the highly emotional context in

which decisions are being made in India and Pakistan, one cannot assume that rational arguments militating against escalation will overrule the more immediate needs to respond to specific incidents or provocations. Already a degree of escalation has taken place, as is evident from the increasingly serious border incidents.

 

III. Scenarios for Escalation.

There are a variety of circumstances in which the current situation might escalate:

 

(1) The Pakistanis might take action against Indian BSF training camps for East Bengali forces in India or against Indian supply operations across the border into East Bengal.

 

(2) Covert cross border infiltration would over time be enervating to the Pakistani efforts to control East Pakistan and could lead to Pakistani attacks on sanctuaries across the border, which the Indians might defend.

 

(3) The Pakistanis in hot pursuit after retreating Bengali separatists have already fired across the Indian border. The Indians would respond sharply if significant Pakistani units crossed into India.

 

(4) The Indians might shoot down a Pakistani aircraft violating Indian air space (or vice versa).

 

(5) A major Bengali invasion of East Pakistan from sanctuaries in India with direct Indian support would also certainly provoke a Pakistani response.

 

(6) The Pakistanis might infiltrate forces into Kashmir as a diversionary maneuveur to distract Indian and world attention from the Bengal situation.

 

(7) The Indian Government, if faced in the future with something approaching genocide of the Hindus in East Pakistan, would find itself under great public opinion pressure and might therefore decide to move in to stop the killing.

 

(8) If the burden of refugees, particularly Hindus, became too great, the Indians might intervene to check the flow.

 

(9) India under pressure from public and parliamentary opinion might recognize the Bangla Desh Government. This in turn would lead to a break in relations with Pakistan and a danger of war. An Indian decision to recognize Bangla Desh would probably be followed by more overt Indian support, which in turn could also trigger an open conflict.

 

(10) Finally, in extremis, the Pakistanis might attack India in the Punjab. If the Pakistani leadership believes it might lose in East Pakistan, a desperate act of vengence against India might be attempted.

 

Of these scenarios the ones most likely to lead to full scale hostilities at this time are those which relate to various types of border incidents. However, if the struggle is protracted and an effective insurgency develops the Pakistanis will come under increasing pressure to take action against India in order to control the insurgency. As long as there is no fundamental solution to the underlying political problems either through Bengali acquiescence in Punjabi rule or through negotiations with the Awami League leadership, this danger will remain.

 

IV. Secondary Escalation.

In the first instance any escalation of the civil war would involve only a direct confrontation between India and Pakistan. However, we have learned from intelligence sources that China may have given a conditional promise to assist Pakistan in the event hostilities break out with India and the Chinese have given assurances that they will initiate military action "along the Tibetan border" if Indian troops deliberately cross the Pakistani frontier in force. Should the Chinese become directly involved it is likely that the Soviet Union will openly support India and will presumably provide such military assistance as is required.

 

V. Policy Actions.

Although US influence in India and Pakistan is limited in the present circumstances, there are various actions which we might take to promote our interest in preventing the crisis from escalating further. As indicated above, the dangers of war will remain as long as there is no resolution of the basic political issues in East Pakistan. If a peaceful accommodation between the East and West can be achieved resting on genuine popular support in East Pakistan, there is little doubt that India would accept such an outcome and would back away from its support for any residual Bengali separatist movement. Also, if the Government of Pakistan were to establish widespread and effective control and the East Bengalis show little will to resist, India may decide to accept the situation that exists and cut back on activities which could cause escalation.

 

The bloodshed of recent weeks has created circumstances in which any viable political solution will be extremely difficult to achieve. Emotions are running high, a degree of escalation has taken place, and the responsiveness of either India or Pakistan to outside advice and influence is limited.

 

There are, however, steps which we might take (a) to deal with the current level of escalation, and to prevent further escalation, (b) to facilitate a political settlement, and (c) in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.

 

A. Steps to Prevent Escalation

The most immediate need is to see that the escalation which has already taken place including numerous border incidents does riot lead to a conflict. We should:

 

- continue to stress both to the Indians and the Pakistanis the importance of restraint and our hope that neither side will overreact to border incidents or provocations. Specifically, propose that they pull their regular forces back from the border.

- emphasize to the Indians the desirability of their conditioning their relations with the representatives of Bangla Desh so as to minimize tensions with Islamabad.

- manage our own involvement in international refugee relief efforts so that it does not support Indian or Bengali cross-border operations and thereby'. directly contribute to escalation.

- consider ways to approach the Chinese to urge them to continue to exercise restraint in the present situation. (For example, it might be possible to ask the British, French or Canadians to indicate the need for restraint through their Missions in Peking.)

- Support and encourage any future third country offers of mediatory assistance. (Earlier in the crisis the Dutch and Malaysians had privately indicated an interest in mediation.) The British have been willing to help resolve the impasse over the repatriation of Deputy High Commissioners. From clandestine sources we know that the Indonesians are also weighing a mediatory role for themselves.

- consider stimulating one of the above countries to take on a role as honest broker, including also Nepal and Canada which have good relations with Islamabad, New Delhi, and Peking.

 

B.    Steps to Facilitate a Political Settlement.

Over the longer term only a viable political settlement can resolve the dangers of

escalation. To facilitate a political settlement we could:

- stress to the Government of Pakistan that a political accommodation is essential to the stabilization of the situation and that our ability to assist Pakistan depends on progress towards a political settlement. (Such an approach would not specify the nature of the accommodation leaving it to Yahya to work with whatever political leadership would work with him.)

- suggest to the Government of Pakistan the view that the only type of settlement is one which would be acceptable to the Awami League leadership.

- simultaneously, while taking actions designed to cause the GOP to seek a political compromise, indirectly through the Indians and directly to representatives of the Provisional Government of Bangla Desh in Calcutta, urge that the Awami League also seek a political compromise.

- consider more active use of the leverage of our military and economic assistance programs in an effort to force Pakistan to begin political negotiations with the Bengalis. (The merits of such a step were discussed in the SRG paper reassessing US relations with Pakistan.)

- encourage the UN Secretary General to play a more open political as well as humanitarian role, perhaps including a public appeal for a political settlement, and offer to send a representative to the area.

- should we conclude that the Bengalis cannot hope to win a prolonged guerilla type struggle, consider tailoring our actions to avoid encouraging the Bengalis to prolong the struggle.

 

C. Actions in the Event of Hostilities.

Should the crisis escalate into an open war between India and Pakistan, we will be faced as in 1965 with many difficult decisions. The situation will be significantly more complex than in 1965 since it is likely that the conflict will be joined on both of India's eastern and western borders and will involve the Chinese and probably the Soviets to some degree or other. In the event of escalation we will need to act swiftly to halt the conflict. We should:

- make an immediate and direct appeal by President Nixon to President Yahya and Prime Minister Gandhi for the end of the fighting.

- immediately call the United Nations Security Council into session and strongly support any UN action designed to terminate hostilities, including a call for a cease fire and proposals to establish peacekeeping forces.

- at the appropriate time, make joint or parallel proposals with the USSR for a cease fire and stand down either in the Security Council or outside.

- suspend formally all military programs for India and Pakistan. (However, if the Chinese should intervene on the side of Pakistan, we should consider continuing or augmenting our military programs in India).

- depending upon the circumstances in which the fighting had broken out, consider suspending our economic assistance to Pakistan and/or India.

 

NEA/INC : ACEQuainton/emg 5/4/71 Clearances     .

EUR/SOV     - Mr. Kienzle

PM/PS      - Mr. Sabastian

EA/ACA   - Mr. Brown

NEA/INC - Mr. Schneider