Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

 

SECRET 337

 

 

 

ISLAMA 09757 281516Z

51 10

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT - 01 /026 W

…….. 002542

P 250910Z SEP 71 ZFG

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 763

INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

SECRET ISLAMABAD 9757

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT PARA 4.)

NOFORN

SUBJ     : TDCS REPORT ON PAK PLANS TO INITIATE SMALL-SCALE BORDER

                INCIDENT WITH INDIA

REF       : STATE 176329

 

1. We do not rule out possible validity of intelligence report in question but are not rpt not inclined attach high degree of credibility to it.

 

      2. In our probes here in recent months, we have found Pres Yahya and Pak Army Chief of Staff Hamid realistic about risks of entering into hostilities with India. They have readily acknowledged Pakistan's military inferiority. In response to our counsels of restraint, they have told us GOP does not want and will not seek war.

 

      3. It is possible that Yahya could envision being saved from military clobbering by India-to which Paks now more than ever vulnerable because they have split their forces between East and West wings-by prompt imposition of cease-fire by UN and major powers. But we believe he probably recognizes uncertainty that India would agree to cease-fire before it had inflicted heavy punishment on Pak forces. Availability

of early cease-fire would probably be important factor in Pak planning if GOP saw preponderant reasons to initiate military action. We do not believe, however, that political reasoning cited in ref intelligence report also is persuasive.

 

      4. We have reason to believe that Yahya has been annoyed by Bhutto's posturing and clamtring for early transfer of power. We have not seen evidence, on other hand, that Yahya is very concerned over direct threat from Bhutto. Bhutto has just expressed

publicly his willingness to go along with Yahya's plans for by-elections in East wing in December and for subsequent convening of National and Provincial Assemblies, provided that civilian governments would be installed by January. That timetable may slip and Bhutto could then be on the spot. At this point we are inclined believe that Bhutto would be able generate good amount of popular support but that Pak military government would be able contain him.

 

      5. There are other reasons which we think might impel GOP at some time to take heavy risks involved in initiating any military action against India. One is possibility of unhappiness among military elements over recent events in country, which might lead Yahya to adventure. We have heard of some murmuring of discontent among military but we have no reason at this moment to believe that Yahya is in fact seriously threatened from within military ranks. Another possible reason for Pak military action against India is feeling that Pak military is doomed to eventual defeat as result Indian support of Mukti Bahini. Here again we have no evidence that concern on this account is either great or urgent enough at this time to propel GOP toward military adventure. These reasons could, however, become more immediate as time goes on.

 

      6. In probing Yahya recently on nature of his discussions with Shah in Tehran earlier this month, Ambassador got impression that Yahya was holding back (Islamabad 9600). We assume Yahya and Shah discussed possibility of Indo-Pak war and what Iran's reaction might be. We are not in position to comment on specifics this subject related in ref intelligence report. We hope, in any event, that Shah did not in any way encourage Yahya to think in terms of a brief and painless military adventure.

 

      7. We shall continue to be alert for indicators if possible military action and shall also continue on each appropriate occasion to counsel restraint on Pak military leadership.

GP-2

FARLAND

 

 

 

Source: The American Papers - Secret and Confidential India. Pakistan. Bangladesh Documents 1965- 1973, The University Press

                 Limited, p.677-678