Analytical
Summary Prepared by Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson
of the National Security Council Staff/1/
/1/ Source:
National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional
Files (H-Files), Box H-082, Senior WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 9/8/71. Secret; Exdis. No drafting
information appears on the source text. The summary was sent to Kissinger by
Saunders and Hoskinson on September 3 under cover of
a memorandum that refers to the papers cited in the summary. (Ibid.)
Contingency
Planning-Indo-Pak Hostilities
The Papers
At the last
WSAG meeting on contingency planning for possible Indo-Pak hostilities (August
17) it was agreed that the State Department would prepare scenarios for US
approaches to the
The papers that State has drafted analyze the problems and suggest diplomatic
moves within the separate and artificial categories of "before" and
"after" hostilities. This makes it difficult to devise a present
strategy toward the Chinese and Soviets with a clear view in mind of where we
want to be if there is an extended war. This approach also makes it difficult
to calculate the possible inter-play of interests among the great powers at the
various stages of a South Asian crisis.
This
analytical summary, therefore, is organized so as to raise the issues that the
State papers seem to miss. These will be highlighted in your talking points./2/
The summary will cut across the several papers State
has produced and construct from them the separate but related approaches we
might wish to take toward
/2/ Saunders
and Hoskinson sent a memorandum to Kissinger on
September 3 outlining talking points for the WSAG meeting scheduled for September
8. (Ibid.)
You should
not be handicapped by this at the meeting since you will be focusing on issues
rather than on papers per se. Our approach makes it a lot easier to get to the
ultimate issues which the papers generally miss.
Just so you
will know what State has done, here is the list of papers which this summary
covers. They follow the summary at sub-tabs under the general tab marked
"Contingency Papers":/3/
/3/ The papers cited here are identified and summarized in the
text by Saunders and Hoskinson, with the exception of
the paper dealing with the approach to take to the South Asian crisis at the
United Nations before hostilities developed, and the report on the meeting
between Rogers and Dobrynin on August 25. For a
memorandum reporting on the meeting between Rogers and Dobrynin,
see Document 135. On August 27 Eliot sent to Kissinger the paper entitled
"Contact with the Chinese on the South Asian Crisis." On September 1
he sent him the papers entitled "Conversation with the Soviets on
-"
-"Soviet." This is a proposed
approach to the Soviets now before hostilities, both in
-"UN." A posture at the UN
before hostilities./4/
/4/ The paper entitled "
-"After
Hostilities."
Approaches to the Soviets and Chinese and actions at the UN after hostilities
break out. This concentrates on getting a cease-fire. It does not deal with the
tough question of
Chicom intervention.
State's
scenario for dealing with the Chinese on South Asia is contained in two
papers-"Contacts with the Chinese on the South Asian Crisis"
considers what we might wish to say to the Chinese before the outbreak of
hostilities and a scenario for approaching the Chinese after the outbreak of an
Indo-Pak war is included in the paper entitled "China, the Soviet Union
and the UN-Post Outbreak-of-Hostilities Diplomacy" (pp. 7-9). The
following summary draws together the main points made in both of these papers
and identifies issues that should be considered.
A. Contacts
with Chinese Prior to Hostilities
The paper on
contact with the Chinese prior to hostilities asserts that the principal
purpose would be to:
-make sure
the Chinese were fully informed of our policies on
-stress
parallel interests we have in discouraging a war between
In any such
contact, State believes that it should be made clear that we are not
challenging the Sino-Pakistani relationship nor threatening
Specifically,
State suggests that the following points be communicated to the Chinese through
"appropriate" channels:
1. We are
seriously concerned about the dangers of war in
2.
Hostilities may not only result from military over-reaction to provocations but
also from the flow of refugees into
3. Our
actions are designed to ease the burden of the refugees on
4. Our
efforts are primarily humanitarian and we will not be a party to any effort to
capitalize on relief for political purposes.
5. We have
urged the Indians to act with restraint and have pointed out to
6. We regard
the
7. Indo-Pak
hostilities would not be to anyone's benefit. Moreover, if external powers did
become involved, it would contribute to rising international tensions that
would make it difficult for the
8. For our
part we are (a) making sure both India and Pakistan are aware that we would not
support an attack by one of them against the other, (b) pursuing an extremely
restrained military supply policy and (c) using our influence to prevent border
incidents from escalating into general war.
