Defense Intelligence Agency

Secret August 1971

 

Contingency Paper,- Indo-Pakistan Hostilities

 

The Prospects

Despite the fact that there are strong negative factors working against an Indian decision to attack Pakistan, the danger of war remains real. Both the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces and some ground and sea forces are on the alert and border incidents have increased. Intelli­gence reports indicate that after August 15 the Indian Army may not be available for law and order purposes in West Bengal.

 

Although the Indians have a substantial advantage over the Paki­stanis, who are faced with difficult supply problems and are out­numbered and out-gunned, Indian decision makers are probably un­certain whether a decisive victory over Pakistan can easily be won. They are aware that the costs of war are high and that an Indo­Pakistan conflict could result in direct Chinese involvement. None­theless, India might decide that war with Pakistan is the only practi­cal alternative open to it in protecting its national interests. An Indian decision to intervene could result from domestic political pressures to assist Bangla Desh, a GOI assessment that the refugees would re­turn only if India helped to establish an independent Bangla Desh, and that without intervention there would be radicalization of the in­surgent movement in East Bengal, increasing Pakistani sabotage against Indian lines of communication in West Bengal and Assam and a general long-term threat to India's own inter-communal cohe­sion, political fabric and economic development prospects. These interests India may well consider "vital" and worthy of protection through the means of war. There is probably still an interim period in which the Government of India will wait to see whether international pressures and domestic compulsions in Pakistan can bring about a political accommodation, the restoration of peace and security in East Pakistan and a significant reversal in the flow of the refugees. Ifno progress is made in these areas by September or October, the chances for hostilities will increase.

 

While it is likely that war would result from an Indian attack on Pakistan or from direct Indian support for a major insurgent effort to seize and hold a portion of East Pakistan, it might also arise through a gradual process of escalation involving border incidents on both sides. Conceivably, but less likely, the Pakistanis themselves might initiate hostilities by attacking guerrilla sanctuaries in India, thus triggering full-scale armed retaliation.

 

At the start, hostilities would probably be confined to India and Paki­stan alone. There would, however, be a real danger that China would provoke border incidents along the Indian Himalayan frontier in or­der to ease pressures on Pakistan. Such incidents are more likely if hostilities break out in the next three months while the Himalayan passes are not blocked with snow. The Soviet Union is likely to sup­port India as indicated by its actions at the UN and the recently signed Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship. This support would probably stop short of military intervention but would have profound political implications on Indo-Soviet relations as well as India's re­lations with China, Pakistan and, perhaps, the United States as well.

 

It would, therefore, be in the US interest to see that the hostilities not expand to include third parties, particularly China. It would also be in our interest to see that the hostilities were not protracted to a point that profound and lasting damage was done to the political, economic and social fabric of India and Pakistan. Thus, should India attack Pakistan despite our efforts, our interests would be best served by an early end to the conflict and by negotiations among all the parties concerned leading to a withdrawal of Indian troops and an overall political settlement. The following sections consider options open to the United States both in the event of a war which was localized to India and Pakistan, though possibly fought on two fronts, and a war in which external powers became involved.

 

Options in the Event of Hostilities

In the event hostilities break out between India and Pakistan the United States could pursue one of three broad strategies - it could: (a) adopt a passive hands-off role, (b) provide military support to the victim of attack, and (c) intervene politically to localize the conflict.

 

A. Passive International Role. We might adopt a relatively passive role indicating our basic neutrality in the dispute. We would seek to avoid being drawn more directly into the dispute on either side. Such a role might be particularly appropriate in circumstances in which the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was unclear or where we judged the likelihood of Chinese involvement to be small. Initially a passive role might benefit the United States, particularly if both sides accepted US neutrality as compatible with their immediate national interests and objectives. This stance might allow us to adopt a mediatory position at some subsequent point to encourage a negotiated political settlement, through the UN or independently, when circum­stances made such a role possible. This approach would be sustain­able only if the conflict appeared likely to be of short duration, since protracted conflict could do serious permanent damage to the internal cohesion and viability of both India and Pakistan which in turn would undermine the bases of peace and stability in South Asia. In pursuing this option we could:

 

- adopt a public posture indicating that we did not intend to become directly involved and would not provide assistance to either side.

- support but not initiate efforts in the Security Council to end the hostilities and achieve a negotiated political settlement.

- suspend all aid and military programs to both sides until the outcome of the hostilities was clear.

- offer at a suitable point through a presidential letter to both heads of government our good offices in arranging the ne­gotiation of a political settlement.

- consult closely with the Soviets and the British on ways to end hostilities and achieve a settlement.

- caution the Chinese and the Soviets against direct involve­ment.

Advantages

- limits US direct involvement, and possibly the involvement of other external powers.

- allows flexibility as events unfold.

- preserves an interim relationship with both India and Paki­stan.

