The White House

July 30, 1971

Secret Memorandum for the President

From: Henry A. Kissinger

 

Subject: Military Supply for Pakistan

 

A relatively low point in scheduled military equipment shipments to Pakistan has, by coincidence, meant that military assistance to Paki­stan has not become a pressing issue between US and Pakistan. The Pakistanis have chosen not to press it. However, Congressional crit­ics - especially in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - have in­sisted that no military assistance be sent until the situation in East Pakistan returns to normal and that they be notified if there are any shipments. And the Indians have made a big point of our not sup­porting the Pakistani government with any kind of assistance until it restores normal conditions.

 

There are, therefore, two aspects to this problem:

 

--One is that our lines to President Yahya must be kept open. The flow of military supplies is important as a symbol that we remain supportive. It has some military value and some political value to Yahya in maintaining the support of his military.

--The other is that there are those in the Congress, in the US public and in India who cannot understand and bitterly op­pose shipment of US equipment and ammunition to be used where there has been killing that has created a very serious situation, including the potential for an India-Pakistan war.

 

Views in Congress are important because they could result in restrictions written into the law or refusal to appropriate eco­nomic assistance for Pakistan.

 

Assuming that present pressures require stopping short of business as usual, there are three general approaches to the problem to consider in establishing broad guidelines for decision:

 

1. The course preferred by State would be to keep an informal administrative hold on all military shipments for the time being. This would be a de facto hold-up rather than an open policy of suspension. Under this approach a small amount of equipment (about $1 million) would continue to flow under direct order from US commercial suppliers because stopping that would require formal action.

 

The advantages of this approach would mainly be that it would reduce the degree of US support for a Pakistani policy which seems to be working against the interests of stability in South Asia and which is bitterly opposed here and in In­dia. State feels that we could avoid shipments for a while be­cause the Pakistanis have not yet made a political issue of this question.

 

The main disadvantage is that it probably would not change Yahya's course but would be read as a form of sanction im­posed in the face of what he considers a legitimate effort to maintain the integrity of Pakistan against Bengali separatists. It could reduce the effectiveness of our communication.

 

2. The course proposed by Defense would be to ship spare parts for all equipment but neither new death-dealing equipment nor ammunition.

 

The main advantage is that this would permit shipment of most of what Pakistan has on order while permitting us to say that we are withholding all new equipment or ammuni­tion. These restrictions could be explained straightforwardly to Yahya as temporarily necessary in order to keep Congres­sional reaction within some bounds.

 

The main disadvantage is that critics would generalize this as full military support for Pakistani policy. It is difficult to judge whether the complications on the Hill - possible severe cuts or restrictions in the economic assistance appro­priation for Pakistan - would not outweigh the practical ad­vantage of this equipment to Yahya.

 

3. There is an in-between position which would be just like #2 above except without spare parts for death-dealing equip­ment.

 

The advantage for this approach would be that we could meet critics by arguing that we were keeping the channel open but without supporting the military effort.

 

The disadvantage would be that it would suspend shipment of the items that are among the more important for Yahya's military, even though we might lessen the impact somewhat by explaining to him that this was a pragmatic delay to meet our present problem and not a policy decision.

 

My own feeling is that we should not make a policy decision now but that we should operate for the next three months using #2 above as a guideline, but approving the SRG a list of items on a case-by­ case basis for release over the next three months.

 

The purpose would be to keep ourselves out of the box we will be in if it becomes established that, as a matter of policy, we have sus­pended aid.

 

It will be difficult to manage with the Foreign Relations Committee in one sense, but in another the job may be easier by being able to point to some relatively undramatic items. The main objective would be to preserve the position with Yahya that we are not cutting off.

 

The argument against this approach is that a little bit of equipment dribbling out would not be enough to satisfy Yahya and would be enough to arouse the Foreign Relations Committee to the possible detriment of the economic aid program. The first would depend on Yahya's continued willingness not to make an issue of us and to read a few releases as a sign of our trying to cope with the problem to his advantage. The undramatic nature of the items released might help with the Senate.

 

I am mainly concerned at not putting ourselves in a box where it costs a great deal to resume aid that in effect has been cut off. This is first a matter of restoring your flexibility.

 

Recommendation

That a list of equipment be established by the SRG for release to Pakistan over the next three months and that, as a guideline, this list may include spares for all equipment but no new death-dealing equipment or ammunition.

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 155 - 158