Department of State

 

AIRGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL A-213

 

 

TO       : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO   : CALCUTTA, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DACCA, KABUL. KATHMANDU, KARACHI, LAHORE, LONDON, NEW DELHI, PESHAWAR, TEHRAN

FROM : AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI

DATE  : JULY 28, 1970

SUB     : ELECTION ASSESSMENT (10 WEEKS TO GO)

REF     : A. RAWALPINDI A-145; B. RAWALPINDI A-149: C. RAWALPINDI A-191

 

(Note: Enclosed are reports on election campaign developments in Pakistan from Dacca, Karachi, and Peshawar (Lahore sent its comments to the Department by A-50, July 21, 1970). This covering airgram contains summaries of political developments by the Embassy and as reported by the posts.)

 

SUMMARIES

 

1. Embassy

The seven months old Constituent Assembly election campaign has entered a stage where one gets the impression that much of the peach fuzz has rubbed off the candidates. Political speeches and statements are beginning to have a stale, familiar sound. Many of the politicians are narrowing their campaign forays to areas close to home. Only zestful Bhutto, confident Mujib and meandering Asghar are hitting the campaign trail with frequency. Qaiyum and Wali are locked in a death grip on the Frontier, Daultana is less active, and the PDP, Jamaat and other leaders are generally moribund except for occasional newspaper flurries. Venerable Bhashani has followed his aborted June "long-march" threat with a new one. He has announced plans to "gherao" the Government House in Dacca on September 8.

 

As the politicians themselves grind along through the monsoon-heavy days, their campaigns give the appearance of being bogged down into exchanges of invective and occasional pot shots at foreign missions and individuals. In the latter regard, the American Ambassador and the Embassy have continued to be subjected to sniping, particularly by the more desperate politicians and irresponsible representatives of the fourth estate.

 

While the outward view of the election campaign may appear sluggish and bit jaded, there are many reports that the parties are hard at work in the backrooms, selecting candidates to stand for election. Dacca report this to be a major preoccupation of East Pakistan's Awami League. A similar kind of screening of

candidates is going on in the West. The consensus remains that the clan system will hold in West Pakistan, at least through the next election, so major efforts are being made by parties to attract and ticket the most important local leaders for their own parties, or denied this, to work towards an election alliance or compromise with other parties.

 

The Martial Law Government of President Yahya has made efforts to re­emphasise its strict neutrality in the election campaign. The behind the scenes maneuvering of Qizilbash and the freezing of the PML/Quader funds now seem to be a thing of the past (see ref. C). President Yahya will make another of his quarterly speeches on July 28. There have been rumours that he might touch on such politically sensitive topics as a change in the election date, and the status of his cabinet. However, in separate exchanges on July 23, Chief Election Commissioner Sattar told the Political Counselor that the Government was not giving consideration to requests by leaders of minor political parties for postponement of elections, and Communications Minister G.W. Choudhury affirmed to the Political Counselor that the October 5 date would hold. Choudhury (protect source) doubted that the President would say anything of fundamental constitutional or political importance.

 

Events of particular significance, which have occurred during the past month have been the break-up of One Unit and the economic and political ramifications thereof, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's West Wing political fling, and the continuance of allegations against foreign interference in the election campaign. (These items are treated briefly after the post summaries below.)

 

2. East Pakistan

During the period under review the two major developments were: (1) the decision taken by NAP (L) at its June 25-27 Central Council Session in Lahore to participate in the elections, and (2) Sheikh MuJibur Rahman's "triumphant" (according to some local pundits) West Wing visit of June 27-July 6.

 

Although monsoon torrents have closed down Dacca's Paltan Maidan as a venue for the public display of political theatrics, East Pakistan nonetheless seethes with political activity as Awami League opponents continue behind-the-scenes to grope (so far without notable success) for alliances or other forms of pre-election "understanding" in hopes of mobilizing forces to stave off the feared AL onslaught. Despite inclement weather, East Pak politicos are till making frequent visits to the Mofussil in order to carry appeals to rural voters. Parties are also facing the difficult task of nominating candidates for various NA and PA seats. A rumor to the effect that President Yahya will announce a postponement of the election on July 28 has gained some currency. This is probably based on wishful thinking of the non-Awami League groupings who would welcome such a postponement. On the labor front, recrudescence of labor unrest was highlighted by a strike of GOEP class four (menial) workers (which is still underway) posed only a potential threat to the general law and order situation in Dacca environs. Students who are now returning to Dacca educational institutions following a six-week long recess, have been conspicuous by their absence. The only instances of major student unrest have been sporadic disorders at examination centers throughout the province.

