Department of State

 

AIRGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL A-34

 

TO       : DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASH DC

 

INFO   : Amembassy, RAWALPINDI Amconsul, DACCA Amconsul, KARACHI, Amconsul, PESHAWAR

 

FROM : Amconsul, LAHORE

 

DATE  : May 22, 1970

 

SUB     : Current Assessment

 

REF     : Rawalpindi's A-149

 

Attached herewith is the Consulate General's contribution to the Embassy's Current Assessment contained in Rawalpindi's A-149.

 

Adams

 

 

 

 

SUBJECT: Current Assessment

 

REF:    a. Rawalpindi's 3265;

            b. Lahore's 211

 

Overview: We stick with most of what we wrote in previous assessment (ref. b.), except to note that chances for holding elections in West Wing look brighter than before, largely as result Governor Atiq-ur-Rahman's firm hand on law and order problems. Latter continue to arise but are being contained with vigorous application MLRs and appropriate arrests. We still see no light at end of tunnel on Constitution­makng and would note that intentions of West Pak establishment (govt, bureaucracy, Punjabi landlords) are now in sharper focus as result LFO and positions taken by Muslim League politicians. These intentions, as we read them, confirm our earlier view that establishment will not repeat not go extra mile to accommodate Mujib. Critical question from West Pak viewpoint is whether Mujib can or will compromise. Opinion here is divided, with many well-informed observers predicting country's split and others insisting Mujib will back down (there seems to be no question off West Pak establishment backing down). Few here stop to consider whether compromise would really be workable or politically acceptable in either Wing. Additional constitutional storm may be building up over powers of Presidency. Public mood, as far as is discernible, seems befuddled, bored with politics and cynical over prospects of "democratic" government emerging from present melee. MLA is in stronger position in Punjab than at any time in past nine months, largely as result Yahya's March 28 speech (Lahore's 560) and governor's respected tough posture. Islam vs. Socialism controversy continues to be noisy, but is essentially a political sideshow in terms of election impact although it does seem to be dragging political center to Right. For longer run, debate could have important bearing on govt policies and programs, especially if governing coalition is weak.

 

2. Remainder of paper will be addressed to specific points raised in para. 2 refftel a.

 

 

A. Considered Reactions To LFO - Reaction to LFO has been generally favorably among people who count here, once you strip away continuing disappointment over One Unit breakup (and sharp reaction in Bahawalpur to its inclusion in Punjab). Right has of late come to view some aspects of LFO with suspicion and in case of PDP last week proposed setting LFO aside and invoking 1956 Constitution. One PDP source attributes Right's new campaign for '56 Constitution to fear that Yahya will push Assembly for adoption of Turkish model with strong presidency and Yahya in the seat. Right campaign also undoubtedly reflects continuing belief that Assembly will fail to write Constitution in 120 days because of autonomy issue. Centrist Muslim Leaguers, on contrary, have reacted with enthusiasm to LFO as indicating regime will not go too far on autonomy question. At least some of them (viz. Shaukat Hayat) appear prepared to see strong Presidency written into Constitution (Lahore's A-31).

 

B. Islam vs. Socialism - controversy continues to dominate political debate and has had serious repercussions for ability of Left to operate freely in Punjab, as debate has spilled out into streets. However, for moment we see little evidence that Right has increased its own direct political support. Beneficiaries seem to be Muslim Leagues which are pleased to see force of Left decline, but at same time have no immediate fear of political power of Jamaat-i-Islam or PDP. One apparent result of Right's upper hand in Islam vs. Socialism debate has been to move Muslim League's discussions on economic and social issues to Right (Lahore's A-31 and press reports of Qaiyum's manifesto guidelines.) For future, distorting effects of Islam vs. Socialism controversy could have impact, but this possibility would be of less importance if strong centrist coalition could be formed. We tend believe MLA involved in Islam N -s. Socialism to extent of taking strong stand against violence from Left (and more tolerant view of provocations from Right) and through Sher All in actions against Leftist press elements (purge now under way of Leftists on staffs of Imroze and Pak Times, both Press Trust papers).

 

C. Youth - has been polarized by Islam vs. Socialism controversy and thereby has been far less engaged on national political scene than in '68-69 when students had common purpose against Ayub. Jamaat is strong on campuses, although its image suffered considerably from debacle at Punjab U when Jamaat faction raided VC's house. Polarization will continue prevent united student action on domestic political questions for foreseeable future and will thereby diminish direct student impact on political situation. Rumors rife that university and colleges in Lahore will not reopen until after October elections (and we bet rumors will prove correct) - eventuality that would further lessen chances any mass student involvement in first stage of political process.

 

D. Political Leaders and Constitution - (see A above).

 

E. Effect of one Unit Break-up on Campaign. We are already seeing political effects of pending breakup of One Unit in increased regionalization of politics. No party in West Pakistan can make reasonable claim to speak for entire area. Fact of regionalization of politics existed throughout One Unit period (although it was lightly disguised by pervasiveness of Ayub's official party) and we are now witnessing intensification this historical reality. CML comes closest to West Pak party, but its base is fundamentally Punjabi with some refugee and other support in Karachi and Sind. It barely exists in Frontier and Baluchistan. Similarly PPP has no strong roots in Punjab, nor does NAP/R or NAP/L. Possible exception is Jamaat-i-Islami, but real extent of its support (and whether it can genuinely qualify as important national political party) remains to be tested. Effect of regionalization of politics is bound to be greater concern with local issues and problems and less sympathy with notional issues if these involve conflicts with local interests. Regionalization of parties will also tend to make achievement of satisfactory coalition with common national purposes much more difficult than it might be, for example if CML or AL were powerful thoughout West Pakistan and East Wing.

 

F. Attitudes of Military - We have no new information on this subject, but would infer that as minimum military must be pleased with tougher line of MLA on Law and order question. Also, we infer from remarks of people who do have military contacts in senior and middle ranks that skepticism over viability of political process as means out of Pak dilemmas is common place among officers.

 

3. Longer View - Logic of present situation in Pakistan militates against continuation of one country over long term. Force contributing to acceleration of separatist juggernaut appear at this juncture stronger than ties that bind. In both Wings, positions taken by major forces increasingly point to fundamental and unresolvable conflict on autonomy question and disposition of national resources. (viz. rumored failure of panels of Five Year Plan).

 

There may be some method of papering over these conflicts in Constituent Assembly (element of compulsion on part of MLA and natural desire of elected politicians to enjoy luxury of five years in power would contribute), but compromise, like our own compromises on slavery question, bound to come unglued, and probably in fairly short order. Heart of matter, as we see it, is that interests of East and West Pakistan (or at least off Bengalis and Punjabis) are basically divergent and both sides now know it. One possible means of preventing separation that we see is through armed force and from this vantage point we are unable judge whether this is indeed viable means. If constitution is achieved in designated time, it will suffer fate of last two constitutions and like '62 version at some point be rejected by "popular demand" in either or both Wings. Widespread belief that constitution achieved under military pressure will only hasten rejection process.

 

POL:

PDConstable/db

 

 

Source: The American Papers- Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, The University Press Limited, p.363-366