0817_71_events

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL 165

ISLAMA 08388 01 OF 02 171332Z

ACTION SS-25

INFO : OCT-01 /026 W 078934

R 1712272 AUG 71

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 122

INFO AMCONSUL DACCA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 8388

EXDIS

SUBJ: ADMIRAL AHSAN ON EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN

1. Vice Admiral S.M. Ahsan, who was governor of East Pakistan until relieved end of February 1971, made following observations and suggestions during one-hour conversation with DCM at Ahsan's home in Karachi Aug 16.

a) Role of US: USG has behaved with admirable restraint and wisdom in its conduct of policy toward Pakistan during recent events in East Pakistan. In view of this, USG is only voice of influence for moderation which might be listened to by President Yahya. In response to DCM's comment that USG already privately urging moderate course, Ahsan recommended that special USG representative be sent to talk to Yahya before it is "too late" to explain absolute necessity of finding political solution in East Pakistan, which possible only through rehabilitation and use of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

b) Role of Mujib: Only practical solution to East Pakistan problem in long run is political. Alternative is separation of East from West Pakistan and establishment of independent state. Continued enforcement of military rule with retention of 80 thousand troops in East and all resultant economic consequences is more than Pakistan could handle over prolonged period of time. Efforts by MLA to weave new political fabric with hodgepodge of has-beens and camp followers were doomed to failure. To achieve political solution, if it not already too late to do so, requires utmost magnanimity on part of Yahya since only Mujib still has ability to end bloodshed and find viable answer. Solution would have to come within framework of loosely united Pakistan with maximum autonomy for East. There is doubt as to whether even Mujib could carry it off or whether he would accept role in view of recent events, but he is only hope. Yahya's ability to utilize Mujib services would require wither that his trial be dropped or he be acquitted, and then in relatively short time he be allowed to enter and control political process of East Pakistan. Prior to March at least, separation from Pakistan was not Mujib's intention and hopefully his attitude has not significantly altered. Rehabilitation of Mujib would admittedly be difficult for MLA to accept, but Pak administrations, particularly Martial Law. historically have been able to find rationale for such moves.

c) Governing of East Pakistan. Even with popular government, it is extremely difficult if not impossible task to govern East Pakistan. Crisis there not only one of frustration of face, exploitation, class, economic difficulties and the like but even more is general rebellion of people against their lot, of 75 million people on 26 million acres with little institutional groundwork for any type of government. A government democratically instituted with strong popular base and maximum support of people would, since last hurrahs died, find itself confronted with variety of insoluble problems. Awami League was fully aware of necessity of some sort of authoritarian back-stopping to implement its programs and was, within own clearly defined limits. quite willing to kre army and police structure to assist in creating necessary discipline required for carrying out programs.

d) Power structure of West Pakistan: The source of power and voice of authority in Pakistan is President Yahya. He is first and last authority. Rumors of dynamic generals vying for power beneath him are simply rumors. Mentality of army in Pakistan is such that subordinates obey and rarely if ever question policy decisions. If President calls in even senior subordinate and comments he plans to carry out givek policy, subordinate "adds ten reasons" why he thinks that policy is correct even if he believes it to be foolhardy. (Generals Hamid, Umar, Gul Hassan, Peerzada and others have really only small influence in running the government.) To deal with Pakistan and to influence course of events one must therefore deal directly), with President. ,

e) Position of India: India's position, has despite public outcry, been reasonably moderate and its hands before the events in March were relatively clean.

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL 163

ISLAMA 08388 02 OF 02 171336Z

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W 078997

R 171227Z AUG 71

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 123

INFO AMCONSUL DACCA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 8388

EXDIS

SUBJ: ADMIRAL AHSAN ON EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN

(f) Asides: Regrets cancellation of Kennedy visit, is very pessimistic about future of East Pakistan, is doubtful of ability of MLA to see reality in East Pakistan, sees removal some time in near future of General Tikka Khan (source for latter is Governor Azhar, NWFP, who recently travelled to East Pakistan). Tikka is "good soldier" and basically not harsh, but he is fundamentally a "sergeant- major" and has limited mental horizon. Any replacement, regardless of caliber, will have little impact unless political solution found. Ahsan predicts that Mujib will be found guilty but not shot, probably commuted death sentence. As to his own role. Ahsan considers himself spent: He has made his arguments for rational course and sees little more he can do.

2. Historical Perspective: Ahsan believed and still believes that Yahya was sincerely motivated in effort restore civilian rule. During Yahya's January visit to East Pakistan he was convinced that President fully intended to turn over power to Awami League, but by end of February he had changed his mind. Speculated that Bhutto was a chief cause of change in President's attitude. Awami League leaders were on whole sincere, relatively conservative middle class who simply wanted firm assurance of redress for East Pakistan through maximum autonomy. Ahsan made it quite clear to President that delay in calling Assembly would lead to disaster and even Mujib would find it difficult if not impossible to control events. There was evidence that by late February when Ahsan was removed, that military build-up was beginning and preliminary steps were being taken for direct and forceful imposition of Martial Law Authority. As Ahsan sees it, MLA did not, does not and is unlikely in future to understand East Pakistan.

3. Comment: Ahsan earned respect and confidence of Awami League and other Bengalis during his tenure as East Pak governor. He maintained active dialogue with Mujib while there. His current despondence came through clearly during above conversation.

GP-3. Farland

Source: The American Papers (Secret and confidential India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Documents; page no – 642-644, The University Press