 

3. Baluchistan and Sind

The last four weeks have witnessed few changes. The attitudes of primary interest­articulating groups seem unchanged. Among political parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) continues to be involved in seeking new allies, and has winkled away some followers from the Bhashani faction of the National Awami Party (NAP (L) ) in Karachi, while in Baluchistan the Council Muslim League (CML) and rump faction for the Convention Muslim League led by Qaiyum Khan (QML) are in active competition for support of the province's Pathans. Students are much in evidence although their value to possible political mentors still remains be satisfactorily tested. The meaning of One-Unit dissolution for the electoral process is open to question as %et, but is clear that resurrection of the new provinces has not provided any special cachet to anti-One Unit advocates. There is likewise little solid information with regard to planning by parties for presentations at the Constituent Assembly, but the old stories that the Awami League-CML-Wali Khan faction of National Awami Party (NAP (R) ) are in cahoots persists. Rumors that some within-regime meddling in the political process remains current, but with diminishing frequency and no new variations. On the economic front, there have been post-budget price increases which may yet have political consequences. Emphasis on East Pakistan in the budget and import policy receives generally favorable comment when discussed in general terms but reference to specifics leads to higgling statements.

 

4. Punjab

The period since the last report (Lahore 1073) produced no significant developments requiring a change in our previous assessments. As politicians felt their way into a novel political situation during the last six weeks, they flitted from one issue or maneuver to another trying to settle on a successful campaign stance. Such issues and maneuvers revolved about alleged MLA interference in elections, Socialism vs. Islam, alleged foreign intervention in political matters, past activities of leading politicians and cautious probes being made by all in the dangerous game of alliances. The campaigning in the Punjab still has an unreal quality because for both politicians and voters it bears slight relationship to the basic political facts of life, namely the "baradri" (clans) system in towns, and the domination in rural areas of landlords and religious leaders. Politicians and voters are waiting for the selection of candidates to give solid indication of who represents what. As elections approach, interest is expected to center on the individual candidate's local position and his position on purely local issues. In the meantime, potentially important issues such as the results of the dissolution of the One Unit, constitution making, and how to live with Mujib's Six Points have not yet surfaced as controversial issues. This is because seemingly the politicians in general are articulating similar lines designed to please the Punjab voter. If individual parties or politicians disagree with the general line, they are prone to wait until after the elections to say so.

 

5. NWFP

In the NWFP, the battle between Wali Khan (NAP (R) and Qaiyum Khan (PML) has intensified during the past month, with Wali Khan and others stepping up their attacks on Qaiyum. Wali and Yusuf Khattak (CML) have attacked Qaiyum for the dictatorial tactics he used during his Chief Ministership in the 1950's, and have accused him of traitorous activity in suggesting a Pak/Afghan/Turk/Iranian confederation. Qaiyum's opponents also charge the PML leader with receiving financial assistance from Finance Minister Qizilbash.

 

On the other hand, there are many in the NWFP who would do almost anything to keep the Red Shirts from coming to power, and the possibility of an anti-Wali alliance among smaller groups and independents cannot be discounted. The smaller groups in the area (CML, PPP) would prefer seeing the Wali and Qaiyum battle kept even in hopes this would permit a decisive role for the splinter elements.

 

End Summaries

 

ECONOMIC POLITICS

The Budget and the Fourth and Annual Plans clearly indicate that economic considerations had to be melded with the political expediencies of Pakistan's current situation. The relatively conservative Punjabi-dominated MLA perhaps wisely refused to produce a hard-hitting budget which would bite hard into the heart of the economic establishment - the industrialists, bankers, and large landowners of West Pakistan The budget does not adequately provide for the Annual Plan goals and thus, even if all the foreign aid assumptions were met, it would put into jeopardy the total goals of the Fourth Plan.

 

To date, politicians and the public have generally not attacked the budget or plans per se but have directed their criticism primarily against the new or increased taxes with each vested interest, from shoemakers to newspaper owners, singling out the specific taxes that affected it. On July 12 Mujib called on the Governor to withdraw the salt levy, the tax on gold and certain "unjust" new levies. He claimed various measure contained in the central budget would add to the suffering of the poor people. He reiterated that the Awami League Six Points were aimed at safeguarding the interests of the common man and that is why the "exploiters" were so upset about them. On July 14 Bhutto expressed concern over the country's deteriorating economy, which he said had reached a stage of crisis. He held that the present trend in the national economy indicated that whatever government is elected will have to take socialist measures. There is, in general, a unity of expression by the politicians, that there should be improved social justice and a marked decrease in disparity.

 

If the Government does not succeed in obtaining some additional measure of aid commitment and expenditure acceleration then not only the Fourth Plan but perhaps even the current year's budget and Annual Plan might be disowned by the new government and the whole effort to arrive at a compromise may have to be repeated.

 

MUJIB'S WEST WING TOUR

Mujib visited West Pakistan June 27 through July 6. He avoided the NWFP (with a promise that he would return in September) and made only a brief foray into the Punjab at Lahore. Dacca (Enclosure 1) reports that some "local pundits" in East Pakistan labelled Mujib's West Wing tour as "triumphant". The triumphant aspect of Mujib's visit if so described would seem to he mainly in the minds of Awami League supporters. To them, it would be a triumph that their leader had visited West Pakistan, bearded the Punjabi in Lahore, and had told it "like it is" without hedging on the Six Points.

