Secret telegram

15 September 1971

From: Amconsul Calcutta

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: Contacts with Bangladesh reps

 

1. Summary: Latest conversation with Qaiyum indicates that `BD Fonmin" Mushtaq Ahmed unable or unwilling meet with Con,-,en Poloff. According Qaiyum, Mushtaq has been informed of September 9 conversations (reftel), has discussed it with Cabinet, but ques­tions utility and purpose of personal meeting, particularly in light dissension in AL ranks over formation all party committee and fears his movements being surveilled by GOl. Qaiyum sought probe into reasons for desired meeting, reiterating he "only BD channel" to USG, but concluded by saying he would sound Mushtaq again. If this proved unproductive, he said, he would try "Primin" Tajuddin Ahmed or "Acting President" Syed Nazrul Islam. Our net impression is that Mushtaq initiative has cooled off considerably but not neces­sarily abandoned. End summary.

 

2. In brief meeting with Poloff September 14, Qaiyum said he had reported fully to BD "Fonmin" Mushtaq Ahmed about previous meeting September 9. Mushtaq subsequently told Qaiyum he had discussed conversation with Cabinet and that Cabinet saw difficulty is his making contact with US official due to problems that had cropped up in wake formation BD all-party committee. Moreover, Fonmin could see no useful purpose in meeting with Poloff, since from what Qaiyum had told him, USG had nothing particular to say to BDG. He asked Qaiyum find out precisely why Poloff "wished talk to him".

 

3. In explaining problems mentioned above, Qaiyum said Fonmin had told him BD students and some MNA's had met in Agartala September 11 and had passed resolution condemning Cabinet's ac­tion in agreeing to formation all-party committee. This had created considerable dissension in Awami League ranks and Cabinet has since begun to fear it is losing its hold on followers. Moreover, GOI  had stationed two Indian army soldiers and three intelligence officers  outside Cabinet's quarters. Mushtaq said Cabinet did not know why ! GOI did this and was afraid to ask or protest.

 

4. Fonmin told Qaiyum Cabinet had been reluctant agree to D.P Dhar's suggestion to form all-party committee, especially after T.N. Kaul told press September 7 it had been formed. However, Kaul had another meeting with Cabinet September 9 and applied so much pressure Cabinet felt forced to give in that evening.

 

5. Qaiyum then went on to describe Cabinet's tenuous position. In Qaiyum's view, if Sheikh is executed, Maulana Bhasani will be able overcome all opposition. "If the Sheikh comes back to East Bengal," he said with considerable emotion, "then we will all go back, inde­pendence or no." Leadership position, according Qaiyum, will be greatly affected by support of students (who comprise bulk of Mukti Bahini). He noted that in last student body elections Dacca Univer­sity, Awami League-supported Student League won majority. How­ever, NAP/R supported Student Union was not far behind, with 20 percent of vote and NAP/L-supported candidates won 5 percent. (He added that Hindu students, who comprise 20 percent of student body, voted en masse for Student Union.) However, Qaiyum believes Bhasani commands considerably more support in East Bengal in general than does NAP/R leader Muzaffar Ahmed.

 

6. In light situation outlined above, Qaiyum asked what he could tell Fonmin were reasons for him meet Poloff. He repeated that as far as he aware, he is only channel between BDG and USG. Poloff replied that USG interested in hearing present position of BDG directly from Fonmin, emphasizing "directly." Poloff said he could tell Qaiyum he authorized by Washington to meet Fonmin to hear his views and im­plied that he might subsequently have something to say to Fonmin.

 

7. Qaiyum said he would once again see Fonmin and intensify efforts to impress upon him importance he (Qaiyum) attached to meeting. Qaiyum then made lengthy discourse on his own and Awami League "love" for USA. He said he believes this feeling shared by bulk East Bengal population and added he ran on pro-American platform in elections and won by whopping majority. If he still found Fonmin reluctant and physically afraid to meet Poloff (Qaiyum said Fonmin continually spoke of being "shot" if he ventured out too much in Calcutta), then Qaiyum said he would approach Primin Tajuddin Ahmed. If that failed, he would go to Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam (Poloff did not comment on these suggestions.) "It is important that we in the Awami League maintain our leadership now and in the days ahead", said Qaiyum, "and if necessary I will fight to death to keep those communists out. The leaders must be made to see that. If they don't then all the Sheikh's struggles will be for nothing." He said he would inform Poloff of what progress he had made in maxi­mum five or six days. He added that he believed time was of essence.

 

Comment. Mushtaq's current views and attitudes as conveyed by Qaiyum indicate that earlier initiative seeking BD-GOP negotiations has cooled off considerably as result of intervening events and new pressures. Whether it has been abandoned or put into deep freeze is still uncertain, especially since we have not been able talk to Mushtaq. We think direct talks with Mushtaq may still be useful. If Qaiyum reports negatively on his renewed approach to Mushtaq, believe we should make attempt contact him through another channel. We doubt that Qaiyum's suggestions re Tajuddin or Nazrul Islam will materialize, but on chance that they may, request Department's guid­ance.

 

Gordon

 

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971, p.214 - 217