Foreign
Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, South Asia,
1969-1972
Released by
the Office of the Historian
September 3, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary
of State
SUBJECT: Mission to Pakistan to Review Relief, Refugee and Related Issues
As instructed by the President
during his meeting with the Senior Review Group August 11, the undersigned
officer discussed the food and relief problems of East Pakistan,
and related issues, with President Yahya Khan and
principal officials of his government in Islamabad and Dacca, August 17-23. (See Tab A for schedule of meetings.)
President Yahya
Khan placed high importance on receiving President Nixon's views -- both by
letter and by his emissary -- and sought to accommodate Pakistan's policies to our point of view. The principal conclusions
from the mission follow.
A. RELIEF PROBLEMS
Priority of
Food Relief Effort. President Yahya Khan concurs in our assessment that there will be a
serious food shortage in East
Pakistan during late September
into December unless large imports of food can be effectively distributed. If
famine is not avoided, he believes the effect on Pakistan's political position in the East Wing would be disastrous.
Hence, Yahya Khan regards maintenance of food stocks
and sustained distribution from government supply depots as a prime strategic
objective. There is now only three to four weeks' food supply
at most depots, even at reduced rations -- contrasted with more ample stocks at
the ocean ports of Chittagong and Khulna. The immediate task is the transport of food from these
ocean ports up-country to meet minimum consumption needs through the end of
December.
Attitude Toward
UN Relief Mission. Yahya Khan grudgingly approved
the 38 man UN headquarters group for Dacca to help with relief in East Pakistan.
He did not believe the UN would perform, stressing that they had done little
since he requested their help some ten weeks ago. Also, he resented a UN
presence in Pakistan when India had refused. But, because the U.S. recommended that relief be channeled through the UN, Yahya Khan accepted the UN Relief Mission
. He will probably accept additional UN field personnel up to a proposed
total of 117 men, only if we again urge that he do so.
A Bengali
Civilian Governor. Discussion of
administrative issues affecting the relief effort provided an opportunity to
suggest a reduced role for the military in the civil administration of East Pakistan.
Again, Yahya Khan was responsive by declaring that
his policy was for a "civilian-ization of the
Government in East Pakistan. (Prior evidence indicated that military direction of
civil affairs had been greatly increasing.) Yahya
Khan accepted the suggestion of splitting the civilian functions of the
Governor from the security functions of the Martial Law Administrator, and said
we had anticipated his decision to appoint Dr. A. M. Malik
-- a loyal and trusted Bengali as Governor of East Pakistan.
Overall Food
and Relief Coordinator for East Pakistan. When it was
pointed out that eight officials held responsibility for different aspects of
food, transport, distribution and relief programs in East Pakistan;
b ut that no one was operationally in overall charge,
Yahya Khan initially found the criticism puzzling,
but then accepted it, He later designated the new Chief Secretary as Food and
Relief Coordinator for East
Pakistan.
Priority Assistance Need is
River Transport. Yahya Khan sees transport within East Pakistan
as critical to control of the province. A major attempt is being made by the Mukti Bahini forces (armed
guerrillas of Bangla Desh)
to disrupt rail and road transport from Chittagong
north, which historically has carried 75 percent of the internal tonnage (60
percent rail, 15 percent road). "The Battle for the Life" of the province is intensifying with
rail and road bridges and locomotives the primary targets of guerrilla
activity. As a result rail transportation has
been reduced to no more than 20 percent of normal capacity, and main tenance of even this capacity is by no means certain.
Consequently, movement of food and relief supplies will have to be by river.
Yahya Khan cursed the stupidity which had neglected investment
in river transport in favor of road and rail development. He regarded the
arrival of some 29 coastal ships -- 25 of which are being financed by U. S. assistance -- as a real contribution to the movement of
food from ocean to up-country river ports. Yahya Khan
asked that the coastal ships arrive promptly. Additional water transport
assistance sought by Pakistan are tugs to pull barges, ferries
to bridge river crossings, and military-type landing craft.
Food Distribution Beyond River Ports Also Essential. Distribution of food
beyond river ports was discussed as an area of weakness in relief operations.