 

On the other hand, as reported by Karachi (1224, 1276) and Lahore (1148) the trip could be termed a fair success judging by crowd size and there is the possibility :hat Mujib strengthened Awami League ties with G.M. Syed's Sind United Front and explored other possible election alliances. On the negative side, Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, a politico/religious leader from the NWFP, pulled out of the Awami League and joined Quader's Muslim League.

 

From our view, the West Wing tour would appear to be fillip to the already strong Awami League majority in East Pakistan.

 

GROWING PROVINCIALISM IN CAMPAIGN

The break-up of One Unit in West Pakistan on July 1 has served to encourage a certain "provincialnes's" in politics. Almost all of the country's leading politicians are confining the bulk of their campaigning to a single province- (exceptions could be Mujib, Bhutto and Asghar Khan). Qaiyum, on the Frontier, claims to have a national following but during the last month, he has remained pretty much in the NWFP with a major concentration Hazara District, which has the largest population in the province, and forays to Dir, Kohat, and Bannu. Even Wali Khan's NAP/R, at one time thought certain of gaining control over the NWFP and Baluchistan, has suffered a major split in Baluchistan and now the Achakzai faction there may be strongest. Daultana's CML (which now includes Nur Khan) is identified throughout Pakistan as a party of Punjabis, though it may get one or two seats in the NWFP and Sind. Sheikh Mujib's tour of the Sind and Punjab may have served to enlighten some West Pakistan about the Six Point program, but it is doubtful that the Awami League will win any seats in the West Wing. An Awami League stalwart in the NWFP, Pir Manki Sharif, saw the writing on the wall and crossed over to Quader's PML.

 

The problems of provincial finance have become important. Front what sources are the newly-created provinces going to secure their revenue? There may be growing agreement even in certain West Pakistan official quarters that the Central Government should have very limited powers, with the provinces becoming increasingly responsible for fending for themselves. One report recently circulated conveyed the impression that the MLA itself, despite its purported adherence to a strong center, is prepared to hand over almost complete powers of taxation to the provinces, and '`permit" each province to contribute proportionately to the Center for defense expenditures and other subjects which will constitutionally be as signed to the Central Government. This would involve the eventual break-up of WAPDA (after the completion of Tarbela Dam) PICIC and other centrally-administered functions, and allow each province to function with the kind of autonomy that the Awami League calls for in its manifesto.

 

However these issues are finally hammered out during the 120-day session of the Constituent Assembly, one cannot help note the growing feeling of regionalism taking place during the present campaign.

 

ALLEGATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Allegations of the Embassy's interference in the forthcoming elections continued to be voiced. Charges by leftist political leaders ranged from accusations of the Embassy utilizing P.L. 480 funds to support certain political parties to the CIA conspiring to "eliminate Pakistan". One particularly odious allegation accuses Ambassador Farland of participating in the fall of Sukarno and being responsible for millions of Muslims being killed in Indonesia. (The Ambassador has never been in Indonesia.) Inter alia an editorial appearing in Mussawat (Bhutto periodical) demanded the recall of Ambassador Farland; the National Awami Party/Left (Bhashani) working committee has said that it takes a serious view of Ambassador Farland's "Anti-Pakistan activity" and charges him with interfering in the forthcoming election; and Maulana Mufti Mahmood, Secretary General of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (leftist faction) has accused the Ambassador of holding secret meetings with political leaders with a view to interfering in elections and has called for his expulsion from the country.

 

The sources for the plethora of allegations are unknown, but they have become an irresponsible part of the electioneering and in view of the perceived United States position vis-a-vs the Middle East situation appear to be attractive to a number of leftist political leaders and students as subject matter for their speeches.

 

Treatment of foreign policy considerations on the political hustings has been practically nil, with the exception of the usual nationalistic stand vi-a-vis India and Muslim support for the Arab cause in the Middle east.

 

 

EAST PAKISTAN: ELECTIONEERING AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS JUNE 15 - JULY 15, 1970

 

A. HIGHLIGHTS OF PARTY DEVELOPMENTS

 

1. Awami League

Mujib's West Pakistan visit was hailed by AL weekly The People, in July 12 editorial which noted rousing reception accorded AL leader and opportunity occasioned by trip for him to explain meaning of Six Points. Although whirlwind tour perhaps of scant benefit to party prospects in West (See Karachi 1276 and Lahore 1148), impressive turnout for speeches well publicized here and overall effect jaunt in East Pak context amounted to further bolstering of AL image as front runner. Main task before party at moment is that of deciding of party nominees for NA from among reported five hundred East Wing applicants and on party nominees for PA from

among one thousand East Wing applicants. (Applications were due no later than midnight July 15 with interviews of prospective candidates to take place July 20 to 25. According to press reports, applicants are mostly lawyers, doctors, retired Government officials, teachers, journalist and social workers.) This exercise is complicated by fact that there is apparently surfiet of applicants from some constituencies and dearth of candidates in others. Aside from going through the motions of selecting candidates, AL reportedly already has tapped certain personalities to hold portfolios in what are in effect shadow cabinets on both national and provincial level. (One informant claimed such "designations" limited to members of the EPAL and PAL working committees.) Mujib and his AL colleagues continue to play up theme of elections as constituting "referendum" on Six Point program and to reiterate party's "go it alone" policy in avoiding electoral alliance (although indicating privately that post-election coalitions likely).

