Department
of State
AIRGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
A- 131
TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO : DACCA, LAHORE,
KARACHI, BOMBAY,
CALCUTTA, KABUL,
MADRAS, NEW
DELHI
FROM
: AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD Date : August 2,
1971
SUBJECT : Pakistan Internal Situation
REF : Islamabad 7598
Enclosures 1-3 are the full texts of the telegraphic
contributions of Congens Dacca, Lahore and Karachi to the reference Embtel.
SOBER
Enclosures: 1. Dacca
contribution drafted by A. Weisburd and R. Carle
2. Lahore
contribution drafted by J. Hataway
3. Karachi contribution
drafted by M. Van Order and D. Raynolds (para
5)
Unclassified on removal of
enclosures
DACCA INTERNAL ASSESSMENT
l . SUMMARY. Security situation has not improved.
Some evidence non-cooperation. Persecution of Hindus
declining in direct proportion to decline in size Hindu population. No
new information re Muslim League prospects, Bengali-Bihari
relations, EPCAF, or leftist activities.
2. MILITARY/SECURITY. From
MLA viewpoint, military/security situation has deteriorated somewhat since June
28. Madhupur Forest and Noakhali
District have emerged as centers Mukti Bahini activity with guerrillas basing selves these
regions. (General Farman Ali believes Toaha-Huq extreme leftist group responsible for Noakhali disturbances and claims army battalion has
been deployed to cope with problem.) MB units [nay also be
operating permanently in Comilla and Sylhet Districts. Congen
received a few reports of army units being ambushed these four sectors. These
constitute first example since immediate post-March 25 period of Bengalis
taking on army from border regions. MB also attacking police stations these
areas. Exchange of fire continues in border
regions. Most recent example mortaring of Comilla
town July 20. Destruction of bidges
and assassinations of peace committee members still widespread throughout
eastern half of province. Rail link DaccaChittagong
still closed. Mining of roads continues. Week July 11-17 truck filled with tea
garden laborers struck anti-tank mine in Sylhet
District. Approximately six killed, twelve wounded. Weekend July 16-18, food
truck struck mine on Dacca-Comilla road between Daudkandi-Elliotganj. Three killed. Resistance has begun
sniping at military vehicles along Comilla-Chittagong
road in Feni area. Nightly bombings
continuing in Dacca. Chittagong experienced three-four bombing
incidents over past month. Resistance had two noteworthy accomplishments during
month. First was fulfillment of threat to disrupt July 15 SSC (matriculation)
examinations. Despite extensive army precautions four exam centers in
Dacca and two in Mymensingh
were bombed. Second was group of attacks on power transformer stations July 19.
Operation not only fulfillment of threat but also most sophisticated
undertaking in Dacca thus far in terms planning and organization. Little current information re western half of province. Our impression this area less active than east with only occasional
interdiction and assassination and little direct anti-army activity.
Some exchange of firing occurring along eastern border. With units now
apparently operating permanently in province, increasing sophistication
resistance activities in Dacca, beginnings of terror campaign in
Chittagong and propaganda victories scored by
disruption SSC Exam, we feel insurgency has made some progress in past month.
3. NON-COOPERATION. Major
known instance of non-cooperation was poor attendance at SSC Exam through
intimidation by MB also a factor. Relative importance MB threats versus
individual determination to boycott exam not measurable. Observations by Congen officers and foreign traders confirm that at some
levels of jute board, go-slow campaign has taken hold. May also be some
slowdown in certain branches GOEP but this not certain.
Many bureaucrats working more slowly than usual. Some
have slowed down after apparent recovery from postcrackdown
shock. But no definite way determine motive for slowdown. Noncooperation
may be factor in some cases.
4. MUSLIM LEAGUE PROSPECTS. Too early form conclusions on prospects Muslim League in
by-elections. At minimum must wait to know number of seats to be contested and
identities of candidates.
