SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

 

 

RESEARCH STUDY

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH May 18, 1971

 

PAKISTAN: THE WEST WING'S "MORNING AFTER"

 

 

The present strife in East Bengal has tended to overshadow developments in West Pakistan. Since the East Bengali strife has begun to have significant disequilibrating effects in West Pakistan, this study seeks to investigate the character and implications of those effects.

 

ABSTRACT

Despite an appearance of general approval in West Pakistan for the military suppression of the East Bengal autonomy movement, there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction. Politicians fear a continuation of martial law in clear opposition to the popular will; businessmen fear economic disaster; the public is uncertain and gloomy; and the military high command is divided in its appraisal of the East Bengal situation and in its view of what to do in West Pakistan. These things probably spell real trouble for President Yahya's government in the early future.

Events in East Bengal have dominated the scene in Pakistan since the night of March 25/26 when the Martial Law Administration of President Yahya decided to use military force to settle its political differences with the Bengalis. The Pakistan Army has succeeded in occupying most important population centers in East Bengal and therefore much of the drama has now leaked out of the East Bengal situation, although the prospects for insurgency, the possibility of conflict with India and the increasingly urgent need for relief of refugees who have fled to India continue to capture attention. In this situation, it now is possible to take a more detailed look at the impact of recent events on West Pakistan, which has dominated the political and economic life of Pakistan since independence was achieved in 1947. The picture revealed tends to be disquieting.

 

Initial Reaction to March 25/26

The initial response in West Pakistan to the Martial Law Administration's decision to ban the Awami League, which as the chief advocate of East Bengali autonomy had captured a majority of the seats in Pakistan's first democratically-conducted election in December, 1970, was affirmative. The inability of the main actors in post-election negotiations-Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, West Pakistan's leading political figure, Z.A. Bhutto of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and President Yahya-to reach agreement had raised fears about the viability of the Pakistani union, and the Martial Law Administration's decision was seen as a determined effort to prevent the union's disintegration. That the banning of the Awami League was accompanied by a ban on political activities by parties in West Pakistan and total censorship of news media appears to have aroused little, if any, immediate concern. More particularly, although aware that the new situation would require very great discretion on his part as he sought to maintain his position as a leader, Bhutto appears to have seen, as did other West Pakistani politicians, that the elimination of the Awami League offered a new opportunity for enhanced influence. And business saw in the new situation hope for the continuation of the "stability" provided by marital law, and a deferral of the threat of nationalization, a theme in last fall's election campaign.

 

Sobering Up

Since the MLA announcement, however, some West Pakistani leaders have become increasingly concerned about the implications of the military action. Z.A. Bhutto has been the most outspoken supporter of the MLA among West Wing politicians. Undoubtedly, he felt that the banning of the Awami League, which left his PPP the largest political party, would work to his advantage. Indeed, his active support for the MLA gave seeming credence to numerous rumors that he had connived with some military figures at the overthrow of Mujib. However, despite Bhutto's cooperation, which appears to have involved an attempt to improve his standing with those within the military who view him as an adventurer, the MLA has so far made no move to allow his party to form provincial governments or assume a share of governmental power. His party's discipline is now being severely tested by this wait-and Bhutto has spent the recent weeks on a constant tour calming brouhahas and redressing grievances within his own party. Bhutto himself, and numerous PPP figures, have "demanded" an early transfer of power to "representatives of the People"-meaning the PPP. President Yahya has however stated that he will not do that until things return to "normal" in East Bengal. Since the restoration of "normality" appears to be becoming increasingly more distant, it is questionable how long Bhutto can retain his influence and control over the disparate groups within the PPP.

The minority West Pakistani politicians were slower to applaud the military action. Some, including Khan Abdul Wali Khan of the National Awami Party, and Maulana Maudoodi of the Jamaat-Islami, refrained from any comment until pressured, and then contented themselves with statements condemning "Indian interference" without directly endorsing Yahya. While the leaders of the minority parties may have seen the military action as an opportunity to increase their own party strength, they were also fearful of a take-over by Bhutto. This has expressed itself in growing controversy. The PPP calls for immediate formation of provincial governments in the West on the basis of seats won in last December's elections (two-the largest-of four provinces would be controlled by the PPP, and the PPP might join a ruling coalition in a third) while the smaller parties call for new national elections and the subsequent simultaneous formation of governments in East and West Pakistan. Council Muslim League leader Main Mumtaz Daultana and others have noted with suspicion that, despite a "total ban on political activities," Bhutto has been allowed to make speeches and give press conferences. They fear that Bhutto may have made a "deal" to become Pakistan's new Prime Minister, with military backing.