9. As the
President made clear in his foreign policy report to Congress,/5/ we will do
nothing to harm legitimate Chinese (or Soviet) interests in South Asia. No
outside power, however, has a claim to predominant influence in the region, and
each can serve its own interest best by acting accordingly.
/5/
Reference is to the report submitted to the Congress on
10. We are
making similar points to the Soviets and would be interested in
These
suggestions appear to be reasonable as far as they go but some very important
contingencies and related issues are not addressed. As State suggests the
Chinese should probably know what our general approach to the South Asian
crisis is but more important to them, and to us, would be our specific reaction
should
-Should the
Chinese provoke border incidents with
-How would
we react to a gradual buildup of Chinese forces along
B. Contacts
with Chinese After Hostilities
The State
paper is premised on the assumption that:
1. In the
immediate aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities, we should attempt to
prevent
2. In the
post-hostilities peace-keeping phase we should move "energetically"
to limit the influence the Chinese may have gained in South Asia, and ensure that
they accept and will not disrupt whatever political settlement may be achieved
between India and Pakistan.
1. Actions
in Immediate Aftermath. State believes that there are a "variety of
factors" encouraging the Chinese to limit their intervention, like fear of
a possible Soviet riposte along the Sino-Soviet border and the damage that
bellicose behavior might do to China's foreign policy posture in general and
the prospects for the President's trip in particular. Therefore, State believes
that should Indo-Pak fighting break out "these constraining factors,
reinforced by statements of our concern, are more likely to be effective than
direct preemptive moves."
State suggests the following specific actions:
-Through the
most direct and rapid channel of communication, convey our concern, our
determination not to seek advantages from the crisis and hope that
-If the PRC
is a member of the Security Council, seek its support for a resolution calling
for an early end to hostilities and creating a basis for a political
settlement.
-If PRC is
not in Security Council, we would keep it informed of our activities there and
seek at least tacit endorsement of any resolution we might favor.
-Include the
Chinese in any other international mechanism that might be developed to cope
with the crisis.
2.
Post-Hostilities Peace-Keeping Phase. State offers no specific suggestions on
how we might wish to cut our diplomatic losses to the Chinese in
Again the
State paper seems reasonable as far as it goes but some very important
contingencies and related issues are not addressed. It makes good sense to
involve Chinese in stopping the fighting and working on a peace settlement, but
what if they do not see it that way? It would seem to be far too rosy a
prognosis to base
Some of the
more important issues this raises are:
-Are there
any pre-emptive moves we can take with the Chinese immediately after the
outbreak of hostilities to prevent them from intervening?
-If the
Chinese do come in on
It is the
answers to these questions that we have to think about not only to deal with
the contingency if it arises but to sharpen whatever we may say now.
II. Approach
to Soviets
State's
scenario for dealing with the Soviets on
A. Contacts
with Soviets Prior to Hostilities
At the last
WSAG meeting on South Asia (August 17) there was some hesitancy on the part of
Under Secretary Irwin and Assistant Secretary Sisco
to agree to produce a scenario for approaching the Soviets and especially on
the specific issue of prior clearance of any actions with the White House. We
attempted to nail both these points down with a subsequent memo from you to the
WSAG members,/6/ but Secretary Rogers and Ambassador
Beam went ahead with apparently already planned approaches to Ambassador Dobrynin and Gromyko. With some
prodding, State has sent over a short paper on further approaches but it falls
far short of being the comprehensive scenario we were looking for.
/6/
See footnote 4, Document 135.
You will
recall that Ambassador Beam in his August 23 talk with Gromyko
and Secretary Rogers in his August 25 meeting with Dobrynin
did little more than to convey our concern about the dangers of war in
State "proposes" that our next move with the Soviets should be to
attempt to elicit support for, or at least not opposition to, the UN relief
effort. They note the apparent close identity of Soviet and Indian negative
attitudes toward UN involvement in any aspect of the current situation, and
apparently (without so stating) hope that a shift in the Soviet position would
also help to bring the Indians around. Specifically, State proposes to instruct
Ambassador Bush to discuss these issues with the Soviets at an early date along
the following lines:
-Express our
concern about the refugees in
-Note the
limited Soviet contribution and hope that they will provide support to the
concept of an international relief effort as the best way to separate
humanitarian relief from political problems.
