Secret telegram
August 1, 1971
From: Amconsul Calcutta
To: Amembassy
New Delhi Secretary State Washington DC
Subject : Meeting with AL Rep
Summary: In discussion with Congen Poloff, Awami League MNA said
AL leaders anxious for political
settlement with GOP and prepared recede from total independence demand. They
fear consequences of Indo-Pak war and of extremist take-over of Bangladesh movement if guerrilla struggle
protracted. He suggested US-IndiaPak-AL summit
meeting. But insisted Mujib's participation essential
prerequisite. He stressed AL faith in US as only power that can
save situation. End summary.
1. On July 30 representative of Awami
League MNA from Comilla, Kazi
Zahirul Qaiyum (protect),
called at Congen to request appointment for Qaiyum with Consul General. When told this not possible, he
said Qaiyum willing to meet with any other officer. Poloff saw Qaiyum July 31. (Reftel not received at time of meeting).
2. Qaiyum gave background of
AL movement up through elections and
events of March 25. He said AL was openly pro-Indian and proAmerican. Now contact had been lost with Americans and
he had been selected by Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khandakar
Moshtaque Ahmed to attempt re-establish it. He said
BD Foreign Secretary Alam instructed some time ago
by BD Foreign Minister to contact Americans, but Alam
uncertain how best to arrange this. He gave no indication that he was aware of Alam's approach to Ambassador as reported Reftel. He said BD Foreign Minister also interested meeting
US government representatives, but emphasized that such a meeting must be
handled discreetly, preferably without GOI knowledge.
3. Qaiyum attended early July
meeting of AL representatives near Siliguri, and said
vast majority believe that US is only country that can save situation in East
Bengal. He said despite April 10 "proclamation of independence" which
reaffirmed at early July meeting, AL leaders still seeking political
settlement with West Pakistan. He said war would not bring any solution to their problem, emphasizing
that no one could foresee ultimate ramifications of IndoPak
conflict. From personal experience he noted that even brief 1965 war had
resulted in enormous setback to his Comilla business
interest.
4. Qaiyum reiterated familiar
contention that if present guerrilla struggle prolonged, it will be taken over
by extremists. He said communists now have only one percent support in East Bengal. But they are working fanatically to
infiltrate liberation movement. If repression and sufferings continue, young
men now joining the Mukti Fouz
will be won over by communists.
5. When asked about Bangladesh plans, Qaiyum
said there have been several long Cabinet meetings recently, and Prime Minister
Tajuddin Ahmed "is at a loss what to do."
He said that seizing and holding "liberated territory" was out of the
question as two fully trained and equipped army divisions would be needed to
hold significant portion of East Bengal. Rather, he thought Mukti Fouz would continue to emphasize guerrilla tactics in
effort to erode West Pakistan's economy and will. He said AL had some "friends" in West Pakistan who might eventually influence the
situation to AL's advantage. Pakistan might be compelled to change its policy
towards East
Bengal in
six months. Qaiyum feared, however, that West Pakistan would get sufficient foreign
assistance to permit it to continue much longer on its present course, thus
virtually ensuring eventual take-over of East Bengal by extremists.
6. Although he hoped US would not provide further military economic
assistance to West Pakistan, Qaiyum expressed understanding and approval of
US efforts to maintain a dialogue with Yahya government.
He suggested, moreover, that best and perhaps only way to solve present impasse
would be to have President Nixon, Yahya, Primin Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman meet together
similar to the Tashkent conference. He acknowledged that much spadework would
be required before such meeting took place, but said that there were men of
good will available on all sides to do this work. He said AL would be willing to retreat
considerably from positions (on complete independence, etc.) taken since March
1971. For example, he foresaw possibility of settlement in which portions of Pakistan army would remain in East Bengal supplemented by UN forces to ensure
non-Bengali interests are protected. (The acceptable Pakistan army units would be the five or six
East Bengal Regiment Battalions now in West Pakistan plus one or two Baluch
and one or two Pathan battalions.)
7. Qaiyum emphasized that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman must play key role
in any possible settlement as only Mujib is capable
of holding East Bengal people together. If Mujib is
tried and executed, all hope for resolution of current impasse will be lost.
For this reason Qaiyum asked that US government do everything in its power
to ensure Sheikh Mujib's safety.
8. Comment: Qaiyum impressed Poloff as sober, responsible man and we have no reason to
doubt his bona fides. (He had Bangladesh ID card and we have bio-data on him
from Congen Dacca.) We are struck by moderation of
his views as contrasted with strident tone of "official" Bangladesh propaganda. We think it plausible
that AL leadership, looking ahead to grim alternatives that will face
them if present chaotic situation continues, are seriously considering compromise
settlement and are trying to establish contact with US government with this in mind.
Although Qaiyum claims his sentiments represent
consensus of elected AL leadership, believe it important to determine whether
in fact top leaders equally moderately inclined. Poloff
told Qaiyum we would of course report meeting, but
did not encourage him to expect any substantive response. Qaiyum
indicated he would call again late next week. Believe we should continue to see
him on discreet, low-key basis.
Gordon
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White
House 1971. p. 166 - 167