Telegram
from the embassy in Pakistan to the Department of
State/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, REF PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Calcutta,
Dacca,
New
Delhi,
Geneva,
USUN, and London.
Islamabad, June 28, 1971,
1440Z.
6487. Subj: East Pakistan Refugees: Kellogg
Discussion with Pres. Yahya.
1.
Summary: In discussion with Special Assistant Kellogg/2/ June 28, Pres. Yahya voiced sharp concern over GOI general intentions and
specifically whether it would allow refugees to return to East Pakistan. Expressed earnest
desire that refugees return, offering full cooperation with UN. Yahya defensive
about current situation in East Pakistan. He was skeptical about
bona fides of streams of apparent refugees whom Kellogg had seen moving inland
on Indian side of border. Yahya urged that Kellogg go
to East
Pakistan
to see for himself, and Kellogg agreed to do so. End summary.
/2/ Frank
L. Kellogg, the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Refugee and
Migration Affairs.
2. Special
Assistant Kellogg, accompanied by Ambassador and DCM, had 45-minute meeting
with Pres. Yahya June 28 on refugee problem. Kellogg
noted he had just visited several refugee camps and also had seen streams of
refugees, who had apparently just come out of East Pakistan, on the Jessore-Calcutta road. Yahya
expressed doubt, stating that some persons seem to move back and forth;
visitors were given wrong information about actual closeness of border; and Yahya thought that large numbers of people could not now
still be coming from Pakistan to India. Kellogg commented that he had spoken to
number of individual refugees, selected by him at random, albeit through
interpreters. They were very largely unsophisticated agriculturist types and
they could not merely have been repeating a story they had been told to relate.
Moreover most stated they had been trekking up to 10 days.
3. Yahya launched into bitter attack on PriMin
Gandhi and her government. He referred to statements in which Mrs. Gandhi
reported to have said that refugees can't go back. "Indian Government says
they won't let them go back." Some of the few refugees who have trickled
back, he said, show wounds and say they were beaten up on main roads in India leading back to Pakistan. Kellogg interjected
that none of Indian officials with whom he had spoken had indicated anything
other than that India wanted refugees to
return to East
Pakistan
as soon as possible. Kellogg noted enormous economic, religious, political and
social pressures on India resulting from refugee
influx, and GOI estimated that $400 million would be required to care for
refugees over six-month period. Yahya reverted to
statements "she" had made. She does not want refugees to return to
territory controlled by Pak Government. She wants political settlement of her
choosing, and then she would turn refugees loose. Kellogg repeated that, from FonSec on down, none of Indian officials with whom he had
spoken had said they wanted refugees to remain; nor had any referred to desire
to see independent East Pakistan; "Bangla Desh" was never once mentioned to him. Meanwhile, if
persons were continuing to leave East Pakistan and not returning in
any appreciable numbers, Kellogg said, it would appear that they continued to
be motivated by fear which caused them to flee in first place.
4. Yahya said he had been told by reliable Bengalis that the
outflow had been halted. Kellogg should go and see for himself. There is no
slaughter going on. Some armed opposition to the government was continuing, and
it was meeting with armed response. How did those
"thousands of arms" come into East Pakistan, Yahya
asked. Pak forces had captured many weapons from Indian infiltrators. Some
regular Indian army men (whom he acknowledged numbered only five) had been captured
on Pak territory. Latter did not include large number of other infiltrators who
came in to fight, blow up bridges, mine areas and then rush back to India when
they see Pak military approaching. Shelling and firing continue from Indian
side of border. Pak army has to fight back. When Awami
Leaguers flew Bangla Desh
flag over East
Pakistan,
it reflected direct collusion by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with GOI. Now Indian support was taking different
form, Yahya said. "You have seen the refugee
camps; you didn't see their training camps" (i.e., for East Pak resistance). Kellogg
acknowledged that he had seen countless persons in refugee camps under squalid
conditions, but he had not seen any training camps in India.
5. Kellogg
said he had sense of urgency. Indian FonSec had also
used that term, adding that "If refugees can't move back, something must
be done." That set Yahya off on another outburst
against Indians. Referring to the refugees, he said "I want them to come
back." He asked whether GOI would do anything to help, such as pulling its
army back from borders. Urging Kellogg again to go see for himself, Yahya said that it would be credible if he personally saw
"many thousands" streaming out from East Pak side. Noting that
Bengalis may look alike, Yahya said it would be easy
to be misled by persons claiming to be refugees but who might actually be destitutes who had previously been living in India. Mrs. Gandhi, Yahya said, had instigated the current problems through
clandestine plotting with Mujib. Her people plotted
against Pakistan. They had armed the
opposition. They had imposed a ban on overflights.
