Department of State

 

 

TELEGRAM

 

 

SECRET 429

 

 

 

ISLAMA 08187 111417Z

51 ACTION NEA-1 1

INFO         : OCT-01 EUR-14 NSA-05 10-11 CIAE-00 INR-06 RSC-01 DODE-00 PRS-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14   

                    RSR-01 / 081 W

035717

R 111305Z AUG 71

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 037

INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

AMCONSUL DACCA

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USMISSION USUN

SECRET ISLAMABAD 8187

SUBJ         : CONVERSATION WITH PAK ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF: INDO-PAK MILITARY

                                     CONFRONTATION

REF           : ISLAMABAD 8185 (NOTAL)

 

1. In conversation Aug 11 with General Abdul Hamid Khan, Pak Army Chief of Staff and second only to Pres Yahya in MLA hierarchy, I asked for Hamid's assessment of current military situation between India and Pakistan. I said we would particularly appreciate his estimate on dangers of escalation. We were deeply concerned on latter subject and, as General Hamid doubtless knew, we had been counseling restraint on both parties. I said we believed that a war would be in no one's interest. We placed utmost importance on both sides' avoiding actions that would exacerbate situation.

 

2. Hamid acknowledged there are risks in having troops face each other in close proximity on both sides of border, as is now case in East Pakistan. It was clearly not in Pakistan's interest to have war, however, and at this point he did not see indication that India wanted war.

 

3. Hamid noted that Pak forces were far inferior to India's numerically and logistically. No senior Pak military commander would want to take on war with India, and indeed it was firm GOP policy to exercise restraint. Pak troops would of course do what is necessary to defend themselves, but Pakistan would not initiate any war. I said I had heard rumors of some sentiment among Pak military that direct action should be taken against Mukti Bahini bases within India near East Pak border. Hamid admitted there was some feeling that, as strictly military matter, enemy bases should be taken out. But such proposals were vocied primarily by local company commanders and QTE there had been no decision to take any such action UNQTE. I said we believed it most important that greatest restraint continue to be exercised.

 

4. Hamid said he was aware of sharp and widespread pressures on Primin Gandhi to move against Pakistan, but it was his impression that she had thus far succeeded in holding the line. He appreciated that, as politician, she had to bend with political pressures and had accordingly made number of very forceful statements. She continued publicly to keep options open as, for example, in recognizing Bangla Desh government, but she was still resisting pressure to take that step. This was evident in her latest speech at big Delhi rally Aug 9. GOI was meanwhile supplying considerable military, political and psychological support to East Pak secession movement, which was vital to continuation that movement. As Hamid saw it however, GOI had not taken military measures that indicated intention to initiate war against Pakistan. It was true there had been some forward movements of ground forces and that air units had been put in state of readiness. But Hamid was inclined to view these measures as in nature of alert precautions. He acknowledged that Pak forces had also been placed on greater degree of alertness.

 

Acknowledging continuing risks along East Pak border even if neither side wishes war, Hamid said he thought it would have been very desirable to get agreement on stationing UN representatives on both sides of border. He regretted Indian rejection of SYG's proposal on HCR reps.

 

6. Hamid said he thought one of various factors inhibiting further escalation by GOI was probable concern over implications for West Bengal. He thought New Delhi had enough on its hands now in dealing with West Bengal problem and would fear expansion toward concept of greater Bengal.

 

7. I asked about report in morning press to effect that Indian regular troops had been in action last week in northeastern salient of Rangpur district and that they had left 72 of their dead and weapons (septel). Hamid said the story was not entirely accurate. He believed that some Indian regular and BSF troops had crossed border together with some Mukti Bahini forces in apparent effort to seal off salient at narrowest point. When Pak army counterattacked, he though most Indian troops had probably withdrawn and that Paks engaged Mukti Bahini elements. Hamid said he was inclined believe that bulk if not all of enemy troops killed in action were Mukti Bahini rathsn than Indians.

 

8. Comment: I found Hamid to be restrained and apparently realistic in his recognition of dangers of escalation. He exhibited no hawk-like tendencies.

GP-3

Sober

 

 

 

Source: The American Papers (Secret and confidential India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Documents); page no – 640 - 641, The University Press.