-Express
hope the Soviets will not continue to oppose UN moves designed to reduce
tensions and cope with refugee problems.
-Note that
if there is famine in
-Recognize
our common interests in peace and stability in
Then, after
we have talked with the Chinese along the lines State suggests, they would go
back to the Soviets and reiterate our "basic position," i.e. that we
have common interests in the peace and stability of the region and that we will
continue to take such actions as we can to de-escalate the crisis. State also
proposes saying:
-We have
made our commitment to peace and restraint clear to
the Chinese and would hope that the Soviets will do the same.
-As the
President made clear in his report to Congress in February, we will do nothing
to harm legitimate Soviet (and Chinese) interests in
This is hardly the detailed scenario we were looking for and it would seem to
be largely diplomatic eyewash. Now that we and the Soviets have said the
appropriate peace and restraint phrases to each other something more
substantive would seem to be in order. We might be able to score a few propaganda
points on the UN issue but the basic fact is that the Indians are leading the
Soviets on this one and our efforts to be most effective should be concentrated
on
Beyond these
comments, there are other issues that should be addressed now, such as:
-Can we and
should we maneuver the Soviets into using their negative influence with the
Chinese to keep them from getting directly involved on the side of
-How can we
achieve our objective in
-What can we
do to encourage the Soviets to use more boldly their substantial influence to
restrain the Indians?
-Is there a
potential trade-off whereby we squeeze Yahya and they
do the same to Mrs. Gandhi and, if so, how do we approach the Soviets on this
delicate issue?
B. Contacts
with Soviets after Hostilities
State's
thinking on how we should approach the Soviets after the outbreak of
hostilities is based on the following assumptions:
1. In the
immediate aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities we should see that Soviet
support to
2. In the
post-hostilities peace-keeping phase, as with the Chinese, we should more
"energetically" limit the influence the Soviets may have gained in
South Asia and ensure that they accept and will not disrupt whatever political
settlement may be achieved between India and Pakistan.
3. Actions
in Immediate Aftermath. As in the case of the Chinese, State believes that
these are a "variety of factors" encouraging the Soviets to limit
their intervention, like their presumed desire not to force the Chinese to
intervene on Pakistan's side and the fact that India can probably handle
Pakistan alone without direct Soviet military support. Therefore, again as in
the Chinese case, State believes that should Indo-Pak fighting break out
"these constraining factors, reinforced by statements of our concern, are
more likely to be effective than direct preemptive moves."
State
suggests the following specific actions toward the Soviets:
-Approach
them immediately, perhaps on the hot line, with a message from the President
stressing our concern with the gravity of the situation, our determination not
to seek advantages from the situation, our hope that the
-Issue
immediate Presidential statement deploring the resort to violence, calling for
a cessation of hostilities and requesting other interested external powers to
work toward this end. The statement, however, would be couched in generalities,
not foreclose any of our options and not attempt to get the Soviets to condemn
one side or the other.
-Call in
Ambassador Dobrynin at the highest appropriate level
and [say?] soon we hope that the Soviets will associate themselves with our
call for an end of hostilities, support Security Council discussion and
reasonable resolutions, and cut off arms shipments. We would inform him of our
intention to make a parallel approach to the Chinese.
-In public
statements at the UN and elsewhere, hit hard on such themes as:
-Soviet
responsibilities to bring an end to the fighting;
-need for Soviets
to suspend military and economic aid as we have;
-we seek no
special advantage from the conflict.
2.
Post-Hostilities Peacekeeping Phase. As with the Chinese, State offers no
specific suggestions on how we might cut our diplomatic losses to the Soviets
in
Viewed from
today's perspective this is probably the right tone and type of posture we
should take toward the Soviets in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of
war between
The question
which remains, but which State does not address, is what if the Soviets do not
choose to use their leverage with
III. The
UN-Before and After Hostilities
Whatever is
done at the UN is in the nature of being supportive of rather than independent
from the major thrust of bilateral policies toward the major actors-India,
Pakistan, China and the Soviet Union. The important thing about our UN posture
at this point is that it backs up, or at a minimum, runs parallel to our
positions in the major capitals. The details are for the technicians to figure
out.
State has developed a scenario for a number of things that could be done at the
UN after the outbreak of hostilities. (pp. 9-11 of paper on
"
Source:
Document 142 , volume XI,