It was agreed that every effort should be made to mobilize small local boats
and trucks by paying premium rates and that emergency relief works would help
in food distribution. We praised the new Chief Secretary as the man who had the
best grasp of these problems and, as mentioned above, President Yahya Khan later appointed him overall Food and Relief
Coordinator.
Need for
Relief Works. President Yahya Khan accepted our recommendation for a
government-sponsored emergency relief works program in East Pakistan
as an important means of stimulating income and providing for the purchase of
food. He approved a $20 million allocation for emergency relief work, and
accepted a U.
S.
contribution of $10 million in rupees for this purpose which we offered from U.S. -owned excess rupee holdings. However, implementation of
the program may be slow because the government is not fully convinced that a
large-scale works program to stimulate purchasing power is absolutely
essential.
Security and
Integrity of Relief Operations. The Mukti Bahini guerrilla forces are
gradually stepping up the intensity and sophistication of their operations in
the north and south central areas, and particularly along the eastern border --
well away from refugee camps near Calcutta which are shown to distinguished visitors. (See Tab B for
map of Mukti Bahini major
operational areas.) While road and rail transport is the primary target, river
ports have been attacked and two Pakistan river boats damaged by sophisticated limpet mines. In
these circumstances (a) food and relief shipments transported under UN auspices
must not be mixed with general and military cargoes, (b) transport provided for
relief must only move relief goods, even if this means that they travel empty
on return trips, and (c) Pakistan soldiers should not escort relief shipments.
These points had not been accepted prior to our mission. Yahya
Khan and his Governor, Tikka Khan, both believed that
relief transport, and to some extent relief distribution, should be under
military control -- points which we firmly resisted. The major function of the
UN Mission -- and the UN emblem on movement of relief goods -- must be to
establish that humanitarian relief is neutral and "above the battle".
If this is not accepted by all parties -- Pakistan, Mukti Bahini
insurgents and India --the UN will fail in its relief mission. Governor Tikka Khan appeared to grudgingly accept this point of
view, but believed that the UN would fail to assure the security of relief
transport in any case. We affirmed in the strongest terms possible to both Pakistan
and UN officials that there should be no mixed relief and non-relief cargoes on
relief ships, no carrying of jute on return trips (jute exports are a prime
target of the insurgents), and no military control, or escort, for the
transport and distribution of relief goods.
"Laissez Passez" for Humanitarian Relief Depends on Tacit
Indian Cooperation. The Mukti Bahini
guerilla forces and the Bangla Desh
radio (operating in India) have not yet decided their attitude toward UN sponsored
humanitarian food and relief movements in East Pakistan.
UN officials in Dacca should be able to assure the integrity of relief
operations, but they cannot contact Mukti Bahini "enemy" forces without compromising their
position with the Pakistan authorities. Consequently, the UN must gain agreement
directly with Mukti Bahini
leaders that there will be free passage of relief supplies. We believe the U.S.
Government can help by discussions in New Delhi of overall relief needs and problems both in East Pakistan
and the refugee camps in India -- stressing the link between the two.
Leadership
of UN Field Operation Critical. The UN
relief effort is at a critical stage. Security and coordination of transport
problems must be handled swiftly in a sensitive and difficult operational situation.
The UN field staff is just arriving, most without prior experience in Pakistan, and leadership of the UN Mission is not resolved. For
these reasons we strongly recommended that the UN Secretariat in
New York move swiftly to take effective charge of their operation.
B. REFUGEE AND RELATED
POLITICAL ISSUES
Psychological
Factors More Important than Economic in Refugee Movement. While a major concern is that famine would probably lead
to further large-scale refugee movement into India, psychological factors have been more important than
economic in the flight of refugees up to this point. Communal riots in late
April, and the resulting fear, fueled the mass exodus to India. Attacked by government forces, the retreating Bangla Desh nationalist groups
turned on the Urdu-speaking Bihari communities
(earlier refugees from India totalling some two million.)
There followed a counter-riot of the Biharis and
Urdu-speaking soldiers against Bengali nationalists and Hindus.
West Pakistan officials state they are attempting to dampen the communal
fires. When asked about exclusion of Hindus from relief assistance in the
cyclone disaster area, President Yahya Khan replied
that "discrimination against Hindus was contrary to instructions,"
and that he "encourages the return of the refugees."
