Secret telegram
10 September 1971
From: Amconsul
Calcutta
To: Secretary State,
Washington DC
Subject: Contacts with Bangladesh Reps
1. Summary: Consulate General in making attempt arrange appointment with Bangladesh "Foreign Minister" Mushtaq Ahmed learned that BD Cabinet position has hardened
recently. Cabinet now taking line that only Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman is qualified to deal with GOP and therefore
opposes negotiations at this stage. Contact man Qaiyum
reports Cabinet has agreed that essential preconditions to negotiations are
for Yahya to (A) free Mujib
and return him to East Bengal and (B) Proclaim general amnesty for all MNA's, MPA's and others connected
with Bangladesh movement -- essentially a return to status quo ante March 25. Qaiyum nonetheless will suggest to Mushtaq
that he talk to Congen officer and will give us reply
ASAP. End summary.
Chief Poloff met Qaiyum
September 9 in effort set up meeting with BD Foreign Minister Mushtaq Ahmed, as instructed reftels.
Qaiyum began conversation saying conditions have
changed considerably since his last meeting with Congen
officer two weeks ago. He said Cabinet met August 28, heard his report about
meeting, and inconclusively discussed feasibility of having Mushtaq Ahmed visit US for discussions with USG. (Qaiyum claimed all of Cabinet approved idea of negotiations
with GOP except PM Tajuddin Ahmed. "I believe
he is turning leftist", he commented.)
3. Later that day, Cabinet began series of meetings with GOI
external affairs policy planning chairman D.P. Dhar. According Qaiyum, Dhar put intense pressure on Cabinet to form all-party
steering or advisory committee for duration of emergency. Awami
Leaguers were unanimously opposed to notion, pointing out they had won massive
victory in December elections. Dhar then made it
clear he mostly interested in giving Moscow-oriented leftists Muzaffar Ahmed (NAP/R) and Moni
Singh (Bangladesh Communist Party) voice in BD affairs saying "our friends
the Russians" insisted on such participation as price for continued
support of both BD and GOL Impression left with BD Cabinet was that if they
did not accede to request, arms supply and other GOI support would cease.
"When you are so heavily dependent on one friend", Qaiyum remarked, "you do what
he asks." (Later, Qaiyum wondered whether US financial or military assistance
might be available to BD. Poloff quickly disillusioned
him.)
4. Dhar visit was followed September
6 by visitation from MEA Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul,
who apparently nailed down bargain and had it leaked to press September 7. (In
meantime, Qaiyum reported he was three times visited
by Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali,
leader of Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and one of Soviet's top front men in
India, who tried to persuade Qaiyum to
support idea of bringing leftists into BD picture.) Press stories Septembers 8
indicated allparty advisory committee called
National Liberation Front had been formed and that membership included entire
Cabinet plus Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam, Maulana Bhasani (NAP/L), Prof. Mu-
zaffar Ahmed (NAP/R), Moni
Singh (BDCP), Manoranjan Dhar
(Pakistan National Congress) and Mukti Bahini Commander Col. Osmani.
(However, Qaiyum told Poloff
committee was not yet established, nor had membership been finally decided. See Septel for status according to press
September 10.)
5. Following Dhar visit, Qaiyum went to Meghalaya, Mymensingh and Tripura for series
of meetings with BD MNA's and MPA's.
At meetings and in separate discussions with "General" Khalid Musharaff, former East
Bengal Regiment Major and MB Eastern Sector commander, Qaiyum
found near unanimous opinion that only Mujib could
negotiate with GOP. (At same time, all were willing abide by any rpt any
agreement reached by Mujib.) Qaiyum
returned to Calcutta evening September 8 and reported to
Cabinet his findings (except for complaints from all sides that Cabinet
ineffectual). Qaiyum was not present for Cabinet
discussions, but was told afterward by Mushtaq Ahmed,
"Things have changed," Mushtaq' had said . Cabinet agreed that no rpt no
negotiations possible while Mujib is in jail because Mujib is only person who could negotiate with GOP, and
added, "We can't deliver any goods under present circumstances." Qaiyum told Poloff that, as
"close friend" of Mujib, he
"knew" Sheikh did not want independence. He said he had told GOP Y
leaders this time and time again before March 25 and begged them to let MNA's sit to discuss constitution rather than initiate rash
military moves that could destroy nation. "They didn't listen," he
said sadly, "I still don't understand them".
6. Asked to outline Cabinet's previous preconditions for
negotiations, Qaiyum sketched four points listed para 3 Calcutta 2355, i.e.(A)
free y Mujib, (B) settlement on basis Mujib's six points, (C) departure from ' BD of Pak army and
(D) BD security to be guaranteed by UN security force, not RPT not by Pak
army. He quickly added, however, that those conditions no longer considered to be within competence of Cabinet to levy. Present position
of Cabinet was two-point demand: (A) free Mujib and
return him to East Bengal in order to reduce duce tensions and (B) grant general amnesty to all MNA's, MPA's and others connected
with BD movement. "Then we can sit down '" and talk," he said.
"The two people who are qualified to negotiate with the Pakistanis are
Sheikh and Kamal Hussain,
and they are both locked up in West Pakistan," he added.
7. Qaiyum then repeated scenario
outlined Calcutta 2230 wherein President Nixon, Yahya,
Mrs. Gandhi, Mujib and possibly Prime Minister Heath would
meet to settle issue. "They could solve it in half an hour", he said,
but it will take us, alone, years of hard fighting." Poloff
said he saw no real chance of such a meeting, but wondered if meeting between Poloff and "Foreign Minister" Mushtaq
Ahmed might be useful in eyes BD government. Qaiyum
asked rhetorically what good such a meeting would do in present circumstances,
but then said he would put question to Ahmed first thing September 10 and
inform Poloff of reaction. He added that he would suggest
to Ahmed that such a meeting might conceivably be of some value in securing
release of Mujib. Poloff
responded that he was in no rpt no position to offer any hope that a meeting
would provide any progress on that subject, but that he would be happy to hear
any suggestions Ahmed might have. Beyond that, all he could offer was to report
Ahmed's remarks to Washington. Qaiyum
murmured he would see what he could do, but warned that Ahmed in any discussion
with USG officials would take "hard line" and demand (a) freedom for
Mujib and (b) complete independence for Bangladesh.
8. Comment: In reviewing record of past conversations with Qaiyum, it appears to us that latest discussion has nearly
brought us full circle. While it represents no advance over the earliest known
BD position, neither does it represent a basic retreat. It clear
that Soviets or their Indian lieutenants have taken advantage of situation to
attempt to move in to put their men on the ground in Bangladesh.
Jones
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and
the Nixon White House 1971, p.211 – 214