 

2. NAP (Left)

The only readily apparent effect of decision taken at party central council session in Lahore June 25-27 to participate in elections has been to free members of the pro­election faction within NAP(L) led by Anwer Zahid/Masihur Rahman to run for office. Strong elements within EPNAP(L) still remain opposed in principle to election (e.g., Pabna-based "Naxalite" faction of Alauddin/Matin and Tongi-based faction of Zafar/Menon). Following announcement, two officials of Chittagong city NAP (L) publicly denounced election decision. Wily NAP(L) President Bhashani conveniently absented self from Lahore decision, and although reiterating that he does not oppose elections, he stated prior to the Lahore meeting he would not actively campaign on behalf of any individual. In apparent hedge, Bhashani announced on July 18 that party not seeking power through elections but rather striving to educate masses. Coincidence of release of Party stalwart and former MNA Masihur Rahman shortly following participation announcement lends itself to speculation some sort of "deal" concocted between party and MLA to secure party participation. Opposing this line of reasoning is that offered by pro-NAP(L) editor of Holiday, Enayetullah Khan (protect) who theorized the MLA discouraged by prospect of NAP(L) participation since this removed possibility of MLA using party as scapegoat if elections cancelled. Other party developments of varying significance included: formal resignation of Mohammad Toaha's ally Abdul Haq (formerly General Secretary of Krishak Samity, NAP Peasant Front) from party June 27, thus leaving Bhashani without general secretaries in either parent party or KS; arrest and sentencing to one year imprisonment by MLA of son of Bhashani for prejudicial remarks apparently made during preparatory activities for Bhashani's "June Movement" in North Bengali; and announcement party's activities would go into high gear folowing mass rally in Dacca September 8.

 

3. NAP (R)

Party remains in shadow of AL on one side of political spectrum and of NAP(L) on other, in general following AL lead on Six Points demands for provincial autonomy

but stressing students "eleven point demands" which it claims go beyond Six Points in focussing on economic problems. Central working committee meeting in Dacca June 12-16: (a) announced plans to participate in elections despite LFO; (b) "deplored refusal of a political party (obviously Awami League) to unite with other democratic forces against reactionaries;" (c) advocated bicameral legislature; and (d) condemned alleged US "global strategy of political domination and economic exploitation."

 

4. Jamaat-i-Islami

Meeting of JI parliamentary hoard in Dacca June 28-July 1 chaired by Maulana Maudoodi nominated 201 candidates for East Wing NA seats. (East Pak "Amir" Professor Ghulam Azam told Congen officers July 17 names not made public in order to facilitate working agreements with other like-minded parties. According to Azam, Jamaat was willing accept 8 points of Pak Democratic. Movement (PDM) as common program for waging campaign and in constitutional deliberations, and to cooperate with parties formerly with PDM, although these parties would not go to extent of setting up a joint parliamentary board.)

 

5. Council Muslim League

East Pak CML luminaries have consistently attacked Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Awami League Six Points. (According to Abul Quasem, CML General Secretary, AL stands for "secularism and secession." See also Dacca A-60, June 30, 1970.) Key theme in EPCML campaign is call for shifting capital to Dacca. Party followed example of other parties by establishing a student affiliate, Pakistan Muslim Student's League, which came into public view at organizational meeting July 8 addressed by EPCML President Khwaja Khairuddin.

 

6. Other parties

PDP central working committee met in Dacca July 11-12, and reportedly dwelt at some length on alliance possibilities. Party heralded accession of "former freedom fighter" Maulana Raghib Ahsan to party ranks, but old warrior's utility to party appeared limited by what press reports termed "attack of tongue paralysis" last year from which he has yet to recover. PML(C) elected new officers, most of whose names apparently not yet household terms, and party prospects in wake of freezing of funds appear increasingly grim. PML (Qaiyum) notable primarily for warnings by Khan A. Sobur against imperialist designs on East Pakistan, and his complaints (expressed in private) re financial problems which will allow party to contest less than half the seats available. Role of Asghar Khan's GOA remains somewhat enigmatic despite Asghar's extended visit June 10-23, although some conceive of him as a possible "honest broker" in effecting alliances or coalitions between various political elements. KSP's A.S.M. Sulaiman (who in effect is an independent running under a party label) provided some comic relief when on June 30 he declared ominously that "some West Pak forces are trying to secede from the East Wing!"

 

B. ELECTORAL ALLIANCES

 

1. Leftist Alliances

Alliance possibilities between leftist or moderately leftist parties such as two Nap's. NPL and KSP remain distinct possibility NPL and KSP leaders recently visited Maulana Bhashani while latter was hospitalized in Dacca and agreed to lay their forces against the Legal Framework Order (LFO). Late entry of NAP(L) on electoral campaign scene, fact NAP(R) consistently rebuffed by AL on alliance appeals, obvious weaknesses of NPL and KSP, differing geographical power bases, etc., are among factors militating in favor of some form of alliance or tacit understanding in selecting nominees for various constituencies between two or more of these parties. PPP and leftist (pro-Hazarvi) faction of Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam are insignificant and do not figure in alliance proposals locally.

