Department of State

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

 

September 22, 1971

 

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

 

Subject: South Asia: Preparations for Hostilities---Intelligence Indicators.

 

Although the WSAG meeting scheduled for September 21 was canceled, a paper prepared for it by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessing recent military intelligence indicators remains of interest. A copy of that paper, which was cleared by both CIA and DIA, is attached.

 

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Executive Secretary

 

Attachment:

   Preparation of Hostilities.

 

 

SECRET

 

 

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKEGROUND USE ONLY

 

September I7, 1971

 

Recent Preparations for Hostilities:

 

The air forces of both sides have been in a high state of alert since early August, and ground forces have been in various states of alert over the same period. Both sides have restricted or cancelled military leaves, possibly recalled some reservists, and conducted civil defense exercises. Both sides have reportedly been evacuating villagers from border areas. In addition, the following more specific preparations for hostilities have been reported in the past few weeks by various sources.

 

India    -announced a "general alert" for the Army;

-moved the 323rd brigade from Kasauli to the West Pak border; -moved the 73rd brigade from the Mizo Hills area to the border of East

Pakistan;

-took up forward positions along the northern border of East Pakistan; -moved artillery toward the West Pak border near Jaisalmer;

-moved elements of the 1 st Armored Division from Jhansi north towards

Amritsar;

-moved about 50 APC's from New Delhi north, probably to Ambala

 

Pakistan -moved a tank regiment from Quetta to the Lahore-Sialkot area;

-took up forward positions in the Lahore-Sialkot area;

-is forming an additional division in West Pakistan (for a total of 3 new

divisions to be formed since March);

-opened command Headquarters "hot lines";

-began sandbagging and construction of air raid shelters at key military

installations;

-began recall of medical doctors

 

 

Other Indications-Or Lack Thereof:

Against these reports are other indications that hostilities are, as of now, neither planned nor imminent:

- both sides are exercising restraint over the continuing exchanges of fire across the East Pak border;

-India has yet to deploy her full armored strength to operational areas and to deploy aircraft now concentrated in the north to reserve airfields further south;

-our embassies' contacts with senior officers on both sides over the past two weeks (with General Hamid Khan in Pakistan, and with Generals Manekshaw and Rawlley in India), revealed concern over the possibility of hostilities but no anticipation of an early attack by the other side;

-foreign visits by senior officials of both governments are now underway or planned for the near future;

-although both governments have publicly noted the possibility of war, neither has issued a direct threat or ultimatum in connection with the present level of activities of the other.

 

Assessment:

Both sides are in a high state of readiness and each is already prepared to respond to an attack by the other. Either side could in some sectors (Pakistan in the West and India in the East) initiate hostilities on short notice. The extent of preparations on both sides appears to reflect the estimate on the part of each that the next round of hostilities would almost inevitably result in a total-possibly decisive-conflict and would be far less susceptible to international mediation than the 1965 war.

 

None of the military moves reported to date may yet be interpreted as an indication that either side now intends to initiate or to provoke a war; rather both sides still appear anxious to avoid full-scale hostilities as long as possible. Whereas Pakistan's short-term intentions appear to be clearly defensive, India's intentions are less certain. Indian military moves may be intended not only as precautionary and deterrent measures but also as a means of maintaining pyschological pressure on the Government of Pakistan to reach an accommodation with the Awami League. There are other indications and reasons to believe, moreover, that India may soon take some new political and/or covert military initiative on Bangla Desh which will at least exacerbate tensions if not provoke an attack by Pakistan. An important key to Indian intentions-confirmation of the composition and destination of India's September 9 armored deployment from Jhansi is not yet available. Should it transpire that major armored elements are being positioned forward of Jullundur, Bikaner, and Jaislamer, there would be a clear possibility that India intended to initiate or to provoke hostilities. Otherwise the indication and the logic of the situation strongly suggest that India will attempt to avoid a war.

 

Given the prevailing tensions, however, the moves by each side could reasonably be interpreted by the other as preparations for attack. Given the benefit which would accrue to the side which struck first, moreover, the possibilities of a pre-emptive attack will increase as preparations continue. Thus there exists a high risk that hostilities could be triggered in the near future either by escalation of the confrontation in the East or by misinterpretation of movements in the West. It is not at all clear what steps-if any-either government would be willing to take to reduce this risk.

 

Conclusions:

1. For the immediate future, India will continue and increase its political and military support for the East Bengali separatist movement, but will not openly intervene militarily and is unlikely to grant formal recognition to the "Bangla Desh Government."

      2. For the immediate future, Pakistan will continue and increase its defensive preparations and efforts to expand its forces and may begin to infiltrate covert forces into Kashmir and Eastern India, but will avoid an overt attack.

      3. Although neither side now intends to initiate or provoke full-scale hostilities, present intentions could change rapidly in the wake of new developments such as a significant improvement in the effectiveness of the Mukhti Bahini, a rapid increase in the flow of refugees, or possibly the execution of Mujib.

      4. Over time, covert activities or the continuing incursions and exchanges of fire across the East Pakistan border could be interpreted by either side as a casus belli.

      5. In a matter of weeks, the military preparations on each side are likely to reach a level at which the benefit of a first strike could be such as to trigger an attack by either side without warning.

 

 

 

 

Source: The American Papers - Secret and Confidential India. Pakistan. Bangladesh Documents 1965- 1973, The University 

                Press Limited, p. 674-676