Hindus Not
Yet Safe in East
Pakistan. American voluntary agency representatives in
Dacca told us that it was not safe for Hindus to return to their
homes. They cited known cases of returnees who had met with fatal accidents.
The Catholic Relief Services Director reported that the presence of foreigners
helps to assure the safety of the remaining minority communities.
Refugees Probably Still
Leaving East Pakistan. While it is difficult to establish
facts concerning current refugee movements, the UN Representative for.
Refugees in East Pakistan estimates that no more than 34,000 refugees had returned
from India through reception centers since June, and that East
Pakistanis continue to flee to India at a rate of 20,000 to 30,000 a day.
President Yahya
Khan categorically denied that refugees were leaving East Pakistan.
He said his army was on the borders and it had orders to stop East Pakistanis
from leaving and infiltrators from entering. Governor Tikka
Khan, however, said that the army's administrative control over many of the
border areas was not assured. Without independent verification by impartial
observers, it is impossible to sort out accurately the conflicting claims. (India claims over eight million Pakistan refugees in India, and Pakistan claims the number does not exceed two and a half million.)
Progress in
Political Accommodation. President Yahya Khan has not progressed far in devising a formula for
political accommodation. His approach to the Awami
League is essentially juridical. Those against whom no
criminal charges have been made may return and be assured that they will not be
tried. So far only 88 elected Awami League
members of the General Assembly and some 94 members of the Provincal
Assembly have been cleared of criminal charges. Amnesty for all other Awami League and Bengali refugees -- in the sense of
freedom from possible criminal charges -- is still uncertain.
Of the 88 elected members of
the General Assembly, Yahya Khan said only 16 were in
Dacca protected by his army -- and one of these had been killed.
When we urged him to lift the illegal ban on the Awami
League "cleansed of its former leadership" to encourage others of the
88 to return, Yahya Khan replied he had gone as far
as West Pakistan opinion would tolerate in making concessions to Awami League sessionists.
Trial of Mujibur Rahman. The juridical approach extends to Mujibur
Rahman, who "will have a fair trial since the
matter is entirely in the hands of the judiciary", Yahya
Khan said. He described the arrangements for a vigorous and independent defense
counsel for Mujib. In his own mind Yahya Khan has no doubt that Mujib
is guilty. "It was two assemblies, two this and two that, but when it came
to two flags and they tore down the flag of Pakistan, that was too much, " he said. (Comment: If Mujibur Rahman publicly recanted
the "two flags", could he still play a useful role?)
We were told by Bengali
friends that if Mujib is killed, there would be a
further mass exodus of refugees from East
Pakistan, an assessment which we
conveyed to Yahya Khan, through his principal Minister,M. M. Ahmad. This led us
to stress that Mujibur Rahman
is more dangerous dead than alive to the unity of Pakistan.
Anti-Hindu
Feeling in East
Pakistan
Likely to Increase. As the Mukti Bahini guerrilla attacks
increase in intensity, the pressure against the Hindu minority still in East Pakistan
also will intensify. General Rahim Khan (charged with
civil affairs in the East and recommended to us by Yahya
Khan as his "sweet general") said 200 local leaders had been killed
by Mukti Bahini attacks in
the struggle which is now beginning for administrative control of rural areas.
The government is turning to, and arming as irregulars, the most deeply
orthodox Muslims in the rural villages. These tend to be the poorer,
opportunistic elements with little or no experience in leadership roles, but
with fierce loyalty to Islam and equally fierce anti-Hindu feelings. This
polarization of the rural social and administrative structure has not gone far
beyond the border area as yet, but it will almost certainly continue in
response to mounting Mukti Bahini
guerrila attacks.
In these circumstances, India's current support for the Mukti Bahini -- through arms, training and a cross border
sanctuary -- intensifies anti-Hindu feeling in East Pakistan
and leads to the further flight of Hindu refugees to India. (The pre-March 25 Hindu population of East Pakistan
has been estimated at about eleven million.)
