Department of State

 

AIRGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL A- 149

 

TO       : Department of State

INFO   : DACCA, CALCUTTA, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, KABUL, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, LAHORE, LONDON, NEW DELHI, PESHAWAR, RANGOON

 

FROM : AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI

 

DATE  : May 22, 1970

 

SUB     : The Pakistani Political Scene

 

REF     : Rawalpindi l 101; 4119; Rawalpindi A-45, February 13, 1970; Rawalpindi A-145, MAY 18, 1970

 

As summer temperatures soar in West Pakistan and pre-monsoon humidity grips East Pakistan, Pakistanis are becoming increasingly confident that General Yahya Khan will permit the country's first-ever, free and democratic elections. The President's March 28 address, the Legal Framework Order issued March 30, the steady progress of the Election Commission machinery and the tougher stance the MLA has recently been taking toward extremist elements have convinced most doubters of Yahya's bona fides re elections and his regime's ability to maintain sufficient public order to permit peaceful balloting.

 

In West Pakistan, the firm and steady hand of Lt.-General Attiqur Rehman, who replaced Nur Khan as provincial governor in January, has had a calming effect and restored confidence in the administration. One continuing trouble area is the former Northwest Frontier Province where local authorities have been grappling with apparent limited success with a serious wave of criminal activity. The origin of the upsurge in violence among Pathans seems more economic than political. (See Peshawar's A-27 of May 14, 1970 for details.)

 

In East Pakistan, despite disappointment over aspects of the Legal Framework Order, the public still looks forward with expectancy to the coming elections and to the end of martial law. The recent onset of terrorist bombing attacks in Dacca and a few other cities has added a new and unsettling element, creating fresh apprehension in the province.

 

REACTION TO LFO POSITIVE IN WEST, NEGATIVE IN EAST

The reaction to Yahya's speech and the LFO in West Pakistan was on the whole very favourable. This was especially true in the Punjab where it was felt that Yahya had finally come down on the side of the Establishment in his emphasis on the need for national integrity and with the conservatives in his emphasis on Islamic ideology. In Sind and the NWFP, while the overall reaction was positive, the President's firm reiteration of his authentication powers raised doubts regarding his willingness to accept any significant diminution in the position of power currently enjoyed by Punjabis. In East Pakistan, the reaction to the LFO was negative. In addition to stirring dissatisfaction with the Yahya regime, the LFO has also increased doubts about the possibility that a political settlement can be reached to meet East Pakistan's desire for provincial autonomy and control over its own economy.

 

 

RIGHTISTS GAIN GROUND IN WEST PAKISTAN

Politically, the so-called rightist or Islamic forces in West Pakistan seem to have registered significant psychological gains at the expense of their leftist rivals. A rightist bandwagon now appears to be rolling as pro-Islamic, pro-integrity of Pakistan themes have become the dominant leit motif of electoral campaigning, especially in the Punjab. While leftists achieved a sizeable turnout for Bhashani's April peasant rally, they suffered bad setbacks with poor May Day rallies , losses to the right in the student and trade union field and most recently the unsuccessful leftist-sponsored newspaper strike.

 

At the moment, the rightists have seized the offensive in the communications field following collapse of the strike. Presumably with at least tacit support from Information Minister General Sher Ali, a purge of leftist journalists is underway. A rightist trend is discernable in the Urdu press where there has been a marked increase in attacks on domestic communists as anti-Islamic, and calls for further removals of leftists from posts of responsibility in the media, universities and government.

 

Politically more important, the swing to the right has influenced the stance of the moderate-conservative party leaders like Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat of the Council Muslim League, the leading party of the Punjab. While previously a post­electoral alliance between the CML and the Awami League seemed in the offing, CML leader Mumtaz Daultana now finds his party much less inclined toward such an arrangement as the swing to the right gains ground. While a Mujib-Daultana arrangement may in the end occur, it appears less likely than was the case several months ago. (See Lahore A-31 for further comment of CML views.)

 

 

PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY DOMINANT EAST PAK THEME

In East Pakistan, the political arena continues to be dominated by the provincial autonomy theme. Even if Mujib has lost ground as many believe, there are no signs that the appeal of his call for a fair deal for East Pakistan has diminished. Similarly,

the desire to push ahead with a division of the economies of East and West Pakistan to assure Bengali control over East Pakistan's economic development remains strong. In response to the visible stiffening in West Pak attitudes, one senses somewhat less optimism is Dacca that elections will in fact resolve the province's grievances. Nonetheless, the political leadership, especially Mujib, stands committed to the election route which the Awami League chief hopes will give him an overwhelming mandate of popular support.

 

 

BREAK-UP OFONE UNIT IN WEST

In West Pakistan the start of the new provincial governments on July 1 has focused attention on related administrative arrangements. Politically the break-up of the Unit has accelerated the trend toward provincialization. None of the major parties can any longer be said to have strength throughout West Pakistan. As noted in Rawalpindi A­145, the electoral campaign in each province is assuming a different character. In Sind, Baluchistan and the Frontier considerable unhappiness exists over the small number of seats in the provincial assemblies.

