Department of State

 

AIRGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL A- 118

 

 

TO             : Department of State

INFO         : BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, DACCA, KABUL, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, LAHORE,                    

                     LONDON, MADRAS, NEW DELHI, PESHAWAR, PARIS, USUN NEW YORK.

FROM        : Amembassy ISLAMABAD

DATE        : JULY 2, 1971

SUBJECT  : EAST PAKISTAN OR BANGLA DESH: SOME OBSERVATIONS

REF           :

 

 

USUN New York for Mr. Oakley

London for Mr. King

Paris for Miss Byrne

 

Introduction

 

The reporting officer, who served in Dacca 1962-1964, spent seven days in East Pakistan, June 2-9. The thoughts that follow stem from personal observations and discussions with residents, foreign and Pakistani, in East Pakistan considered in the context of the reporting officer's previous experience in Pakistan, on the Pakistan Desk in the Department, and in South Vietnam.

 

Atmospherics

 

The current situation in East Pakistan is a nightmare born of desperation, resulting in unparalleled suffering for a multitude of Bengalis. No end is in sight. The Army's gross underestimate of the strength of Bengali nationalism, misunderstanding of the roots of this nationalism, and heavy handed tactics have unleashed a chain of actions and reactions now beyond the control of the military command. These have culminated in an overwhelming, all pervasive sense of fear by Bengalis: fear of the Army, of Bihari immigrants, of one another and in many cases of the Mukti Fauj. This attitude, justified and prudent in many situations, has prevented the avowed objective of the Government of a rapid restoration of "normal" conditions throughout the province. Evidence seems to point to fear as a major element in the Hindu exodus from East Pakistan the last six weeks, perhaps a more significant cause than direct military and Bihari actions.

 

The Martial Law Authorities are aware of the urgent need to restore some degree of confidence on the part of the population. Thus, military complaint centers have been set up in some towns and are being patronized. Although the military have been responsive to complaints from foreigners (one missionary tells of another missionary's looted radio being replaced by one, bigger and better than that stolen), we are doubtful Bengali complaints are receiving much more than sympathy, except in extremely flagrant cases. At the same time, the military in other ways is acting to perpetuate the conditions it hopes to eliminate or acquiescing in actions having the same end result.

 

Such MLA policies as expulsion of many Hindus, permitting Biharis to conduct looting and reprisals with little discrimination, seizure of transport boats and trucks and screening of Bengali civil servants are inconsistent with the MLA objective of "normalcy". This perhaps reflects conflicting policies within the MLA establishment at various levels, military parochialism, and the inherent dilemna faced by governments in coping with an incipient insurgency.

 

Prospects for a Political Settlement

 

Events during the past three months in East Pakistan have touched all levels of East Pakistani society. The resulting bitterness of most Bengalis against West Pakistan, the Army and "Bihari" immigrants is scarcely veiled, runs very deep, and, in the reporting officer's view, is irreconcilable. Any political "settlement", short of rehabiliation of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and formation of provincial governments with broad autonomous powers analagous to the Six Point formula under his leadership, will not bridge the hostility which has surfaced as a result of the series of events in East Pakistan.

 

As a have-not society, Bengalis have historically opposed the government in power, even including their own democratically elected United Front Government in 1954. It is hard to imagine that a political accommodation along the lines President Yahya sketched out in his speech June 28, Assemblies composed of repentant Awami Leaguers with by-elections for those unrepentant within the framework of a constitution along the lines of the 1962 model, will be meaningful to East Pakistanis historically conditioned as oppositionists. His formula, which reflects a conventional Pakistani approach to constitutional and legislative problems, totally ignores the impact of developments since the Army's move against the Awami League-the bloodshed, general treatment by Army personnel of Bengalis as potential enemies until proven otherwise, the economic and population dislocations. It is doubtful if this formula would have worked had Mujib's arrest not been accompanied by the consequences which did, in fact, flow from his arrest. It is clear that it will not work now. Nurul Amin, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury and some others who have been mentioned as possibly providing leadership alternatives to Mujibur Rahman are honorable men. But they also have very little stature politically in East Pakistan and even smaller prospects for attracting popular support in the present situation. There is no popular leader aside from Mujibur Rahman.

Should Yahya be disposed to consider treating with Mujib (and all indications point to the contrary), there are strong pressures working against this type of "political settlement". The Army's prestige and honor are very deeply involved in the East Pakistan crisis. A large number of officers have been killed. Army officials and soldiers give every sign of believing they are now embarked on a Jehad against Hindu-corrupted Bengalis. Negotiations with Mujib, under these circumstances, would probably cause serious rumblings within the officer corps, particularly by those officers responsible for the Army's action in East Pakistan. This could conceivably result in a GHQ coup against Yahya. A volte face on Mujib would be hard for many other pro-regime conservative elements in West Pakistan to swallow after the intensive propaganda effort by the Government in recent months linking the Awami League to India. Lacking strong public support and a strong power base within the Army, such as Ayub enjoyed as the Army's father figure, Yahya might well place his own future in jeopardy should he reverse his stand on Mujib in the near future.

It may be useful to recall that none of the post-World War II insurgencies have been ended with a negotiated peace. "In each of these cases (Greece, Malaya and the Philippines) the civil differences were put to rest-if at all-only by the logic of war" to quote a former member of the Policy Planning Council.