General Rahim
Khan told us of plans to abolish all traditional village leaders and councils
and displace them with thoroughly loyal peace committees -- the deeply orthodox
Muslims mentioned above. We strongly advised against it on the grounds that the
resulting social and administrative disruption would force traditional village
leadership into opposition, extend the conflict and --in our judgment -- open
the way to radicalization of the rural areas. Normally, it would be difficult
to imagine a way to completely disrupt a traditional subsistence society and
economy like that of East Pakistan. But Pakistani officers are capable of doing it, as they
seek to solve an immediate and increasingly urgent military problem.
C. FRAMEWORK FOR RELIEF AND
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Massive relief to East Pakistan
estimated at $315 million, with a proposed U.S. share of $235 million. We estimate that a massive relief
program for East Pakistan for FY 1972 could cost up to $315 million to address the
following key problems which have been identified:
$ Millions
-Food
Supplies
155
Current PL 480 commitments meet most of
anticipated requirements for cereals, oil
and high protein food
-Transport
25
River
boats, coastal vessels, tugs, trucks,
spares and contingent airlift of food for
possible famine pockets
-Direct
Relief
10
Child
feeding, support of UN and voluntary
agency programs, medical supplies
-Work Relief
(rupees)
20
A
government sponsored work relief program
to stimulate income and provide employment
-Agricultural
Inputs
30
Fertilizer, pesticides, pumps, sprayers,
parts to prevent drop in local rice
production next year
-Refugee
Resettlement
75
Costs
of housing, other necessities for a
productive life, reestablishment of
community services, assuming 3 million
(or all Muslims now in India) return
Total $315
A strong effort should
continue to be made through the United Nations to obtain contributions from
other countries, but realistically we assume the U. S. will probably share
about 75 percent of the costs, for a U. S. share of about $235 million -- $115
million PL 480, $25 million U.S. -owned excess rupees, and up to $95 million
appropriated dollars. (See Tab C for details on the proposed relief program for
East Pakistan.)
Mending Pakistan's Consortium Relations. President Yahya Khan and his
Economic Advisor, M. M. Ahmad, want to improve relations with the consortium,
but they prefer to move slowly in making financial requests to avoid further embarassment to Pakistan in its relations with other governments and the World
Bank. We proposed a consortium meeting in the third week in September -- at the
time of the Bank/Fund Executive Directors Meeting in Washington --to review: (a) immediate relief requirements for East Pakistan
and the need for further international help, (b) extension of debt relief by
common donor action, and (c) somewhat longer term relief and reconstruction
needs, particularly for agriculture. Our initiative in seeking to mend Pakistan consortium relations was appreciated by President Yahya Khan and his Economic Advisor. However, given member
country attitudes, they insisted that the next consortium meeting agenda be
restricted to debt and relief assistance for East Pakistan.
We urged,none.theless, that
the consortium also should consider requirements for agricultural commodity
assistance. We are
working with the Bank to assure the necessary coordination and staff work.
Relief for refugees in India estimated at $830 million with a proposed U. S. share of $ 320 mil] ioat. Pitts
tan refugee relief costs in India will total $830 million for FY 1072 ($.1.10 million for
food. and $300 million for non-food relief) on the basis of 8 million refugees.
This staggering refugee burden is about equal to total annual consortium aid to
India.
PL 480 can help meet
requirements for wheat, rice, oil and other commodities. To date we have
provided $40 million of food assistance, and PL 480 relief could reach $170
million.
A planned 40 percent U.S. share of the refugee burden would mean $150 million in
dollars to help with non-food costs, such as shelter, clothing, sanitation,
medicine and special food supplements particularly for children. We have
contributed $30 million in grants for this purpose to date.
Thus, total U.S. assistance for the refugees who are in India could reach $320 million.
India also will seek a maximum amount of development loans
through the aid donor consortium to minimize the loss of momentum in its
development program during this period of extraordinary financial burden. (See
Tab D for details on refugee support costs in India.)
D. RECOMMENDED FUTURE LINES OF
ACTION
President Nixon's initiative
in directing massive relief to East Pakistan has: (a) improved the public and
moral posture of President Yahya Khan's government
(through its concern for relief to its citizens in. the East Wing), (b) reduced
the prospects of widespread famine, (c) led to some deemphasis
of military control over civil affairs, and (d) brought a Bengali Governor to
head the civil administration in East Pakistan. These are important gains which
were only possible because of our policy of maintaining a dialogue with Pakistan, as well as with India. We should continue to keep open channels of communication
and influence.