5. BENGALI-BIHARI
RELATIONS. Our impression is Bengali-Bihari
relations very bad. This conclusion based on incidents and attitudes previously
reported and absence evidence that situation has changed since reports.
6. PERSECUTION OF
HINDUS. Most blatant forms persecution of Hindus appear
to have ceased. No recent reports mass slaughters or unprovoked burning of
villages. Important factor in decline in persecution is drastic decrease in
number of Hindus available to persecute. Latest estimate puts six million East
Pakistan Hindus in India.
Vast majority remainder either in hiding, living in areas not
easily accessible to army, or working in tolerated occupations, e.g., as
sweepers, barbers, fishermen. One example this phenomenon Comilla town. District is 20% Hindu and town
percentage at least as high as district. But only Hindus left in town are those
in unattractive occupations. Cyclone area one of few where
still large numbers unhidden Hindus of other than excepted classes.
Reports from priest working that area indicate Hindus being denied relief
supplies and subjected to army harassment. Question evacuee property covered septel.
7. DE-HINDUIZATION. Main
instance de-Hinduization was expulsion of Hindus.
Hindu monuments being destroyed some areas. Such destruction observed in
Dacca and Chittagong and Hindu sculpture now very easy to
obtain. Some Dacca streets with Hindu and English names renamed with
Muslim names.
8. EPCAF. Information status EPCAF unavailable. Congen
learned that organization called Razakar Bahini (Volunteer Force) being formed. These units
organized by local peace committee when directed to do so by army. Peace
committees naturally pick QUOTE reliable END QUOTE individuals. Razakars trained and armed by military but not uniformed. Razakars generally responsible for protection particular
villages and bridges, power lines and so on in vicinity of villages.
9. LEFT. Toaha group
communists very active in Noakhali area. Ahmedul Kabir in jail. Otherwise no
information on leftist activities.
LAHORE INTERNAL ASSESSMENT
1. MLA SUPPORT. Yahya still enjoys firm support of Punjab majority. In fact, part played in
Kissinger's China visit; McNamara's letter on publication
of Cargill Report, have improved his image as well as that of U.S. Other factors which contribute to MLA
support such as Indian threat, image of Yahya as
savior of country, still operative. Economic pinch caused by rising prices,
higher taxes, not yet strong enough to erode support. Labor leaders unhappy
their inability function normally but minor labor layoffs have not effected rank and file. Students chafing
under MLA restrictions but confining activities to right-left sparring on
campus.
2. CONSERVATIVES
ACTIVE. On political scene, activities of conservative parties have
lessened domination of political platform by PPP. Qaiyum
Khan's tours of Punjab
have presented image of uncompromising patriotism which may have increased his
popularity here. Merger of Convention and Council Muslim Leagues also drew
considerable interest. Daultana, after sitting on
sidelines for some time, reentered political scene with series speeches to
party workers and press releases this week. `In patriotic speech July 21
strongly attacked India, insisted transfer of power must be
simultaneous both wings and only possible after complete normalcy in East
Pak, strongly supported MLA as representative regime, praised
"modest" Yahya's statesmanship and vision
for role in Kissinger visit. He also criticized Qaiyum
for not joining merger but reserved main attack for Bhutto, accusing him
supporting Ayub, opposing Miss Jinnah,
being anti-Islamic, and suggesting he take his ideology to country of origin.
Comment: Daultana's public support for MLA puzzling
in view personal critical views expressed in private.
3. MUSLIM LEAGUE
MERGER. Merger of two Muslim Leagues very much incomplete
without Qaiyum group. If Qaiyum
talks with Nasrullah Khan should lead to merger
between his PML and PDP, new party would have some East Pak organization and be in stronger
position in West
Pakistan,
than other Muslim Leagues. At same time, we presume Qaiyum
unpopular in East Wing due his consistent hard line on Bengalis. Daultana's present MLA line could be effort gain MLA favor,
then take advantage Qaiyum's East Pak weakness to reap rewards in East Pak by-elections. Should by-elections
result in parliamentary majority for any moderate party, or near majority,
conservative elements of PPP will be tempted to defect and Bhutto will have
difficult if not impossible job of holding PPP together.