Disadvantages

- risks serious damage to our interests in South Asia if the con­flict were protracted.

- could increase Indian dependence on the Soviet Union and

Pakistani dependence on China.

- cautioning the Chinese could damage Sino-American rela

tions.

- neutrality could be seen as de facto US opposition by the ag­grieved party in the conflict.

 

B. Military Support. At the other extreme would be a decision to support one side with military assistance. The US has limited com­mitments to both sides (bilaterally, and through CENTO/SEATO with Pakistan, and through the 1963 Air Defense Agreement with India). Texts of the operative portions of Treaty documents are at­tached in Annex B. Although in recent years these agreements have been regarded as dead letters by Pakistan and India and do not pro­vide for automatic US involvement in an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the Pakistanis or Indians might seek to invoke them to gain our involve­ment. If we wished to demonstrate our support for one party in the hostilities we might respond positively to these overtures.

 

1. To Pakistan: Under the most likely scenario for escalation - an Indian attack on Pakistan - the Pakistanis would probably turn first to us as they did in 1965. If we judged it to be in our interest to assert the paramountcy of our interests in Pakistan and in its national unity and integrity, we might offer to assist Pakistan's defense effort through the supply of military equipment, although not with US combat personnel. Such assistance in the short run would not affect the outcome of the conflict, but it could be politically significant in creating a close and enduring relationship with Pakistan. Such a course would have a serious negative impact on our interests in India and with any future independent Bangla Desh. It would effectively destroy the basis for a constructive relationship with India. It might also have some negative impact on US-Soviet relations, especially since such a move on our part would probably place us with the Chi­nese in support of Pakistan and against the Soviets whose sympathies would almost certainly be with India. Specific actions we might take include the following:

 

- develop in coordination with the Government of Pakistan an emergency military supply program.

- actively move to terminate all US programs in India.

- take the lead in developing international efforts calling on In­dia to end her intervention and return to the status quo ante. - support a Security Council resolution condemning India.

 

Advantages

- would support our interests in Pakistan and in its national unity.

- would dilute Chinese influence in Pakistan and might mar­ginally improve our own relations with China.

- would strengthen our relations with other Muslim powers.

 

Disadvantages

- would severely damage US interests in and relations with In­dia.

- would have little effect on the outcome of the conflict.

- would lead to increased Soviet influence in India.

- would leave no basis for a conciliatory role by the United States.

- would damage US-Soviet relations.

 

2. To India. The promising of military assistance to India is a con­tingency which could arise in a South Asian war if India were not the initiator of hostilities with Pakistan and if China had intervened mas­sively on Pakistan's side and seemed to threaten India in a major way, e.g., by an attempt to seize the Brahmaputra valley. Such sup­port of India, if clearly offered in the Chinese context, would demon­strate our recognition of India's importance in Asia. As a result our relations with Pakistan would be strained and it would be difficult to maintain a close post-war relationship with Pakistan unless the United States simultaneously worked (see C below) to achieve a ne­gotiated political settlement, which preserved Pakistan's unity and integrity. Specific actions we might take include the following:

 

- offer to consult with India under the 1963 Air Defense Agreement.

- develop, if India desired, an emergency military assistance program focussed primarily on meeting a Chinese threat.

- share intelligence with Indians on Chinese military deploy­ments.

- coordinate with the British and the Soviets on additional as­sistance measures.

 

Advantages

 

- would be consistent with our overall Asian policy of assisting states threatened by external aggression.

- would establish a firm basis for a close relationship with In­dia and a possible future state of Bangla Desh.

- would counteract the recent growth in Soviet influence in In­dia.

- could form a part of a cooperative effort with the Soviets.

 

Disadvantages

- would create severe strains in our relations with both China and Pakistan.

- would run risks of gradually increasing US involvement es­calating into a more extensive commitment, involving direct US confrontation with one or more outside powers.

 

C. Political Intervention. Given our long-term interest in maintaining a constructive relationship with both India and Pakistan and our de­sire to limit external influence in the subcontinent we could adopt a policy of political intervention, which went beyond the relatively passive role of Option A. The principal goal of a more active politi­cal role would be to localize hostilities and end them and to provide the United States with ways of influencing the nature of any final political settlement designed to remove the basic cause of hostilities. In particular, we would want to use our involvement to achieve a settlement which was fully acceptable to the people of East Pakistan, whether within or without the framework of a united Pakistan and which removed the destabilizing factors which the refugees and a radical insurgent movement pose for India. Unless war resulted in the overwhelming defeat of one side or the other, a political settle­ment in the aftermath of hostilities would probably require new elec­tions in East Pakistan. These in turn might have to be internationally supervised, either under direct UN auspices, through a four or five power initiative, or under special arrangements negotiated directly between the parties or arranged through an international peace con­ference. The political steps which we take in the course of the conflict will have to keep in mind the requirements of international in­volvement in a settlement.