 

2. Rightist Alliances

Of late their has been flurry of activity among rightist parties such as CML, PDP, Jamaat and Markazi Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (pro-Thanvi group) to work out some form of electoral alliance. Jamaat, which noted for strong grass roots organization but lacking leaders of stature, could benefit from better known personalities of PDP and CML, and they in turn could benefit from Jamaat's organizational capabilities. Although so far no such alliance yet made public, some form of cooperation likely to evolve among these parties which advocate stronger central government and more central role of Islam than that favored by Awami League and parties further to left. East Pak PDP, Jamaat and CML have not to our knowledge included PML(C) or PML (Qaiyum) among possible alliance partners.

 

C. POST ELECTION COALITONS

Awami League sources emphasize that the AL will not undertake any election alliances, although they indicate coalitions expected evolve following elections. Form of coalition offering best hope of framing workable constitution is one comprising largest parties of both wings (presumably Awami League and CML). Least stable situation would occur if coalitions formed which isolated principal party of either wing. Although pro-Awami League students express intentions of selves and other Awami Leaguers to bring pressure to bear on all non-AL members of the East Pak National Assembly delegation (by persuasion or intimidation) to follow AL lead in NA, such monolithic unity among East Wing delegation as a whole seems unlikely.

 

D. STUDENTS AND CAMPAIGN: SECULAR YOUTH AND PIOUS ELDERS Student unrest and political activism, although a world wide phenomenon, has been commonplace in East Pakistan for decades. Many East Pak political figures, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (a former member of the East Pakistan Students League EPSL) began their political careers in student politics. Politicized student organizations played leading roles in pre-partition nationalist movement, various language movements, and in agitation that contributed to Ayub's downfall last year. In present campaign, Awami League and NAP(R) are relying heavily on their strong student arms (EPSL and EPSU-MOTIA, respectively) which provide sizeable pools of youthfully enthusiastic manpower. All significant and some insignificant East Pak parties have student affiliates, in recognition of usefulness of student support. Although it a certainty that students will play a growing role as election campaign enters final stages (as was case here in 1965 elections), it is difficult to gauge how effective they will be in mobilizing voter support on behalf of specific parties or candidates. Not only is Awami League banking heavily on support from it student arm in proselytizing for party, but it is likely that party also will nominate a considerable number of youthful candidates (former EPSL leaders Tofail Ahmed and Abdur Rouf will definitely run for NA, with latter to confront NAP(L)'s Masihur Rahman in Rangpur) for whom student organizational support essential. Fundamental question will be effectiveness of students in rural areas, especially in areas in which no students reside (which frequently is case in poorer villages). In areas where students reside, reports indicate villagers do look to them for guidance on worldly issues. In other areas students apparently will seek out local opinion leaders and try to persuade them of the virtures of particular parties and candidates. Although we originally thought that students might use summer recess for campaign work, we have no indication that any such activity took place on a large scale. (Students returning individually to villages nonetheless may have brought rural folk up to date on recent political developments, etc.).

 

E. CAMPAIGN RELATED ECONOMIC ISSUES

 

1. North Bengal Hunger Marches

Pending receipt of information to contrary, issue of "famine" in North Bengal and elsewhere appears it be poiticization of disaffection in chronically food-deficit areas rather than major deterioration of economy, and demonstrations appear to have ebbed (perhaps due to arrests of march leader by MLA and increasingly inclement weather). Believe Dacca 1243 (joint State/AID) still accurately depicts situation. (Congen FSL will visit Jessore and Khulna July 19-25 on fact finding mission and we will report his impressions of situation in these areas.)

 

2. Post Budget Consumer Prices

Although considerable grumbling taking place over increased duties on fertilizer, paper, gold, shoes, etc., negative comments by politicos appear so far pro forma and unenthusiastic. In sum, no dramatic trends yet discernible.

 

3. Fourth and Annual Plans

Debate re Fourth Plan abated and assessment in Dacca 01049 still hold. Negative reaction to FY 71 budget and Annual Plan continues, but nothing significant beyond that already reported (Dacca 1257, joint State/AID).

 

4. Attitude Toward Foreign Loans

Little stress has been given in current campaign to issue of debt servicing/foreign loans. Exceptions are reference in Awami League Manifesto to reducing reliance on foreign loans (see Dacca A-59, June 26, 1970), as well as sporadic commentary in leftist press (such as Holiday) re more beneficial terms of assistance from "socialist" countries than from Western Nations.

