Telegram
from the Department of State to the embassy in India/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, REF PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted
and approved for transmission by Schneider and cleared in substance by Van Hollen. Also sent to US Mission Geneva and repeated to
USUN, Islamabad, Dacca, Calcutta, and London.
Washington, June 26, 1971,
2258Z.
115314.
Subject: East
Pakistan
Refugees; Discussions with UNHCR Sadruddin.
1.
Following is Noforn, FYI only, uncleared
and subject to revision on review:
Summary:
During discussions in Washington June 24 with the
Secretary, and Assistant Secretary Sisco, UNHCR,
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan,
indicated grave consequences which could flow from presence of East Pakistan refugees in India. He described his
efforts to obtain a UNHCR presence in East Pakistan and India in order to facilitate
return flow of refugees. Said that GOP had agreed to his presence in
Dacca and he believed he
could obtain Pakistani agreement to presence in refugee reception centers. GOI,
however, had categorically refused to accept UNHCR presence beyond
New Delhi. Sadruddin,
who was quite critical of Indian policies regarding refugee return, said Indian
refusal appeared result from GOI desire protect cross border infiltration from
international view. UNHCR believed some return flow possible on basis
restoration of peace, even before political accommodation, but Indian
cooperation, which thus far not forthcoming, would be essential. Sadruddin also expressed concern regarding possible Soviet
objection to UN operation of sort he is planning. Department encouraged Sadruddin continue his efforts and it was agreed we would
keep in close touch in future. End summary.
2. Sadruddin started off hour-long discussion with Secretary
and Sisco June 24 by expressing his great concern
that unless quick political solution to East Pakistan situation could be
found, there might be a new Viet Nam in South Asia. There was polarization
between Bengalis and Punjabis, with no sympathy between the two elements.
Extremists in East Pakistan-Naxalites-are using fear
against a "foreign army" to strengthen themselves. Result could be
extended guerrilla warfare. Sadruddin explained India was quite worried about
this. The Inner Cabinet had decided not to recognize "Bangla
Desh," not to go to war with Pakistan but to provide complete
support for the "Mukhti Fauj."
Consequently India does not wish there to
be UN presence on East Pakistan border. It desires international relief
but does not wish to have foreigners wandering about border areas.
3.
Discussing return flow of refugees, Sadruddin said he
thought some East Pakistanis would return if they had an element of guarantee. Sadruddin has already received GOP approval for UNHCR
presence in Dacca. He believes he can get
agreement to presence in refugee reception centers, but to do this he may have
to have Indian agreement to presence on Indian side border. He considers some
refugees would return with simply a return to peace in East Pakistan, if only because of the
"continuous squalor" of Indian refugee camps. Expressed
concern, however, about inconsistency of Indian policy. On the one hand,
India complains about
presence of six million refugees and insists they must return and on the other
hand it imposes conditions (negotiations with Mujib,
etc.) for their return. Speaking of "Indian escalation," Sadruddin referred to possibility of Indian
"preventive aggression" and said resulting conflict would place
regional and great powers in very difficult situation, comparable to Middle East. Said there was also
danger that international community would be left with indefinite burden of
supporting refugees.
4. UNHCR
said India was not following a
logical pragmatic path. It says it does not want escalation and refugees must
return, but it seems uninterested in repatriation. It is important that India not insist upon
political solution as prior condition for return of refugees. By political
solution, India appears to mean return
of Mujib. While India confronted by burden of
refugees and possible communal problems, it is in excellent international
position. Pakistan is weak, substantial
international assistance is being provided, and there is great sympathy for India. India has succeeded in
bringing US and Soviet Union together in an airlift. Consequently, there is
every reason for India to be moderate in
regard to refugee return. Yet Foreign Secretary Kaul
was adamant against any UN presence in India along East Pakistan border. It seems
obvious India wishes to keep very
close control of border area.
5. Sisco commented it very important we make major point to
Indians in regard to UN role and presence. This would contribute to stopping
refugee flow and reversing it. It is essential that there be no East-West
conflict regarding the UN role. We want financial support for this UN activity
from many nations, including Soviets. We would hope Soviets would support and
use their influence on the Indians because of the danger to their interest of a
prolonged impasse regarding refugees.
6. Sadruddin said we must be sure Soviets will not attack UN
role regarding refugees as they have in past regarding Congo and Korea. Asked
what their position likely to be in Fifth Committee regarding financing.
Sisco commented Indian attitude likely to be the key.
If Indians see UN role as in their interest, then Soviets
likely support.
7. Sisco inquired about Sadruddin's
view of Yahya. Sadruddin
replied pressures on him very great. He must make all decisions. He is not
happy about army actions in East Pakistan and agreed that actions
against Hindus were unfortunate. He covers army, however. Sadruddin
emphasized importance of his maintaining relationship with Yahya.
He is only person of importance in Pakistan. Because of what UNHCR
has done to maintain this relationship, he has come under attack in India. GOI, however, conveyed
apologies.
8. Sadruddin reported that in 28th June speech/2/ Yahya will say those elected members of Awami
League who are not "criminals" should come forward and lead people of
East
Pakistan
so that he can hand over power to them. He will announce Turkish type of
constitution providing for substantial army control. Sadruddin
feared this would not be enough. He should withdraw army. Yet he cannot do so
in border areas so long as India supporting
infiltration. If India accepted UN presence,
then perhaps Yahya could withdraw troops. Said it
important keep pressure on India to moderate its
position on refugee return; control Bangla Desh elements; and stop infiltration. If Indians wanted to
crack down on latter they could.
/2/ The text of President Yahya's June
28 speech was transmitted to the Department in telegram 6477 from
Islamabad, June 28. (Ibid., POL 15-1 PAK)
9. Sadruddin said he had spent day with SYG in
New York. SYG had said he would
talk to Malik and tell him UN presence in East Pakistan was necessary. UNHCR
did not know whether he would speak similarly about need for presence in India. This because SYG
concerned Malik will say this depends upon Indians.
10. Sadruddin said when he met with Mrs. Gandhi she was very
"hawkish." She sought to impress him with seriousness of situation
saying "we may have to resort to other means." Secretary said Swaran Singh had used term "special measures" or
"another option" when he was in Washington. Secretary had replied
that if he meant military means, we thought this would be very great mistake. Swaran Singh then backed away from this implication.
11. UNHCR
said India was taking position it
was controlling and coordinating relief. There was no need for UN presence or
presence on part of other foreigners. Foreign teams were not welcome. This was
causing problems in UK.
12. Sadruddin concluded by stating East Pakistan situation is greatest
challenge to confront UN which had become involved largely because of US
urging. Unfortunately, UN was quite weak administratively. He expressed concern
that UN may not be able to meet challenge unless it can get help. UNHCR
organization already over-extended. British press has been highly critical of UN.
SYG does not have specific plan in mind. Sadruddin
spoke of UN's recruiting new personnel, including persons from Eastern Europe.
Rogers