Secret telegram, 20 August 1971

From: Amconsul Calcutta

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: Meeting with Bangladesh Representative in Calcutta

 

Summary: At meeting August 19, urgently requested by Qaiyum, he told Poloff that he had briefed Bangladesh Cabinet on his contact with us and had received instructions to convey Cabinet appreciation for USG efforts to date, to affirm that Cabinet willing accept any settlement negotiated by Sheikh Mujib, and to request advice from US experts on dealing with their problems and USG cooperation on proposed visit of Fonmin to US. Qaiyum also reported GOI decision to keep up arms supply and training for Mukti Bahini (MB). End summary.

 

1. Although we have discouraged Awami League NINA Qaiyum from initiating contact with Congen, he sent message to Poloff August 19 urgently requesting meeting same night. He explained that he leaving next day for Agartala and had important information to convey prior his departure. As there inadequate time to check with Department, Poloff agreed see him to continue "listening session" described reftel.

 

2. Qaiyum said BD Cabinet met evening August 16. Present were Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam, Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, Foreign Minister Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, Finance Min­ister M Mansoor All and Home Minister A H M Kamaruzzaman. Qaiyum, the only other person present, was asked describe his con­tact with Congen. He was excused by Cabinet after being told they would consider what he said and give further instruction.

 

3. On August 17, Qaiyum met with Ahmed who said Cabinet had several points they wished conveyed to Congen. Qaiyum had taken notes on them which he referred to at meeting. The points are:

 

A. Cabinet appreciative of USG for efforts to solve current impasse. They regard report that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's wife was taken  from Dacca to West Pakistan and Pak Ambassador Hilaly's public I.. comment that Sheikh Mujib would not be summarily shot as hopeful signs. (Comment: Qaiyum explained that Mujib's wife had been moderating influence on him. She was instrumental in persuading Mujib to remain in Dacca on March 25 in the hope he would be able to work out compromise with Yahya, even at that late date.) Cabinet suspects that the USG was somehow responsible for these encour­aging events, Qaiyum explained, and thus wished to voice apprecia­tion.

 

B. Cabinet decided that any repeat any agreement reached between Mujib and Yahya will be acceptable to them, provided it arranged through "proper channels." By "proper channels" Qaiyum explained they meant they hoped USG would participate in arrangements leading to agreement. They do not favor agreement negotiated via Soviets such as Tashkent Declaration.

 

C. Cabinet discussed August 19 Indo-Soviet treaty and felt that it could lead to East Bengal being "swallowed by Indo/Soviet combi­nation." They ask for US expert advice" for BDG to cope with this problem in particular, as well as overall East Bengal situation. Qai­yum elaborated saying BD had no experts and inadequate funds. Therefore, it not in position to figure out how to tackle its problems, and is soliciting US advice.

 

D. Cabinet wants Foreign Minister Ahmed to visit U.S. with delega­tion of 3 or 4 other BD representatives to discuss ways of solving their problems with U.S. officials. USG "cooperation is solicited" in facilitating this trip. Qaiyum said Foreign Minister understands that he could not be received "officially" in U.S.

 

4. Qaiyum said early August BD Cabinet meetings with GOI offi­cials in New Delhi were mainly concerned with Mukti Bahini prob­lems. GOI has now agreed MB may purchase arms from abroad and bring them into India. Only foreign arms received to date (other than those taken from Indian army inventory) was consignment of Yugo­slav weapons channeled to MB through GOI. GOI also agreed greatly to step up MB training. In addition to training now given at youth camps and MB centers, Indian army agreed provide additional

training for 14,000 men from the western zone and 10,000 from the eastern side of East Bengal each month. From 24,000 total, 5,000 re­cruits monthly will be selected for additional 4 weeks advanced training. Qaiyum said recently India has increased supply of arms for MB. GOI also now manufacturing ammunition for Chinese weapons taken from East Pakistan.

 

5. Qaiyum said he felt there were both "hard liners" and "soft liners" in West Pakistan. He explained that both groups wanted keep Paki­stan intact. "Hard liners," such as General Tikka Khan, thought that this could be done through harsh, but brief, military repression. "Soft liners," represented by Admiral Ahsan and General Yakub, believed that Pakistan could remain together by making honorable settlement with Awami League. "Now that hard liners have failed," Qaiyum said, "there might be scope for soft liners." Qaiyum added that he personally favored complete independence for East Bengal, but he and most other BD representatives would willingly accept some sort of confederation for East and West Pakistan. Explaining Cabinet po­sition on this, he said, "they believe that Mujib's life is more valu­able than independence."

 

6. On question of recognition, Qaiyum said, "everyone understands that if India recognizes Bangladesh, everything is finished." By this he meant recognition would permanently close door on possibility of compromise solution. He also believes that if Mujib is executed, BD government as currently constituted will collapse. At present, they resisting efforts from left-wing extremists to form United Front. If Mujib dies, they no longer will be able resist this pressure, and United Front will be formed which will quickly be dominated by leftists. Qaiyum said that he and majority of his colleagues are anti­communists and "rightists." They want "to save themselves," and only way they can envisage doing this is to work out compromise in near future. Qaiyum said that some day there must be settlement and from personal standpoint of Awami Leaguers, they hoped that it would be one in which US rather than Soviets (or something worse) is involved.

 

7. Comments: We have repeatedly told Qaiyum that although we re­port his remarks, we in no sense authorized enter into any sort of "negotiations" with him. He says he understands this, but neverthe-

less claims Cabinet appointed him August 16 as point of contact with USG. We told Qaiyum, frankly, what we reported to US was at con­siderable variance with "hard line attitude openly taken by other BD representatives. We suggest it might be useful if BD government found additional ways of their desire for negotiated settlement known. Qaiyum replied, he could get signatures of 375 MPA's MNA's on statement attesting to their agreement to sub-para l(B) above. He also offered have Foreign Minister draw up document ex­plaining their position and present it.

 

Gordon.

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971. p. 180 - 183