 

F. OTHER ISSUES

 

1. Defense

Although numerous politicos express in private desires to reduce defense spending, in public such a posture is politically untenable. Politicians from almost all parties continually call for greater defense spending in East Pakistan and greater East Pakistani representation in the military. Issue of US resuming arms supply to Pakistan not part of East Wing political debate and effect of resumption or continued postponement of decision likely would be negligible here, although favorable decision would be welcomed by right wing parties such as CML, PDP, Jamaat, PML(C) and PML (Qaiyum)

 

2. Allegations

Allegations of US interference in campaign continue to be made by sensation-seeking politicos. As often as not such allegations are merely echoes by East Pak politicos of accusation made in West Wing by West Pakistani party colleagues (see Dacca 1292, 1306 and 1350). Charges that elements within regime working for or against certain political leaders and parties occasionally surface (e.g., reports that Qaiyum is MLA's man, etc.) but as yet do not appear widely believed.

 

3. Election Postponement

Local rumor mill has it that President Yahya will address nation July 28 and announce postponement of elections until December, thus reflecting rising crescendo of pleas by all parties except Awami League to change election date on ostensible grounds expected inclement weather October 5 in East Pakistan would reduce voter turnout (and additionally to allow time for AL popularity to wane and for other parties to organize). EP JI "Amir" Ghulam Azam told Congen officers if elections held during monsoons, "women and order voters" (presumably groups most likely to support Jamaat) would be unable travel to polling places. If elections postponed, AL likely raise major hue and cry alleging MLA perfidy, but party freedom of action appears limited by strong pro-election stand and as was case with LFO, AL probably will have no other choice but to swallow bitter pill.

 

G. GENERAL MOOD

Politically articulate East Pakistanis express cautious optimism reelection prospects but are less sanguine with regard to constitution framing process. Cynics feel Punjabi­dominated military and civil service maybe unwilling to allow East Pakistani-

dominated Constituent Assembly to function, and that there may be a counter-coup to forestall elections. On whole, positive steps by MLA in moving in direction of elections and passage of time during which law and order situation has not collapsed (as some predicted it would if free campaigning allowed) have contributed to increased optimism that party democracy may be able to function in Pakistani context, aside from whether or not East Pakistan will win greater provincial autonomy. Undercurrent of pessimism-on autonomy issue persists, and even Awami Leaguers express concern of a possibility of "sellout at the center" by Mujib and Awami League delegation, noting that weak center not consistent with Mujib's ambitions for prime minister post.

 

DACCA:WSButcher

 

 

KARACHI ASSESSMENT AS OF JULY 29, 1970

 

As in case last estimate, developments over past four weeks have not repeat not worked any noteworthy change in either position of most parties or basic attitudes of interest groups. There is a growing amount of activity as spokesmen of various parties take increasily to the hustings to speak of the virtue of their own parties and of the iniquities of others. With the din of speech-making fast reaching the threshold of pain, the coming ten weeks may prove especially difficult too bear.

 

To degree positions of individual parties have changed, PPP continues reveal it is party still in gestation. In recent past, it has begun attract to its fold a number of leftists in Karachi who earlier identified with NAP/L. Exact reason for change in loyalties still remains be explored but one view holds that it fruit of division which have riven NAP/L in East Pakistan. Impact of these accessions in Sind still remains be seen. As last assessment stated, there steady stories that some among Bhutto's more traditionally-oriented supporters in Sind were beginning to find presence of leftists uncomfortable and might bolt. This has not rpt not happened so far; rather, we find other traditional types joining Sind unit. Thus, whatever reaction may be in Sind to presence of leftists in party's Karachi unit, Bhutto appears still be seen as figure of promise to significant number traditional types in Sind. As result, PPP's electoral chances in absence to date of ability on part party's centrist opponents to find common ground for joint action may have brightened.

 

In Baluchistan, a brisk struggle for the support of the Province's Pathan population appears have emerged. The QML and CML are both endeavoring to build on Baluch­Pathan antipathies, which emerged as One-Unit approached its end. At that time, some Pathans sought the transfer of those areas in which they predominate to Sarhad but the Baluch blocked move. With Baluchistan Unit of NAP/R in forefront of Baluch position, Pathans bolted party and are still up for grabs. One months ago it seemed QML might be successful in wooing Pathans but more recent indications suggest that CML, which has won over some among more prestigious Pathans of Baluchistan, is forging ahead, outcome is still uncertain, however, and it even possible NAP/R may regain some of its lost standing.

 

In view small changes since last assessment, we turn to specific subjects listed Rawalpindi 5393. Youth, or at least students, continue be element receiving as close scrutiny as circumstances - and opportunity - permit. It seems evident that great bulk of student are apolitical and that those who find selves engaged in political activity tend either to the extremes of right or left. With Jamaat-i-Islami's Jamiat-e­Tulba occupying right almost exclusively, real variety is on left, reflecting fragmented character "progressives". In Karachi, there three primary student groups, two of which combine forces. Noisiest is Rashid faction of National Students Federation (NSF/Rashid) which earlier identified with NAP/L now appears have with thrown in with PPP. Kazmi faction of NSF (NSF/Kazmi) continues have ties with NAP/R, General Secretary, M.H. Usmani -- since it, like NSF/R, has preponderance of refugees in its ranks - rather than from Wali Khan coterie. Active in both Sind and Karachi is Sind Students Federation (SSF); close to NSF/Kazmi, it too reflects NAP/ Rview but tends to grow confused as it tries to reconcile differing views of its Sindhi and non-Sindhi (i.e., refugee) members. Just to complicate matters, there also Sind Unit NSF but it termed "Nationalist Groups". Identified with G.M. Syed's Sind United Front (SUF), it seeks promote Sindhi aspirations; fact that it uses NSF appelation is reminder of time when Syed was with NAP/[Z. Last group of significance in Sind is Sind Students Cultural Organization (SSCO) and it appears to be pro­Bhutto although perhaps not rpt not outright student front for PPP. Baluchistan has two groups of note, which parallel Karachi's two NSF faction; both use name Baluch Students Organization (BSO) and have (founder'?) chapters in Karachi. BSO/Abdul Hai faction, which largest, supports NAP/R while BSO/Shamshad Group is said be NAP/L-aligned hut may, like NSF/Rashid in Karachi, be sliding towards PPP.

