Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on
Released
by the Office of the Historian
Conversation Among President
Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and
the Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13-5:40 p.m.
Nixon:
Like all of
our other Indian ambassadors, he’s been brainwashed. Completely throw in
[unclear]. Anti-Pakistan.
Keating:
All right, now let me—
Nixon:
Where are your sandals?
Keating:
Give me—
Nixon:
[unclear]
Keating:
Give me 5 minutes.
Nixon:
I hope you haven’t turned the Embassy over to those hippies like your
predecessor. [unclear
exchange]
Keating:
Let me have 5 minutes to—
Nixon:
Go ahead.
Keating: —just give you a little
background. Then you want to ask me some
questions about the Foreign Minister.
Nixon:
Go ahead. No, I—he should meet
with the Foreign Minister, don’t you think so?
Kissinger:
Yeah. Are you going to leave—
Keating:
Yes, I’ll be—
Nixon:
I think he ought to come in with him. [unclear]
Kissinger:
[unclear]
Nixon:
The point is, the point is it’s best to get you
with the Foreign Minister. If he wants
to talk to us, talk to the Ambassador.
We don’t normally have ambassadors in.
I’d get some iced tea? Would you
like iced tea?
Keating:
No, no.
Nixon:
Booze?
Keating:
No, nothing.
Nixon:
Coffee?
Kissinger:
Coffee.
Nixon:
Maybe coffee.
Keating:
Now in all seriousness—
Nixon:
Keating:
They are difficult.
Nixon:
I listen to it all the time.
Keating:
The Indians are—
Nixon:
[unclear exchange]
Keating:
Let me say personally, I’m delighted that you’re starting off that way
because—
Nixon:
I’m not [unclear].
Keating:
Don’t let any of these bastards get you down. And you’re not, that’s
great. That—I don’t mean any.
Nixon:
Yeah.
Keating:
The Indians are difficult, and time after time I’ve had to talk to them,
to have stood up to them on
Nixon:
Yeah.
Keating:
But the rightist parties were completely wiped out. And since that time there has been evidence
of greater stability and a better relationship with us.
Nixon:
That’s good.
Keating:
Let me give you chapter and verse of two things. Remington Rand and Union Carbide have big
interests there. Union Carbide very big. They’ve been trying for several years to get
a license to extend their activities. All bureaucrat stuff from one ministry to another. Three weeks after the election they were
called in and said we’re going to approve your license. Get going.
We need employment. Have as much
of your product as possible, export oriented, but get going and there will be
no delay. And the presidents of the
Indian companies of those two concerns came in to see me. And we’ve been trying to help. Just delightful, and they are. I went to call on the new Minister of
Industrial Development, Choudhury [Moinul Haq], who succeeded my
friend Mr. Dinesh Singh, the son-of-a-bitch, and he
is a top notch. Just
top notch. And I had a
conversation with him that I have never had since I’ve been in
Next, Mrs. Gandhi.
Our relations have always been pleasant.
She has never turned me down when I wanted an appointment. But since then, they’re more cordial since
her election. Now part of it is because
she’s got this weight off her mind. She
was trying to run a government with a minority party. And now she can, if she has the will, can do
the things that she thinks ought to be done.
I escorted her to a concert that Mahalia
Jackson gave her; if I had the time I’d tell you about it, it was the most
fantastic performance and she just loved it.
And she couldn’t be nicer in her dealings with me. So that I consider that there is a change in
the situation. And I sent two cables to
the Department. Henry, the numbers are
5311—New
Nixon:
[unclear]
Keating:
One was sent shortly after the Army went in and started the killing in
Kissinger:
Yeah, I’ve read it.
Keating:
You know, it was the result of a lot of
talk. It represents my—
Kissinger:
The basic principle is that [unclear].
Keating:
Yes. [unclear
exchange] The main thing is to... I’m convinced there is a change in the
subcontinent. And that
Nixon:
[unclear]
Kissinger:
No, I didn’t see that.
Nixon:
Is it something to act on now?
Keating:
No, no. They represent in further
form my views, and they're the consensus of my staff that is super. I have a wonderful staff, I think, and
they’re so loyal, and they’re just great.
Nixon:
That’s good.
Keating:
Now, I presume you’re interested in knowing what the Foreign Minister is
going to say to you. And I can only
guess, but I have talked—
Nixon:
What does he want? Does he want
to talk about—I suppose he wants to talk about
Keating:
Yes, that’s it. Because—
Nixon:
What do they want us to do?
Keating:
Well this—
Nixon:
Break up
Keating:
No. No. In the beginning they
were, just as we were, for a single
Nixon:
What are we up to now?
Keating:
Seventeen and a half million.
Kissinger:
Yes.
Keating:
And—
Nixon:
The first one was two and a half million.
Keating:
Yes, it was two and a half million when I went in.
Kissinger:
The C–130s.
Keating:
And the C–130s. That’s all a
new—we’re doing quite a little. And he
should be, I believe will be grateful.
He’s a very nice fellow; I don’t know that you’ve met him.
Nixon:
No.