Now India might be hopeful of getting large amounts of additional foreign aid,
on pretext of refugee need, to help it cope with own existing problems.
6. Kellogg,
attempting to get discussion back to urgent need to deal with refugee
situation, stated that American people were deeply concerned over the suffering
and that we were anxious to do what we could to help. Yahya
retorted that it would be most helpful if India would stop giving
support to armed resistance and would help get refugees started back. He said
that impression might have been gained from foreign press that East Pakistan was burning. That is
not so; it is not an inferno. East Pakistan is now open territory, Yahya said. Vast majority of area is quiet, although border
areas remain unstable. Yahya referred to presence and
action of Indian border security force and Indian army in border regions. Main
support to resistance thus far had come from BSF. But if Indian army moved
against East
Pakistan,
Yahya said matter-of-factly, "of course,
fighting can't be limited to East Pak istan."
He said Indians were maintaining 30-35 training camps and arming East Pak civilians in them.
Responding to Kellogg's comment that Indian FonSec
had said it was not in India's interest to have
independent East
Pakistan, Yahya
said vehemently "Kaul is a damned liar. His
actions don't tally with what he says." Yahya
added that it is important to see what is actually happening. Pakistan's borders are being
kept boiling. He said Kellogg should go to the border areas and see which way
the firing was coming from. Then he could ask Kaul
how the thousands of captured arms came to East Pakistan.
7. Yahya said he would like to get UN in to help bring back
refugees. Referring to rhubarb in India over Sadruddin's statements there, Yahya
said UNHCR had actually said that conditions are not normal but that they are
returning to normal although it would take time. Yahya
claimed that Sadruddin was criticized in India because he was Mussulman.
8.
Ambassador referred to suggestion he had made to Yahya
on June 24 that President appoint full-time high-level refugee coordinator. Yahya referred to appointment of H.R. Malik/3/ who would be
working with "Kittani's/4/ people." He said another man would be
working with UNHCR rep, but did not give any details and did not seem in mood
to concentrate on that aspect.
/3/ H.R. Malik, chairman of the East Pakistan Agriculture
Development Corporation, charged with responsibility for administering the
distribution of food.
/4/ Ismat Kittani, UN Assistant
Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs, appointed Special Representative of
the Secretary-General to establish guidelines for United Nations assistance for
East
Pakistan
in May 1971.
9.
Referring to fighting in border areas, Kellogg asked whether some persons were
fleeing into interior of East Pakistan. Yahya
said some had, and referred vaguely to number of Beharis
whom government was looking after.
10. Ambassador
used occasion to inform Yahya that USG had just
authorized additional $1 million for coasters that could help meet urgent
transport needs not only in cyclone areas but elsewhere in East Pakistan. Also
informed Yahya of authorization for $4.7 million for
variety of relief and reconstruction activities in cyclone area, to cover such
needs as housing, shelters, and embankments. Ambassador pointed out that
agreements would have to be concluded within two days, i.e. by end of fiscal
year. Yahya expressed appreciation, although his mind
was obviously focused primarily on problems with India which he recounted.
11.
Reverting for at least third time near end of conversation of value of
Kellogg's seeing situation for himself in East Pakistan, Yahya
asked that we inform FonSec Sultan Khan and have him
arrange trip. Kellogg said he accepted Yahya's
suggestion, and Ambassador undertook inform FonSec
soonest. (Ambassador did so in meeting FonSec about
one hour later. FonSec assured that arrangements will
be laid on. Kellogg and DCM are planning depart Islamabad June 29 and arrive
Dacca morning June 30.)
12.
Comment: Yahya was obviously in disturbed mood, and
wished to focus only on urgency of what India rather than Pakistan must do to ease refugee
problem. (In that regard he seemed reflect some of same concerns which Prince Sadruddin voiced in discussion with Secretary and Sisco June 24-ref State 115314.)/5/ In brief tete-ˆ-tete following Yahya's
discussion with Kellogg, Ambassador found Yahya
disturbed over report from Ambassador Hilaly
concerning former Consul General Blood's testimony before SFRC last week. Yahya was also disturbed over latest report of statement by
FonSec Douglas-Home on need for political settlement
prior to aid. This is day on which Yahya's most
awaited speech is being made to nation on his plans for political accommodation
and "transfer of power." We found him a very
harried man.
/5/
Document 79.
Farland