Secret telegram

August 24, 1971

From: Amembassy Islamabad

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Sub: Contacts with Bangla Desh reps ... Pres. Yahya's reaction

 

1. Summary: Pres. Yahya indicated his approval quiet USG contacts with individuals formerly associated with Awami League and indi­cated appreciation for receipt present and future info obtained through said contacts. Looked with favor upon an unpublicized meeting between GOP and Bangla Desh group for purpose seeking political rapprochement. Embassy disinclined to issue visa to QUOTE foreign minister UNQUOTE. End summary.

 

2. Immediately following Aug 24 call by Ambassador David Popper and me upon Pres. Yahya to discuss narcotic drug problems and pur­poses of Popper's mission as related thereto, I requested a private conversation with Yahya in order to discuss matters suggested reftel.

 

3. In accordance reftel I stated that the US Consulate General in Cal­cutta had been picking up QUOTE signals UNQUOTE from various Bangladesh sympathizers, particularly Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, a former attorney in Comilla. These signals seemed to indicate that a substantial number of MPA's and MNA's presently in Calcutta and elsewhere were seriously amenable to the acceptance of an agree­ment which would maintain the integrity and unity of Pakistan, within the general concept of the so-called QUOTE six points UNQUOTE, if such an agreement could be somehow reached be­tween Mujibur and Yahya, given the circumstances of Mujibur's on­going trial. I told Yahya that in making mention of this I wanted him fully to understand that USG had taken no initiative whatsoever in gathering this information nor was the USG seeking to play a mediatory role between the GOP and the outlawed Awami League. Conversely, I stated that USG had consistently maintained a diplo­matic stance of non-involvement and had in no way sought out or solicited contacts with QUOTE Bangladesh govt UNQUOTE reps. However, I noted Yahya's many conversations with me during which he emphasized his hope for a return to normalcy and his addi­tional hope that with such a climate he could turn power back to the people. Since USG was now privy to this information, I thought that in the interests of the much sought for peace I should bring it to his attention.

 

4. Yahya's reaction was favorable and positive. He said that he was '" most happy that I had provided him with this type of intelligence and he felt that the US had been correct in its political and diplomatic posture, adding that he hoped our officials QUOTE with their cus­tomary care and exercise of discretion UNQUOTE would maintain appropriate contacts. Yahya noted that his overriding desire was to ' bring harmony back into the body politic of Pakistan with such ad­justments therein as would be for the greatest possible good of both wings. That included, he said, widespread economic and political adjustments in the east wing which he stood prepared to make. He opined, however, that he could not understand why those MPA's and MNA's who had been fully cleared did not come forward and take over the organization of a govt so that he could transfer power soon­est.

 

5. Following the general discussion on the aforesaid aspect, I asked Yahya if he saw any major obstacle to a select group of GOP mem­bers, unpublicized and on neutral ground in a foreign country, meet­ing with a few of the key people for whom Qaiyum indicated he spoke. I said the purpose of such a hypothetical meeting could be to ascertain jointly whether or not there existed areas in which political rapprochement could be effected. This would serve its own purpose, and in addition the related matters of refugees, food^, distribution and rehabilitation could get under way meaningfully and with full pur­pose. Yahya replied he would favor such a development wholeheart­edly, asking that in case such a contingency developed, I keep closely in touch with him on this matter generally.

 

6. It would seem that several forces are at play in this present situa­tion. (A) At least some of the Bangla Deshers are realizing that their independence would be sorely limited by the interests of India, as such independence may be an illusion, and (B) Yahya may be com­ing to the conclusion that his appetite wasn't commensurate with the bite he took. In any event the foregoing represents a glimmer of light amidst the encircling gloom, and a hope for vindication of US policy vis-a-vis Pakistan.

 

7. Re paragraph 4 of reftel, it is the Embassy's strongly held belief that we should avoid problems involved in issuing visa to Bangla­desh QUOTE foreign minister UNQUOTE. To do so would almost inevitably raise concerns here about our good faith in not repeat not encouraging separatist movement. These concerns would be en­hanced by inevitable US and world press/television coverage which QUOTE foreign minister UNQUOTE visit would receive in US. Rather than have Bangla Desh QUOTE Fonmin UNQUOTE in US,

embassy believes it highly preferable that he take his story to inter­ested GOP representatives in London, where reportedly he will soon be going. He would be less visible in London than in New York or Washington and it should be easier there to make covert contacts with GOP representatives.

 

Farland

 

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971. p. 190 - 192