 

While identification student groups may be easy, assessment their utility for mentor parties is not rpt not. We continue think that they have negligible direct influence but that they nevertheless useful as adjunct and as forging bed. We expect see students fronts used as part propaganda and canvassing efforts but since their activities necessarily limited to cities. scope of their activities will be limited. Capacity and potential of students for action is nevertheless underscored by current round troubles in Hyderabad (Karachi - At 23, note 2). While this agitation still non-political (or at least non-party) in character, fact that students acting concertedly and remaining unfazed by ongoing arrests are indicators their usefulness to any mentor party which can fire their imagination and capture their loyalty.

 

Re. Item 2C, dissolution of One-Unit ought to have given proponents a fillip, but this does not rpt not seem to have been case. In Sind, SUF has slumped and character of NAP/R in Baluchistan such that its position not rpt not wholly dependent on what proved be outcome. If anything, dissolution has weakened proponents: SUF because its raisin d'etre virtually dispeared and Baluchistan NAP/R because controversy over inclusion Pathan areas have disaffected Pathans of the Province. With question of degree of provincial autonomy to be decided in constituent assembly, both these parties still have opportunity make appeals on ground that they alone will be prepared make strong pitch for devolution substantial autonomy, however, with restoration provinces now achieved, Sindhis probably more interested in finding home among those who will obtain power rather than among possible lonely proponents of substantial autonomy (this, of course, assumes Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will resile on Six Points) and Baluch know that dependence on central government for financial resources makes any sincere demand for substantial autonomy sound hollow. Thus, SUF may increasingly become vox calantis in deserto (quite literally) and while Baluchistan NAP/R does little more than pay lip service to concept substantial provincial autonomy.

 

With reference to hard plans being made tackle autonomy issue at constituent assembly (Item 2E), evidence most scanty. Position of SUF remains unchanged  and, as noted above, possibly unimportant. NAP/R here continues beat drum for greater devolution but signs that they working with others find resolution undetected. Most observers continue believe, however, that negotiations are in process between such as CML, NAP/R and Awami League but that none of participants can acknowledge this fact prior to elections lest it diminish their electoral prospects. There much public talk about what constitution should be, but hard evidence of concerted efforts at this stage still missing.

 

There little new to add to past reporting re charges that some within regime playing political games (Item 2D). Qayyum still seen as cat's paw for Qizilbash; versions vary re Yahya's awareness. To degree that there is change, it lies in some small falling off of frequency with which such tales told.

 

Re Economic matters, there have been post-budget price rises resulting from increases excises. For example, prices of vegetable ghee are up 12.5 per cent, paper over I S per cent, hotels and restaurants (including those catering to workers) have raised prices 10 to 20 per cent, so called "cheap cigarettes" are up 15 to 20 per cent while "best quality" have been raised 5 to 7 per cent, and steel products, including steel sheets used for roofing, have risen by about 8 per cent. These increases, which most keenly felt by lower and middle classes, have not repeat not yet led to any organized consumer protests but they could lend themselves to political exploitation. There has already been spate of editorial comment and many public statements by leaders of industrial organizations criticizing budget in this respect.

 

Import policy changes have, in general, been applauded but manufacturers for domestic market whose raw material have now been added to export bonus at 10 per cent have complained of effect this will have on prices. Inclusion of education and professional training abroad among items of cash-cum-bonus list has been criticized by some as increasing costs for such training and education by estimated 80 per cent. In rebuttal, others point out that most people studying abroad under private programs come from wealthy families and can bear increase.

 

Almost all general comments re. special emphasis on East Pakistan in budget and import policy are favorable, reflecting general awareness that much must be done for East Wing. However, as particulars are mentioned, there inevitable higgling statements about absorptive capacity, bureaucratic inefficiency of public enterprises, limited entrepreneurial skills and history of shortfalls in implementation past programs which suggest not rpt not only doubts about effectiveness new approach but possibly latent measure of resistance. Exempt

 

KARACHI: DMCochran

 

 

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FRONTIER JUNE 15 - JULY 20, 1970

 

1. An interesting but not unexpected development of the past few weeks in the Frontier has been the rising opposition to Qaiyum Khan leader of the PML. Long subjected to the barbs of Qaiyum, Wali Khan of NAP(R) has apparently decided to unleash his own campaign of personal vituperation. Wali's current line is that Qaiyum: (1 ) is trying to sell out the Pakistan nation by advocating a confederation with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey; (2) conspires with other "sinister" elements to undermine provincial autonomy; and (3) was the perpetrator of innumerable "crimes" while Chief Minister of the old NWF Province.