Keating:
Very kind fellow. Now, beyond
that, he will say, as he did to me: "This aid is great. We appreciate it
very much." But he said the basic
problem is to try to get these refugees back into
Nixon:
What is it, 300,000?
Kissinger:
No, it’s about—
Keating:
Five million. And add that it’s in a crowded part of
Nixon:
Sorry, it was 300,000 we were feeding.
Keating:
That’s right. That’s
correct. About five million, and of that
about three of them—
Nixon:
Why don’t they shoot them?
Keating:
About three of them are in
Nixon:
What does he think, Ken, we should do?
What would we recommend?
Keating:
He thinks—I think he thinks—
Nixon:
We should pressure Yahya?
Keating:
Yes. I think he feels that—what he said is
Now, I am conscious of the special
relationship that you have with Yahya.
And I respect it and I don’t to want to—
Nixon:
[unclear]
Keating:
Personal relationship.
Nixon:
Not only just that, but there are some other major considerations.
Keating:
Well—
Nixon:
Well, let me say this, when do we see Singh? Tomorrow?
Kissinger:
Thursday, Mr. President.
Nixon:
Thursday, fine. [Thursday was
June 17. The meeting took place on June
16.]
Keating:
There has been some suggestion that it will be possible for you to, I
don’t think this has come to you yet, but it’s something we’ve talked about in
the Department—
Nixon:
Yeah.
Keating:
It will be so long before aid to
Kissinger:
No, no. I know about the—Connally told me about it.
Nixon:
Yeah.
Kissinger:
That’s a scheme they thought up of taking $25 million out of—
Nixon:
The
Kissinger:
The
Nixon:
I think we just better find the money to give to
Keating:
I don’t think any, I don’t think any—I think they had about $80 million
for
Kissinger:
Well they want to take—there’s $70 million for
[Omitted here is a discussion
unrelated to
Nixon:
Let me say
this, I don’t want to give you the wrong impression about
Keating:
550.
Nixon:
550? [unclear]
Keating:
There are.
Nixon:
I don’t know why the hell anybody would reproduce in that damn country
but they do. But nevertheless, I know
that country is trying to make it [unclear] basically with some semblance of
democracy—private enterprise, call it whatever you want. And I know that looming over from the north
are the Chinese [unclear]. It’s,
therefore, very much in our interest to see that
Keating:
Not always.
Nixon:
Not always. But that’s
irrelevant. I mean [unclear] but what
I’m getting at is here, right now, you can be sure that we will play a friendly
game with the Indians. Particularly in view of the fact that the Government is
more stable, that is good, and you can take a more rational line on things like
Keating:
Yes.
Nixon:
And let me say, the openness as far as the Congress is concerned, there really isn’t anything in it. [unclear] Not one goddamn bit. It’s not a popular country in this Congress.
Keating:
No, I know that. I served
there. I know that.
Nixon:
But that is even less popular today because foreign aid is less popular.
Keating:
That’s right.
Nixon:
But nevertheless—
Keating:
But in the Congress there’s a strong feeling on this
Nixon:
I understand that, I understand that.
[unclear] Hell, they had us involved in a civil
war in
Keating:
And we also must avoid—if possible—any conflict, armed conflict, between
the two.
Nixon:
Oh, God.
Keating:
And the Indians, they’re pressing Mrs. Gandhi so hard, and Parliament is
now in session, the politicians are—
Nixon:
Yeah.
Keating:
And up to date I must say she’s been a [unclear]. They’re pressing her very hard that we can’t
stand this refugee thing. We’ll just go in
and take a little piece out of
[Omitted here is a discussion
unrelated to
Nixon:
I don’t know what the Christ we are up to.
Kissinger:
The most insulting way we can—
Nixon:
You have to go now?
Kissinger:
I have an appointment with Rush but he can wait.
Nixon:
[unclear] My God, does Farland, is he sending memoranda
that he thinks
Kissinger:
Baloney. He’s got this maniac in
Nixon:
Right. Right. You told him that?
Kissinger:
I told him all of that.
Nixon:
We don’t tell the Foreign Minister that?
Kissinger:
No, you can tell the Foreign Minister that above all. But in front of Keating he’ll blab it all
over. Yeah, I’d say we have great
sympathy, but they must be restrained.
And we’ll try to find some money but we cannot take it out of the
Nixon:
Well the Ambassador will tell the Foreign Minister that.
Kissinger:
Oh, yeah.
Nixon:
But Keating will go blab it over to the State Department. What Keating had [unclear]
Kissinger:
Well it would be considered such an insult by Yahya that the whole deal
would be off.
Nixon:
I don’t know what the Christ he’s talking about.
Kissinger:
I will, when I’m talking to the Chinese, set up a separate channel so
that we’re not so vulnerable. I mean we
can’t be that—
Nixon:
Of course, I don’t know, Henry, it just may be that the poor
son-of-a-bitch can’t survive. Five million? Is it
that bad really or are they exaggerating?
Kissinger:
Of course, I don’t know how many of them they generate?
Nixon:
Yeah.