Department of State

AIRGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL A-109

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: RAWALPINDI, DACCA, LAHORE, PESHAWAR

FROM: KARACHI

DATE: June 9, 1970

SUB: Conversation with Yusuf Haroon

1. Enclosed with this airgram is a memorandum describing a conversation between a Consulate General officer and YUSUF A. HAROON, Chairman of Pakistan Services Limited (which operates the Intercontinental Hotel chain in Pakistan), brother of Agriculture Minister MAHMOOD HAROON. briefly Governor of West Pakistan immediately prior to the imposition of Martial Law and effective head of Karachi's politically prestigious Haroon family of Karachi. Haroon, who spend much of his time in New York, had returned to Pakistan to participate in the cornerstone-laying ceremonies for the Khyber Intercontinental Hotel in Peshawar and to take political soundings.

2. During the conversation, Haroon discussed the presently bleak prospects for merger of the political centrists and his analysis of the standings of several of the mote important political parties. In addition and more importantly, he voice grave concern about the intentions of the military, characterizing their activities directed towards the restoration of civilian rule as a "charade". It is Haroon's view that the military is anxious to have the elections held. However, he concludes that they do not believe that the Constituent Assembly can frame a constitution and this eventuality will enable the military to justify their continuation in power.

Luppi

Memorandum of Conversation

PARTICIPANTS : YOUSUF A. HAROON, Chairman, Pakistan Services Limited, brother of Agriculture Minister MAHMOOD HAROON and effective head of the politically-prestigious Haroon family of Karachi.

D.M. Cochran, Political Officer, Amcongen Karachi.

DATE : June 5, 1970

PLACE : Offices of Pakistan Services Limited, Karachi

Prospects for Mergers by Centrists: Haroon said that the prospects for cooperation between poitical centrists are presently most bleak. One of the primary reasons for his trip to Pakistan at this time was to study the current situation with special attention to the possibility of bringing about some measure of cooperation between the center parties. As the result of his several conversations, he found that while the leaders of the Council Muslim League (CML), Mian Mumtaz DAULTANA, and the Convention Muslim League (PML), FAZL QADER CHOUDHRY, see the need for joint effort, their lieutenants are opposed and thus the two leaders are unable to make any headway. Equally importantly, the rump Convention Muslim League (QML) led by Khan Abdul QAYYUM KHAN is in no present mood for cooperation with either of the other Muslim Leagues. Haroon expressed the view that Qayyum Khan's intransigeance stems largely from the encouragement he is receiving from Finance Minister Muzaffar All QAZILBASH who, moved by a desire to thwart Daultana's ambitions, is seeking to use the QML as a counterweight to the CML. The existence of the Daultana-Qizilbash antipathy is, says Haroon, most unfortunate for it makes the possibility of centrist cooperation even more remote than would "normal" inter-party rivalry.

Political Role of the MLA: Haroon said that as a result of his conversations he has been forced to the conclusion that the commitment of the Martial Law Administration (MLA) to the restoration of civilian rule is false, public protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. He said that following his conversations, especially with General GUL HASAN and General UMAR ("afriend of twenty-five years"), he has come to the opinion that the senior military officers are engaged in a "charade". It is his view that the military is quite prepared to hold the October elections but that they are attempting to insure that the Constituent Assembly (CA) is so fragmented as to render impossible the drafting of a constitution which will have the support of a majority of the CA's members. Though their light rein on labor, students and the more exuberant political parties, they are laying the ground for a situation in which concerted action is extremely difficult. Moreover, by leaving nine months for the parties to "campaign", the military anticipate that the contenders will adopt increasingly hard positions which will make compromise equally difficult. Once the populace have come to realize that the politicians cannot act unitedly, he said, the military will have justification for continued rule.

Haroon said that the senior officers are, however, mistaken if they believe that they will be able to hold power for long. If the military retains power, it will not be long before younger officers at the lieutenant colonel and major level mount a coup. This group is already disenchanted with the senior group, and especially with President YAHYA who is now focussing less on the business of governing than on the pleasures of life, now even more readily available. Should such a coup occur, the ruling group woud doubtless prove to be more xenophobic, puritanical and leftist in economic terms.