 

 

LAHORE FIELD: LESS POLITICS MORE ECONOMIST

Ferment has continued in the labor field during the past three months as workers seek to assert their rights under the new labor regulations. Somewhat unexpectedly, the current unrest has generally had an economic rather than political character. The feared polarization of labor politically has, in fact, not occurred. On the contrary, more moderate leadership seems to be gaining ground at the expense of radicals. The tougher stand of the government has discouraged the extremists. The workers themselves have shown less than the anticipated interest in purely political questions and more concern about bread and butter issues.

 

 

YOUTH: POLITICALLY ACTIVE, BUT DIMINISHED IMPACT

If labor has not polarized, university youth has. In West Pakistan both rightist and leftist camps have become even more clearly identified, with the student arm of the Jamaat-i-Islami showing considerable strength and leftists centered in the National Student Federation. In East Pakistan, virtually all parties are seeking to mobilize students as workers for the election campaign. The Awami League has the upper hand and by far the largest student organization. The rival NAP (L) student group, like the parent party, is racked with internal dissension and recently split into several factions.

While students are likely to be active in the campaign in both wings, their overall public impact is reduced from a year ago. Because of the ideological and political polarization, they lack the single focus they had in the anti-Ayub agitation. The

Yahya regime, as such, continues to remain largely out of the Direct line of fire from students.

 

 

BUSINESS: FEWER WORRIES ABOUT FUTURE

As the elections seem more certain, businessmen are turning their thoughts from adjusting to the MLA to considering how they will get along with an elected government. In this regard, one senses increasing confidence that business will be able to work out a modus vivendi. Of late there is less concern about calls by the politicians for nationalization and increasing attention regarding taxes, import policies, price supports for agricultural exports, levels of economic assistance, adjustments in exchange rate (will the Bonus Voucher System be preserved or will there by devaluation), and the parameters of the Fourth Five-Year Plan.

 

 

THE MILITARY: REASSURED ABOUT YAHYA, DOUBTS ABOUT DEMOCRACY

To the limited extent, the Mission can gain insight into the thinking of the Pak military, we have the impression it is satisfied that Yahya has adopted a tougher stance with extremists and has helped bring greater stability into the current scene. The military is also pleased by signs that Yahya seems inclined to require a constitution that preserves a strong center. As the campaign proceeds, we have also heard reports that the military is increasingly skeptical (as are other elements of the West Pakistani establishment) that the democratic process will prove viable in Pakistan. At the same time, there is a willingness to proceed with elections and to give the politicians a chance to govern, if only to prove their incapacity.

 

 

BEYOND THE ELECTION: DOUBTS ABOUT CONSTITUTION-MAKING

In general, the increased confidence that elections will be held is not matched by equal confidence that the National Assembly will produce a satisfactory constitution and then be able to provide the country with adequate leadership. As East and West Pakistani leaders increasingly talk at cross-purposes, constitution-making seems a more formidable task than several months ago. With positions becoming hardened, the chances for compromise seem poorer, especially on the key issue of provincial autonomy. Although public discussion has focused on this question, other issues are being discussed privately as the politicians consider constitutional questions behind the scenes. Here too East-West Pak differences appear. For example, on the important question of the powers of the presidency, CML leader Shaukat Hayat told us his party favours equipping the President with strong emergency power, while Mujib's legal adviser, Kamal Hossain, said the Awami League was studying ways to assure limited and weak emergency powers for the President.

 

Conceivably, the political leaders will be more amenable to compromise after elections. The allure of five years in office should provide a considerable impetus for MNA normal size to meet the other side halfway. Moreover, the parliamentarians are likely to receive "help and guidance" on constitution-making from President Yahya and his advisers, who are armed with the threat of new elections if the assembly fails to produce a constitution Yahya feels he can authenticate.

 

Possibly, interwing differences can be bridged. But this will clearly take more understanding on basic issues and a greater willingness to work out satisfactory compromises than has so far been evidenced. Theoretically, one such arrangement might be a Mujib-Yahya deal under which East Pakistan would receive control over its economy and in turn would guarantee to maintain defense spending at levels satisfactory to the military.

 

Even if differences are not fully bridged, a constitution that papers these over may well emerge, and permit an elected government to take office. In such a case, East-West Pak divergencies would remain unresolved and could subject the new government to heavy strains. Unless a genuine East-West consensus develops, any new governmental structure, even one in which Bengalis play a major role, would appear to be inherently fragile and to have a relatively short life expectancy. Whether a collapse would lead to a formal split between East and West Pakistan or to the reimposition of martial law over the country would, of course, depend on the situation then prevailing: the specific circumstances under which the break occurred, the mood of the military leadership and the willingness of Bengalis to match present fiery words with deeds.

 

Sober

 

 

Source: The American Papers- Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, The University Press Limited, p.358-362