4. BHUTTO AND PPP. Internal
strains in PPP clearly evident last ten days with Mukhtar
Rana of Sheikh Rashid faction openly attacking both
Bhutto and Khar in series of statements demanding big
landlords in PPP either distribute their land or turn it over to party. Bhutto,
who successfully patched up party in April, unable to do so in two-day stay
Lahore this week and was himself target of
threats and insults from radical PPP members. Party finances in Punjab also in bad shape with contributions
difficult obtain so long party not in power. Despite these weaknesses, Bhutto
has considerable potential as disruptive force. Any decision take to streets
would probably be supported by radical faction. If well financed, PPP could
muster sizeable crowds. However, any such campaign now, unlike 1969 movement
against Ayub, would not be supported by majority of
either middle class or masses, even many PPP supporters would oppose naked bid
for power while country in danger and, as Qaiyum has
threatened, bid might well be met by violence from right. Unless martyr
instincts and frustrations overcome Bhutto's reasoning, we do not believe he
will expose himself and PPP so long as Yahya's plans for
transfer offer possibility of power. This respect, believe his demands for
lifting ban on political activity, his "power or prison" statement,
designed appease his party and at same time pressure Yahya.
KARACHI INTERNAL ASSESSMENT
REF : Karachi 1492
1.SUMMARYARY. Semblance of
political activity being maintained by political activists, principally PPP as
organized group and by individual spokesmen of smaller groups.
Impression is that domestic politics not currently issue of
prime concern inhabitants this consular district. What passes for political
activity gives the impression of being somewhat forced, not reflecting stirring
within the total body politic. Currently regime's rule unchallenged. Bhutto
only figure possessing potential to attempt mount significant
agitation against regime. A Bhutto decision to confront regime could result in
outbreaks of violence of unpredictable intensity and duration. However,
doubtful Bhutto resort to agitation could generate upsweep of comparable
magnitude to his electoral showing, or equal to pressure on Ayub
in '68-'69. Should incidents of violence occur they
likely to be sharp, but regime expected to react promptly and strongly enough
to cope with any PPP challenge. Bhutto may try tactics of disruption, but he
keeps his commitments to do so quite nebulous and flexible suggesting his
realization this course of action a last resort.
2. INTRODUCTION. Little
evolution or shift in popular domestic political sentiments noted here since
assessment Yahya's June 28 speech contained reftel. GOP's facilitative role in Kissinger visit to China has provided positive, emotional
boost local confidence and pride in regime. Inference improved Sino-US ties
means improved Pak-US ties has for now improved atmospherics Pak-US relations.
IBRD President McNamara's letter of explanation regarding leakage Bank's report
on Pakistan to Yahya
has been treated positively. Yet to crystalize is
reaction to Bhutto's July 20 Lahore statement he
agreeable to four-month delay in transfer of power provided there was no
further proscrastination. Appears inescapable some
will interpret July 20 comment as a reinforcement Bhutto's July 5 observation
he expected PPP to have effective power by November or be in jail. Implicit in
these statements is threat that if power not transferred confrontation with
regime only other alternative open for Bhutto. Reiteration this formulation
could serve to box Bhutto into situation where failure to achieve what he wants
(power) leaves him with options of either forcing confrontation, or backing
down. Latter course likely generate creditability gap with potential results of
reducing his control over PPP and diminishing his personal stature.