 

Business Problems Unresolved

The business community, centered in Karachi, greeted the military action positively for several reasons. Not only were they fearful of nationalization but they were well aware that the PPP (like the Awami League in East Bengal) drew its support largely from workers, who could trouble business deeply through labor disputes backed by political power. They were also aware that much of their foreign exchange was generated in East Bengal. that much of their import-export business was centered on East Bengal, and that their industrial products, largely unsaleable on the world market, had a captive market in East Bengal. The month of civil disobedience in East Bengal instituted by Sheikh Mujib, had shown them-by stopping their receipts, impounding their stocks, and interrupting their trade-how disastrous for business any separation of East and West Pakistan would be. They therefore welcomed the military action, first because they assumed that East-West trade would quickly resume its former pattern, and second because they correctly saw that the action precluded any early transfer of power to political parties-East or West.

As the civil war continued, and no early resumption of trade seemed possible, business began to feel the pinch. The Karachi Chamber of Commerce petitioned the MLA for emergency financial assistance, declaring that many of its members faced bankruptcy because of circumstances in East Bengal "not of their own making." The Karachi stock market, after an initial spurt, fell and has remained down. The threat of labor trouble continues, as workers become impatient for the rewards they were led to expect during the Fall political campaign. Finally, the foreign exchange shortage has become so acute that an IBRD official has estimated that $500 million per year for several years will be needed just to stave off the economic collapse of West Pakistan. Some businessmen, faced with ruin, are beginning to look at the continuing, costly, military action in East Bengal not as a boon but as a disaster.

 

Popular Uncertainty

The popular mood of euphoria in West Pakistan, based on relief that the tensions surrounding the political negotiations had ended, lasted about a week. Thereafter, there appeared a growing atmosphere of "uncertainty and gloom." Internal inconsistencies in MLA announcements in the controlled press-simultaneously announcing "normalcy" and new military drives-have contributed to the uncertainty, noted by our consulates and by western reporters. The MLA propaganda campaign to blame everything on India seems to have succeeded to some degree, but may have contributed to the gloom, since many who did not think East Bengal was able to break away unilaterally now fear that secession will be possible with Indian help.

 

The Prospect Is Disquieting

With increasing public uncertainty, economic difficulties, political dissatisfaction, and splits within the military establishment, West Pakistan contains the seeds of serious trouble. We do not know the extent of dissatisfaction, nor can we say yet whether this dissatisfaction will eventually be expressed through action. It is apparent, however, that public confidence in the MLA has declined substantially, and there can be no doubt that critical and difficult decisions lie immediately ahead.

Immediate public concern would evaporate in the face of a clear-cut military victory in East Bengal, a political solution guaranteeing the continued unity of Pakistan and a restoration of economic ties with the East Wing. This, however, appears unlikely in the extreme. All analyses instead indicate that the most likely situation will be long-term-if slow starting-insurgency culminating in the separation of the two wings. The Government may be able to ally short-term political grumbling in West Pakistan by some gesture toward sharing power with politicians, but is unlikely to relinquish real power while it still faces active resistance in the East, and political extremists will not remain satisfied with gestures for very long. Businessmen's fears would be calmed if business with the East were resumed, and if the western donor countries expressed willingness to support Pakistan's faltering economy with massive aid infusions. However, Pakistan's public image abroad has so suffered because of the East Bengal situation that it will face significant difficulty in attracting the needed levels of assistance, which would be hard to obtain even under the best of circumstances. If the Bengalis do eventually succeed in throwing out the Pakistan Army, there will inevitably be a major reaction in the West Wing against the authors of the present East Bengal policy. That reaction, coupled with the undercurrents of discontent, probably spells real trouble in the early future for President Yahya's government.

 

INR/Near East and South Asia

Director            : Dayton S. Mak

Analyst          : David McGaffey

Ext.                  :21382

Released by   :

Date                  : 5/13/71