 

Immediately on the outbreak of hostilities we should be prepared to take various actions:

 

- we should call immediately for a UN Security Council ses­sion to consider the crisis.

- we should consider how the General Assembly could be used to support the Security Council efforts and whether if the General Assembly were not in session it would be useful to call for a Special Session.

- in the Security Council we should develop a resolution which called for an immediate cease-fire and direct negotiations between the two sides on the terms of a military withdrawal and a political settlement.

- if the prospect of direct negotiations were poor or there was no response to the Security Council's call, we should con­sider supporting a more direct UN role, including a UN good offices mission or a visit to the area by the Secretary Gen­eral. We should be prepared to support these UN initiatives strongly in Islamabad and New Delhi.

- we should indicate in the Security Council and in the General Assembly if it should be in session, that we fully support UN peace-keeping efforts and would be willing to contribute fi­nancially and with personnel to a peacekeeping operation designed to achieve a withdrawal of troops or to monitor the implementation of a political settlement. For example, we might wish to propose as a means to create the basis, for a vi­able constitutional settlement in Pakistan the holding of new elections in East Pakistan under UN supervision.

- immediately send Presidential messages to President Yahya and Prime Minister Gandhi calling for an end to hostilities and a negotiated settlement. Initial messages should indicate any decisions we have taken to suspend military or economic assistance to either side (or both sides) and should state clearly what we are doing with the other side to bring about a settlement.

- we should initiate bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union, Great Britain and other interested powers on ways to bring the hostilities to an end.

- privately and publicly urge the Chinese to act with restraint and to avoid direct involvement.

- As a part of the process of consultation we should explore the possibilities of a four or five power declaration calling for an international conference designed to bring about a political and military settlement and to guarantee its implementation.

- In order to discourage additional countries from becoming involved, we should also seek through diplomatic channels to prevent the governments friendly to Pakistan such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Jordan from transferring any US military equipment to Pakistan. On the outbreak of hostili­ties we should indicate to them that we would not counte­nance the transfer of US controlled equipment to Pakistan which would prolong the conflict and inhibit a political set­tlement. (We would not, however, wish to pursue this course should we decide ourselves to reopen the military sales pipeline to Pakistan in the event of direct Indian attack.) If hostilities have broken out because of a direct India attack on Pakistan or because of direct Indian support for a Bangla Desh Liberation Army (Mukti Fauj) attack on Pakistan we would want to use our influence to the degree possible to end Indian military action. This will not only require vigor­ous action in New Delhi, but also consultation with the So­viet Union and others, and efforts in Islamabad to obtain commitments about political settlement which could be used to achieve Indian withdrawal.

- move to terminate any residual military sales still in the pipe­line to India by holding up all shipments and licenses of military supplies destined to India, carefully assessing the likelihood of a Chinese attack on India before taking defini­tive action.

- review any pending shipments of military assistance to Paki­stan, delaying any decision to reopen military sale while diplomatic efforts to terminate the hostilities are initiated.

hold economic assistance to India in abeyance for the duration of the conflict. (A de facto suspension of assistance would take place in Pakistan since most AID and PL-480 programs would be disrupted as a result of hostilities.)

 

If the circumstances of the outbreak of hostilities were ambiguous and murky we should:

- announce publicly a temporary suspension of military supply to both parties.

- urge other major arms supplying powers, such as Britain, the Soviet Union, China and France to suspend arms shipments to India and Pakistan.

- consider whether, in order to bring hostilities to an end and

achieve a political settlement, we should suspend all eco­nomic assistance programs to both sides.

- take action in the Indian and Pakistani consortia to mobilize international economic pressure on both sides. This could be done through bilateral negotiations or especially-called con­sortium meetings.

 

Advantages

- would provide maximum flexibility to the United States in a complex situation and would maximize the use of interna­tional organizations and multilateral diplomacy.

- would maximize use of US programs and influence to shorten hostilities, and inhibit third-party intervention.

- would contribute directly to a realistic political settlement.

- would maximize the possibility for the US to maintain rela­tions with both India and Pakistan (and perhaps Bangla Desh as well) in the aftermath of hostilities.

- would create conditions in which the US and the USSR could cooperate in a common political and peace-restoring role.

 

Disadvantages

- since the actual effect of such a policy would be to put pres­sure on the invading country (probably India in occupation of a portion of East Pakistan), it could lead to serious strains in our relations with the Government of India.

- could be seen in Pakistan as a repetition of the 1965 failure of the U.S. to fulfill its treaty commitments.

- might be ineffectual in shortening the hostilities and hence in preserving our fundamental interests in the area.

- could strain our relations with other third countries whose in­volvement we were trying to discourage, e.g., Iran, China.

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 158 - 166