Possibility seen that a regime-sponsored merger of three muslim leagues will garner sufficient seats East Pakistan
by-elections, if and when held, and from WestPakistan
to deny Bhutto majority role at center. With PPP cut out at center defections in
Sind PPP could occur, hazarding party's current
comfortable (about 50 of 60 seats) domination prospective provincial
legislature. Appears likely Bhutto's June 24
Baluchistan coalition was put together in
anticipation Yahya's June 28 speech was to provide
for some measure transfer power provincial level. Since this didn't occur, viability
this coalition until provincial governments installed possible but not likely. PPP
influence on developments Baluchistan marginal at best. If Bhutto should confront
regime his Baluchistan coalition partners can't deliver degree of agitational
support NAP(R) could. Bhutto's failure to make political accommodation with NAP(R)
alienated him from group with greatest agitation potential in Baluchistan. Doubtful Bhutto can do about face
now and enlist Baluchistan NAP(R) support if he goes
confrontation route. We have no confirmation any reports of extensive current
troubles in Baluchistan.
Bhutto remains single figure in consular district who could be
inspirer of any potentially significant anti-regime agitation. However, while
attempting maintain semblance political pressure on regime Bhutto has set
deadline for hard political decisions sufficiently far ahead to suggest he not
desirous of face-off now. Bhutto could be playing for time hoping developments,
both internal and external, over next three months will enhance his position
and make regime more amenable to treating with him. It is difficult to perceive
train of developments which could cause regime to be more forthcoming toward
Bhutto and PPP on other than its own terms.
3. PPP AS POTENTIAL DISRUPTIVE FORCE. In this consular district,
particularly in Sind and marginally in Baluchistan, PPP possesses potential for being
disruptive force. However, magnitude this potential impossible assess exactly
because of number of variables involved, i.e., existing state of relations with
India; state of economy; regime's willingness to be tough at early stages;
degree of general public support and sympathy, and perhaps techniques employed
by PPP. It seems that overall situation as it exists militates against a sudden
and sustained resort to violence by PPP as means of unseating Yahya as Ayub was unseated.
Situation Summer 1971 isn't same as Fa1llWinter/Spring
of '68-'69. During Ayub decline all opposition
focused on one objective, get rid of Ayub. Current
articulated political aspirations center on transfer of power, not get Yahya. While toppling Yahya might
be goal of individual politicians it not goal used to enlist popular support.
Regime has support, or at least acquiescence of business/commercial interests,
conservatively oriented middle class and many traditional landlords. This
support springs from two different motivations(1) Pakistan is in danger, regime needs support of
public, and (2) antipathy towards Bhutto. No indications here establishment
considering abandoning Yahya as happened to Ayub. Eventual political outcome of anti-Ayub tumult was unclear yet this uncertainty failed to damp
agitation against Ayub. In current context apparent
and logical beneficiary of violent anti-regime agitation would be Bhutto and
PPP, prospect which does not generate near universal popular acceptance and
support anti-Ayub crusade did. Possible supporters of
PPP--students, laborers, political extremistscould be significant factors in urban disturbances where PPP most
certainly would try to force issue. In Sind urban concentrations PPP could bank
on appreciable, not universal support all these groups. Students within
province aren't a monolithic group and refugee/Sindhi, extremist/conservative
divisions within student groups would provide both supporters and opponents of
a PPP campaign. On balance, probably more would support PPP than oppose it, but
then a vast majority of students might abstain from activist roles,
particularly if participation in violence involved. Industrial laborers provide
reservoir of supporters for violent campaign but their ranks would also be
split. Influence of J-I backed National Labor Federation and some apolitical
labor federations would be exerted to keep potential demonstrations out of any
agitation. Except in Karachi, where NAP/R strength limited, Bhutto, PPP and its
student and worker affiliates would be alone on left leading forces of
dissidence. Usmani of Karachi NAPIR has said he would
support PPP in confrontation with regime, but he doesn't have much to throw
into pot. Activated by its supporters could cause disruption in Sind urban centers. However, to say this
does not mean resultant disruption would lead to assumption political power.
