"The Repression of Bengal" by Mr. Reginald Prentice, a
Member of the
British Parliamentary delegation which visited Pakistan and India, in
"Sunday Times", London, dated July 11, 1971
IN THE ABSENCE of a political solution the crisis thrown up by
the events in East Pakistan can only get worse. This applies to both Pakistan and India. In East Pakistan there is bound to
be continuing repression, using the most brutal methods, simply because this is
the only way in which a few thousand troops can maintain power over 70 million
hostile people. The troops are heavily out-numbered. Their supplies and
reinforcements have to travel 3,000 miles round the south of India. Parts of the country are very good
territory for guerrilla forces. The guerrillas can take shelter in India and will be reinforced by recruits from
among the refugees. More than one observer has predicted an escalation of the
fighting into a Vietnam type of situation.
From the Indian side the prospect is equally depressing. In
the border states the local officials, doctors and
nurses are doing a wonderful job in keeping most of the refugees alive. But
this is happening in a country which is desperately poor and most of it is
happening in West
Bengal,
which is one of the poorest and overcrowded areas in the world. The local
administration is obsessed with the refugee problem at the expense of other
duties; local development projects are postponed; schools are closed to the
children because they are packed with refugees. An explosive situation may well
develop in the refugee camps as a result of months of enforced idleness. An
equally tense situation may develop among the local people, who see the
refugees getting more food than themselves and getting
it free-although they do a full week's work. But this cannot be solved by
letting the refugees work, because there is already very high unemployment.
The world must take a larger share of this burden. So far the
total aid committed from the rest of the world amounts to well under half the
estimated cost to India for a six-month period. All countries
must commit much larger sums of aid and recognise
that this may have to continue for a very long time. But however large the aid
contributions, India will inevitably pay an enormous price
and this will become much greater as time goes on.
This downward spiral can only be reversed by a political
solution acceptable to the people of East Pakistan. In practice this must mean a
solution acceptable to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League. The
pattern is the familiar one of a colonial situation breaking up, in which the
only people who can make an effective settlement are the leaders of the
political party which has the confidence of the population. Yahya Khan must either accept this, or continue with his
policy of suppression-a policy which is bound to fail sooner or later.
Supposing that Sheikh Mujib were
released from prison, the Awami League recognised again and genuine discussions were held, what
would be the outcome?' The six-point program on which the Awami
League won the election last autumn provided for East Bengal to be self-governing for most
purposes, but with the central Government controlling foreign affairs and defence. The idea of one Pakistan would be preserved, but the
provincial Government in the East would have effective control over its own
destiny.
It is very doubtful whether this solution is still possible.
There has been too much bloodshed and bitterness in recent months. The
essential point is surely this: whether the settlement is to be some kind of
loose federation, or whether (more probably) it is to be complete independence
for Bangla Desh, will have
to be decided by the Awami League, as the only
credible representatives of the people of East Bengal. They must make the decision and the
military rulers of West Pakistan must accept that decision.
At present the military rulers are in no mood to do anything
of the kind. They persist with their threadbare claims. They repeat that the
Army had to restore "law and order"; that the remaining trouble is
caused by a few "miscreant:" aided by the Indians; that the refugees
would like to return home but are forcibly prevented by the Indians; that life
in the east wing is returning to "normalcy", that the world should
not be misled by India lies, etc., etc.
The real hope of a change must rest on two factors-their
continuous failure to pacify East Bengal and the growing economic cost. Pakistan is a poor country to start %kith. It
is now suffering a heavy loss of export earnings from East Bengal, where the economy is badly distrupted and is showing few signs of recovery, despite
the claims about "a return to normalcy". (East Pakistan, so much poorer
than the West has always earned the larger share of foreign exchange.)
There will be a serious food shortage in the East later this
year, perhaps of famine proportions, owing to the disruption in the sowing of
the crop due to be harvested in a few months' time. This will be aggravated by
the breakdown of the transport system. Meanwhile drought conditions have caused
a poor harvest in the West which normally makes up part of the grain deficiency
in. the East.
On top of all these difficulties the consortium of Western aid
donors has, decided not to make fresh pledges of economic aid to Pakistan for the new financial year which
started on July 1. Existing projects will be completed, but this decision,
provided the Western powers persist with it, will mean a rundown of overseas
aid and a deepening foreign exchange crisis in the coming months. Even in
normal circumstances, this would have been a very serious blow to the Pakistan economy. The group
of generals who run Pakistan know very little about economics, but
sooner or later the hard facts of the situation may compel them to change
course. It is our only hope.
I believe that there are three ways in which pressure can be maintained . in favour
of a political solution. First, the Western Powers must stand firmly by the
decision not to renew economic aid (apart from relief aid, properly supervised
by the U.N. for the victims of the likely famine in East Pakistan). There are powerful arguments
against using aid as a political lever in most cases, but this is a very
exceptional situation. Quite apart from the political circumstances, effective
development projects could not be carried out in East Pakistan in the foreseable
future, so that any economic aid to the country would be channelled
into projects in West Pakistan alone. This would have the effect of easing the economic situation and
releasing resources for the suppression of the East. Speaking from my
experience as a former Minister of Overseas Development, I believe it is wrong
to attach political conditions to aid in 99 cases out of a 100-but this is the
100th case. Any power lever must be used which might help to bring about a
political settlement.
Second, there should be an immediate end to the shipment of
arms from the U.S.A. to Pakistan. World opinion should back those
senators and congressmen in Washington who have urged the Administration to
reverse its policy. That the United States should line up with China in supplying the armed forces of Pakistan at the moment is something that
defies any rational explanation.
Third, there should be the most explicit condemnation from
governments, parliaments and influential commentators of all kinds. It must be
made clear that the governments and peoples of the world identify themselves
with the aspirations of the people of Bangla Desh, and that we are united in demanding a shift of policy
by the Government of West Pakistan.
We may not have decisive power to enforce a peaceful solution,
but such power as we have must be used to the full. This is not a time for
diplomatic niceties. It is a time to stand up and be counted.
Mr. Prentice was a member of the
Parliamentary delegation which recently visited both East and West Pakistan.
(By Reg. Prentice, a member of the
British Parliamentary delegation which visited Pakistan and India, in SUNDAY TIMES, London-July 11, 1971)