Secret telegram                                                                             

25 August 1971

From: State Department Washington DC To: Amconsul Calcutta

 

Subject: Contacts with Bangla Desh Reps

 

1. Positive reaction of President Yahya to Ambassador Farland's presentation of Bangla Desh rep's negotiation feeler is encouraging. There is still very little on which to pin large hopes but in view of President Yahya's attitude we should proceed as follows:

 

We should avoid any mediatory role. We do, however, see merit in carrying our present involvement one step further i.e. by helping two sides communicate with each other on arrangements for meeting on neutral territory for exploratory session on possibility of serious ne­gotiation. We appear to have confidence of both sides and we may be helpful in bridging wide gulf of pride, bitterness, and hostility that separates them.

 

2. First order of business, however, is to further test temperature of water by attempt at verification of Qaiyum's bona fides. We see no  better way to accomplish this quickly than to contact the Bangla Desh QUOTE Foreign Minister UNQUOTE Mushtaq Ahmed di­rectly in Calcutta. If he in effect verifies content of approaches pre­viously made by Qaiyum, we would then want to inform him that substance of talks with Qaiyum has been passed to President Yahya.

 

3. We would also inform Mushtaq Ahmed that Yahya showed interest in a meeting of GOP reps and BD reps and volunteer to pass back to President Yahya any response Mushtaq may have. Should reac­tions from both sides to meeting prove favorable, we could then ex­amine question whether further US role in providing communication link between them would be necessary or desirable.

 

4. Caveats - We are confident posts share Department's awareness need for utmost caution and discretion in carrying out these next steps. Publicity concerning possibility of direct contacts between GOP and BD reps; exposure of our role; or knowledge of our con­tacts with Mushtaq Ahmed could cause sudden and terminal shriv­eling of this tender shoot. Furthermore, we should all keep in mind at every step that what may appear sincere desire to negotiate on one or both sides might in fact prove to be little more than tactical maneuver in complex process of pursuing greater influence over US policy. We will also need to bear in mind those who would want to see negotiations fail. We presume such elements would exist in Pakistan, India and BD movement.

 

5. FOR CALCUTTA: You should at earliest opportunity contact BD Foreign Minister Mushtaq Ahmed with object accomplishing pur­poses outlined in paras 3 and 4 above, at same time reiterating that we are passing messages but not acting as mediator. If subject of visa for Mushtaq Ahmed surfaces, you should follow guidance State 154078 i.e. request has been referred to Washington. If you believe occasion propitious, you may at your discretion suggest that question of Mushtaq Ahmed's visit might better be deferred while present ef­fort to arrange BD and GOP contacts underway. If Mushtaq Ahmed out of India, report info on whereabouts soonest.

 

6. FOR ALL ADDRESSEES: We will welcome continuing analysis and comments on: (a) possibilities for negotiation between BD reps and GOP; (b) dynamics of possibly troublesome division within BD movement (including Mukti Bahini) over QUOTE independence vs.

" accommodation UNQUOTE; (c) GOI attitudes toward negotiated settlement in lieu of independent Bangla Desh; (d) kind of settlement Yahya could sell in West Pakistan to military and politicians; and (e) ways in which apparent BD insistence on central role for Mujib might be reconciled with Yahya's apparent need for QUOTE seces­sionist scapegoat UNQUOTE. Any other observations or contribu­tions would of course also be welcome.

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971. p. 193 - 194