 

Implications of Lack of Political Settlement

 

Assuming that Yahya cannot take the one step which might peacefully resolve the immediate Pakistan crisis, the future looks bleak for the GOP. There are positive factors, nonetheless, in motion. We would anticipate that economic pressures will soon accelerate the return of workers to industrial establishments and other business concerns in East Pakistan. The vital jute export industry should be able to resume approximate 1970 production figures in the near future. Maintenance of law and order in the major towns should pose no serious problems to the Martial Law Administration despite low level selective terrorism. Presumably the GOP will continue its apparent program of screening suspect Bengalis from sensitive positions in Government, replacing Bengalis where ever possible on a temporary basis with West Pakistanis, i.e., in the East Pakistan police, East Pakistan Civil Armed Force, Pakistan International Airlines, District and Divisional Administrations, and in the Government of East Pakistan. Thus an administrative apparatus of sorts will shortly be in place. These developments will probably occur regardless of political developments.

 

The reporting officer was struck by the comment of a longtime resident American missionary who stated that the East Pakistani peasants in his areas (near West Bengal border, west north west of Jessore) want to remain out of the Mukti Fauj-Pakistan Army conflict. He had asked the Mukti Fauj, who operated in an area north of his mission station, not to seek support from his community which would run the risk of retaliation from the Army. This attitude may well predominate in rural areas of East Pakistan where the vast majority of the population lives at a subsistence level and not infrequently below subsistence. This passivity, based on fear and all consuming poverty, coupled with the restoration of a semblance of a governmental administrative apparatus, including intelligence gathering operations, may be another positive factor assisting the GOP in at least neutralizing the rural population.

 

Paradoxically, GOP policies to date, while instilling a very real fear of the Government throughout the province, may have had also the effect of driving some peasants into the active opposition. The indiscriminate pillage, execution, collective punishment and molestation which appears to have characterized the Army's operations in certain areas of East Pakistan-against Muslims as well as Hindus­might have created a psychological climate where fear only barely submerges a desire for revenge on the part of some peasants personally affected by the Army's actions. The Army may have by inadvertence and maladroitness created the "water" in which the Mukti Fauj can swim, to use Mao's analogy.

 

The urban population centers, conscious of the MLA's assumption of total power and, most importantly, containing substantial numbers of politically aware young people provides a fertile recruiting base for Bengali resistance elements whether Communist or Bangla Desh. It is probable that these urban elements will comprise the bulk of any emerging resistance organization.

 

The Mukti Fauj, as are most other real Bangla Desh assets (the widely-listened-to Bangla Desh radio, financial resources, military equipment, propaganda channels), almost totally dependent on the continued support of the Indian Government. Their exploits to date have occasionally been dramatic (like hijacking the river steamer "The Rocket"), but insignificant in military or psychological terms. The monsoon season now underway and the tieup of most Pak troops along the borders provide great opportunities for the MF to conduct harassing actions against small Army units and individual Government supporters among the East Pakistani population. The reporting officer believes that the MF will probably not be prepared to seize this opportunity until towards the close of the monsoon period in late September or October when the Army will be regaining mobility. There are no indications that, aside from defecting East Pak military units, which evidently prefer to remain as units, the Mukti Fauj "volunteers" will be prepared to move soon in any appreciable numbers. Nor are there signs as yet of any emerging underground Bangla Desh resistance network within East Pakistan. We would anticipate that the MF will be unable to launch in the short term more than a low-level, pinprick variety of insurgency along the lines of the Burmese Red Flag movement.

 

Historical Footnote

 

As a matter of record, it is worth recording the chain of events in the towns the recording officer visited (Khulna, Jessore, Mymensingh), leading to and compounding the tragedy of East Pakistan. While difficult and hazardous to generalize (and here the cliche on Vietnam that anyone can find facts to support any thesis holds true about East Pakistan), it appears that few non-Bengalis were killed as communal or political acts during the Awami League's (AL) March general strike. One Khulna source stated 19 Biharis were killed at the beginnings of the strike, but the local AL Leadership quickly moved to forestall further bloodshed. In Mymensingh town, a similar situation developed. In Dacca, non-Bengalis were harassed, their possessions looted, but few appear to have been killed. Following the March 26 arrest of Mujib and efforts by the Army to eliminate known and potentially dangerous AL supporters among students, police, etc., what emerged depended on the presence or lack thereof

of a substantial Pakistan Army presence and defecting East Pakistani military units and the degree of resistance to the gradual assertion of the Pakistan Army's presence. In Khulna, the reaction to the crackdown on the AL occurred two or three days later-on March 28. The reaction took the form of an unchecked anti-Bihari bloodbath around the complex of jute mills. The small army garrison remained in its compouned unmolested. Subsequently, when Army reinforcements reached Khulna from Jessore, the army forces acquiesed in a reversal of victims. One Khulna source estimated that about 4,000 Biharis were killed and about double that number of Bengalis in the counter-reaction. In Mymensingh, the Awami League controlled the town until the end of April. Some communal (anti-Bihari) killings took place during that period. Apparently in mid-April, two or three Pakistan Air Force jets strafed the towns causing very little damage or casualties, but unleashing fierce reprisals on Bihari inhabitants who were until the arrival of the army systematically slaughtered. With the Army's takeover, the town, largely deserted as is the countryside to the north (June 8), has witnessed some Bihari attacks on Bengalis, but not of the magnitude of the Khulna reprisals.

 

 

FARLAND

 

           

           

 

 

              Source: The American Papers : Secret and Confidential India. Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965 - 1973, 

                           University Press Limited, Page no - 613 - 617