Position of the Parties:

The Muslim Leagues: The CML will do well in Punjab and make a creditable showing in Sind; individuals indentified with the PML will do well in constituencies where they have power, but the party itself suffers crippling disabilities; the QML may give the CML a flutter in Punjab and capture some seats in Sind while perhaps proving a relatively formidable challenger in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). But if cooperation between the three parties were possible, the position of a united Muslim League in West Pakistan would be much more significant.

Wali Khan faction of the National Awami Party (NAP/R): The NAP/R should take 4060 percent of the seats in the NWFP, but will face a stiff challenge from the QML. In Baluchistan, it should fill the field.

Awami League: The Awami League still holds a commanding lead in East Pakistan but its ability to function effectively in the post-election period is subject to serious doubt. Sheikh Mujibur RAHMAN is, through his evermore extreme statements, making it more and more difficult for his party and himself to play any constructive role during the period of constitution-making. Moreover, his increasingly rigid stand on the Six Points is depriving him of the flexibility which will be needed in the process of compromise required to meet (i) Punjabi concerns and (ii) the terms of the Legal Framework Order. "I have known Mujib for many years - it is well-known that we (the Haroons) have long supported him - and he is far from bright or supple." Now, said Haroon, he is allowing himself to take - or be forced to take - a stance which could well prove irreconciliable with West Pakistani interests. However, reliance on rhetoric is the order of the day; not only the Awami League but all other parties are using unfulfillable promises rather than working within the realm of the possible. Their inability to resile in the post-election period from the positions they are now taking will simply play into the hands of the military.

Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP): Haroon said that the PPP has proven to be a phenomenal attention-getter, but its ability to secure any significant number of seats is open to quetion. In Sind, the party has demonstrated considerable strength. This may, however, prove to be temporary since a significant number of PPP Chairman Z.A. BHUTTO's followers are beginning to question the value of their present allegiance. They joined the party after concluding that Bhutto would have an important role to play following the election. This

group now questions this judgment and many among their number are beginning to look elsewhere, a development which suggests the PPP may soon suffer a sudden decline in real support. In Punjab and NWFP, Bhutto enjoys considerable popularity but is unable to find suitable condidates who might translate this popularity into votes.

Jamaat-i-Islami: The Jamaat is well-organized and well-financed but its ability to obtain votes is still questionable. While it may enjoy a measure of popular backing, it- like the PPP - does not appear to have the kinds of individuals within its ranks who can secure votes. It is influential but probably a poor compaigner.

The Future of Pakistan: Haroon stated that he and his brother Mahmood are seriously troubled, and fear that it will prove very difficult for Pakistan to remain unified. (For Mahmood's views, which this conversation suggests remain unchanged, see Karachi's A150, Sept. 10, 1969). Positions are hardening in both wings, and in the West Wing, Punjab is far and away the most opposed to East Pakistan's aspirations. Haroon said that he still plans to play some political role in Pakistan he went so far as to discuss his views of the Presidency under a constitution permitting civilian rule, indicating that this was an office he might find attractive (with Mujib as Prime Minister?). Nevertheless, he added that he is turning his attention more and more to his business interests abroad, leaving the distinct impression that he is preparing himelf for the emergence of either an etatist government or, quite possibly, chaos.

An American Role: At the end of the conversation, Haroon said that he might soon feel required to call on the United States for assistance. Haroon was told that the U.S. Government will not intervene in Pakistan's internal affairs. He indicated his understanding of this position but added that Pakistan may need even greater support in the near future (Note: It was difficult to avoid concluding that Haroon, should be return to Pakistan to take a more active apolitical role, can entertain the idea that he may be called to high office.) Haroon added that he plans to return after another month or so to test the climate. He had expected to stay longer on this visit (he left Pakistan on June 6) but found that there was little scope for any political activity on his part, particularly in regard to bringing together the centrists.

Source: The American Papers- Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, The University Press Limited, p.372-375