We believe government would move hard and fast to nip any
disturbances. Violence in rural areas of Sind could occur, but it appears Bhutto's
strategy would depend on carrying urban areas to assure his success. Scattered
violence in rural areas has occurred in West Pakistan before without threatening
government's control in other areas. In Baluchistan
PPP incapable of generating any serious significant disturbances on its own
without cooperation of NAP/R. NAP/R-PPP collaboration in Baluchistan
not likely now, or in foreseeable future. Mengal of
NAP/R has stated frankly he wouldn't support Bhutto movement because replacing Yahya with Bhutto, if possible, would be exchange of one
autocrat for another and this view most likely shared by other NAP/R figures.
In addition, among Balouch NAP/R suspicion remains
alive Bhutto may be playing army's game. They absolutely convinced he tool of
army in his refusal reach accommodation with Sheikh. This suspicion was revived
by Bhutto's papering together anti-NAP/R, anti-Sardar
coalition which compatible with goal of Baluchistan's governor to prevent NAP/R coming to
power in province. PPP might be able to stir short-lived minor fuss in
Quetta town and perhaps Kalat
District, but that would be extent of its current capability acting alone.
4. POPULAR ATTITUDES
TOWARDS YAHYA. Masses appear responsive to promises to improve their
plight. Thus far, Yahya has not been cited as source
of their woes. PPP's inference Yahya political enemy
because he thwarting transfer power to elected representatives of people who
only group capable and desirous improving lot of masses. Too
sophisticated to make impression on masses. Straight forward attack
directed at mobilizing masses against Yahya on
personal or political basis unlikely succeed under present conditions. Segment
of masses might be mobilized for Bhutto, but currently no ground swell
sentiment against Yahya. Generally middle class
favorable disposed towards MLA and Yahya or at least
not actively hostile. Middle class with little empathy for unwashed or East
Pakistanis probably more opposed Bhutto and his image as political/social
extremist. Bhutto's espousal of political violence, if necessary, to promote
social/economical change carries implicit threat to middle class of setback for
them to extent lower classes would benefit and narrow middle class already scanty
margin of economic social advantage.
Yahya may not be loved by all but many may
see his rule as preferable to any alternative available and welcome him as a
symbol of stability and order. In Karachi especially, but throughout consular
district also, there are many who doubt veracity of government line regarding
past events and current conditions in East Pakistan but they generally hold
belief that all was justified to prevent secession of Eastern Wing. Skeptics
and disenchanted appear content to sit on their hands and await further
developments.
5. ECONOMIC FACTORS. While
developments East
Pakistan
inflicting great wounds national social fabric, shortrun
economic effects obscured and largely absorbed in West by strong inertial
element in economy here. If economy were developed type with business cycles,
believe situation by now would be shambles. Instead, consumption high due to
large wheat crop spring 1970 and cotton crop winter 1970, and industrial
production high due to expanded demand in West and supply additional exports. Shipments still arriving from foreign assistance pipelines.
Demonetization struck hardest at basically unruly, unorganized clandestine
hoarders of wealth, not articulate leadership, and poor welcomed spectacle of
large cash holders discommoded. Tax bills presented end June less severe than
many feared. Reports of adverse public opinion in Consortium countries largely
shrugged off as indication foreigners misguided by malicious Indian propaganda;
meanwhile quite serious elements take pride in official assurances Pakistan
could go it alone if need be. Important recall in latter
connection that MLA figures and business leaders both calling and planning for
reduced reliance on foreign assistance long before 1970 elections and
subsequent developments.
Domestic price levels should be watched, together with labor
picture. Number firms have used East Pakistan situation as excuse dismiss
handful obnoxious employees in retrenchment moves, but massive layoffs so
widely predicted months ago in foreign press still haven't appeared. This
reduces Bhutto's field of public appeal. Since he can't point to recession in
West caused by MLA he has only weaker claim that things would be even better
with PPP in charge. While lower income groups might buy this line,
establishment convinced to the contrary, particularly after PPP link to events
in Lyallpur last March.
Source: The American
Papers (Secret and Confidential India, Pakistan and Bangladesh documents 1965 –
1973),
page no – 624 – 631, The University Press Ltd.