 

2. Wall's attack against Qaiyum will undoubtedly become more intense as the campaign nears its final stages. The two rivals are bound to clash over the question of government favoritism and its potential effect on the conduct of free elections. NAP is disturbed by "evidence" that Minister of Finance Qizilbash is lending support to Qaiyum's campaign in the Punjab to undermine the position of Daultana, his arch­rival. NAP's fear is that Qaiyum will take advantage of his close relationship with Qizilbash to intimidate and blackmail the voters in the NWFP. In an effort to frustrate whatever designs Qaiyum may have, Wali has warned that NAP will not tolerate a fraudulent election verdict.

 

Unlike the PML which has kept silence on the subject, NAP has also expressed concern over the imposition of new taxes and the "top-heavy" administrative machinery which was thrust on the NWFP when the provincial government became operational on July l. NAP leaders tend to suspect that the additional taxes and the costly bureaucracy, which are likely to place a heavy financial burden on the province, were imposed as a result of a "plot" to demonstrate to the unwary citizen that autonomous provinces are economically unsound and that it was a mistake to re­establish them.

 

3. That there is a concerted effort to "gang up" on Qaiyum is quite obvious. Knowledgeable observers detect an upsurge in Qaiyum's popularity and there is an effort to "cut him down to size." Yusuf Khattak, (CML) has joined in the chorus of criticism by upbraiding Qaiyum for his violent, vindictive dictatorial past and urging the voter not to allow him to capture power again. Smaller parties such as the CML would much prefer to see an even context between NAP and the PML for the obvious reason that a deadlock would enhance their own electoral position. Divisions among the opposition, of course, furthers the interests of NAP, a situation which is not entirely ignored by those who are bent on preventing the Red Shirts from coming into power. The possibility of a united front against NAP, therefore, cannot be discounted. Despite all the jockeying, however, the situation is still fluid and no one in the Frontier is willing to make predictions. It is interesting to note in this connection that former Muslim League luminary, Gul Mohamed, MPA, the suave, wealthy and unscrupulous merchant-industrialist is still sitting on the fence. Like a shrewd gambler, he has been weighing his chances and so far has refused to plunge in any direction.

 

ABDUL GHAFFAR KHAN

The patriarch of the Red Shirts is still a controversial figure in the Frontier and his words and actions have an impact on the campaign. In his latest radio broadcast from Kabul, Abdul Ghaffar Khan tried to reassure his Pakistani audience that his ideas of Pukhtoonistan has been fulfilled with the establishment of the autonomous NWF Province, and that he was not channelling any of the money he had received from India into the campaign to help NAP. The broadcast was significant in that it was made over the official Afghanistan radio, and as the Khyber Mail editorialized it was "symbolic of a major breakthrough both in Abdul Ghaffar Khan's stand and in Afghan/Pak relations as regards to Pakhtoonistan." Of course, not everyone applauded Abdul Ghaffar Khan's statement. Naya Inqilab, the PML official party paper ignored the substance of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's statement and went on to warn that the old Red Shirt leader still dreams of an independent Pakhtoonistan with himself as the undisputed monarch. CML spokesmen took exception to Abdul Ghaffar Khan's criti­cism of past Pakistani regimes and Pakistani "illiberal constitution" and advised him to concentrate on the plight of his hosts, the Afghans, "who were groaning under the hard, autocratic regime of the Afghan rulers."

 

STUDENTS

The political role of the students in the NWFP is hard to define. Final examinations keep them absorbed with their studies and there has been no sudden burst of activity to cause ripples on the relatively calm surface of the political life of the Frontier. During the past, students in general have been concerned with institutional reforms and if in despair they have on some occasion quit the classroom for the streets, their demonstrations have been confined to the campus.

 

The University of Peshawar and the various colleges will close July 26. To deny the students an opportunity to organize mass agitation, the authorities have decided to open the institutions after the elections or during the first week of November. Although the students have been denied the campus as a staging point for demonstra­tions, they are not prevented as individuals from volunteering their services to the party of their choice. Qaiyum boasts a large student following which translated in practical terms means a highly valuable group of dedicated party workers. Although Qaiyum claims that a majority of the students are members of his Ghazi Pukhtoon Student Federation, a more realistic estimate would place the number of his youthful followers at no more than one third of the organized students.

 

Of all the political parties, NAP is the only one which does not depend on its student followers to help it mobilize the voter. The party's grass root cadres are composed of zealous, dedicated workers who by all accounts fill NAP's local requirement's. The absence of student-workers from NAP would therefore cause the party no great hardship.

 

PESHAWAR: AVelletri

 

 

Source: The American Papers- Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, The University Press Limited, p.401-416