Carrying forward the relief
effort involves us in difficult --but manageable -- operational problems of putting
starch into the UN organizational structure and using our influence with Pakistan to keep the UN relief effort to the fore. Our approach of
providing relief through the UN is essential if we are to avoid U.S. involvement in the "Battle for the Transport Lifeline" when it comes to
transport of relief supplies. The critical element for the success of our
massive relief policy through the UN is acceptance, or tolerance, by all
parties -- Pakistan, Mukti Bahini
insurgents, and India -- that food and humanitarian concern for the people of East Pakistan
is "above the battle." The Indian attitude appears likely to be a
governing factor; the Government of India must accept the fact that
humanitarian relief cannot be limited by political boundary. Refugees and
relief in India and in East
Pakistan are integral parts of
the same problem.
While we have made some
progress on relief and reform in East
Pakistan, the security situation
continues to deteriorate and the Hindu population is still leaving the
Province. Whatever the origins of the conflict as an internal Pakistan problem, today India is "fighting" Pakistan by proxy through its support to the Mukti
Bahini insurgents and Pakistan, indirectly, is fighting back by pursuing policies which
will encourage the entire 11. million Hindu population
of East Pakistan to go to India and not return. Neither arrived at this mode of warfare by
advance design but both appear to have "innocently" seized the
"weapons" at hand. The situation urgently calls for the equivalent of
a "cease fire, " or "stand fast." Elements of an equivalent
"cease and stand fast" would appear to be:
For Pakistan: A public declaration that protection of all minorities --
the 300,000 Bengalis in West
Pakistan and the Hindu minorities
in East Pakistan -- is a sacred trust. The new Bengali Governor, Dr. Malik, has two overwhelming advantages for the job. He is
trusted by Yahya Khan and he has an established
public record of espousing the cause of Muslim-Hindu harmony. (He showed us clippings from Calcutta newspapers in the early
1950's which praised his courageous stand on this issue.) We should
encourage Yahya Khan to support Dr. Malik in measures to reduce anti-religious passions against
Hindus whose home is East Pakistan. (The 80 million Muslims in India are hostage to the success of this policy).
For India: The Government of
India must face the reality that continuing economic assistance for relief and
economic development, both urgently needed, will be supported by the publics in
Western countries only if every effort is made to reduce tensions and forestall
the headlong plunge to war. India bears responsibility which cannot be ignored for the
training, arming and providing cross border sanctuary for Mukti
Bahini. We should parallel our approach to Pakistan on relief needs and administration with similar
discussions with India at an appropriate level. Our objectives would be to
encourage:
(a) Indian support for the
principle that movement of relief goods for East Pakistan
is above political considerations and military interdiction. Some supply of
food to East Pakistan might be arranged through India,
(b) Indian recognition that
intensification of insurgency --however it occurs -- increases the flow of
refugees to India and reduces the chance of their return,
(c) Indian recognition that
their objective of avoiding radicalizing Awami League
leadership will fail because intensification of the insurgency will radicalize
rural East Bengal, with potentially serious political repercussion in Eastern
India,
(d) A 60-day dampening of
insurgent activity, insofar as India can use its good offices to this end, to
permit cooling of anti-Hindu passions in East Pakistan and to encourage a
calmer process of political negotiation between the Pakistan Government and Bangla Desh representatives, and
(e) Acceptance by India that UN observers stationed in East Pakistan
can cross into India on valid refugee business.
Without making our relief and
economic aid directly contingent on Indian performance on the above points, we
would want India to understand the link which we see between helping
refugees in India and establishing conditions in East Pakistan
for the return of all refugees. We should seek to arrive at a mutuality of
interest on this linkage.
The steps proposed, to be taken separately but on parallel lines, by both India and Pakistan, would require significant changes in the way each now
views its vital interests in East
Pakistan. If, however, some
palpable degree of "cease and stand fast" can be encouraged on both
sides, ways may be opened for greater progress toward political accommodation
between the leaders of Pakistan and the Awami League/Bangla Desh leadership.
Maurice J. Williams
Coordinator of U.S. Disaster
Relief for East Pakistan
Source: Document 143,
volume E7,