Secret Telegram

September 28, 1971

From: Amconsul Calcutta

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: Contact with Bangladesh reps - meeting with Mushtaq

 

1. Summary: Congen political officer held 90 minute discussion with BD "Fonmin" Mushtaq Ahmed September 28. Mushtaq placed blame for events in East Pakistan since March 25 squarely on USG because of its continued support of GOP. He nonetheless said it fervent desire of BDG to regain close friendship with United States. He hoped USG would find it in its own interest to help arrange for peaceful independence for Bangladesh. He warned that time is running out for USG to step in and help avoid leftist takeover of BD. He had no de­sire to talk directly to GOP but requested USG to speak to GOP on behalf of BDG. He asked for official response to his requests as soon as possible. He expressed desire to discreetly maintain direct channel with Poloff and said he assumed there would be no other channel. He added he had not authorized any other channel himself, although he knew other well-intentioned BD leaders had and might in-future contact USG reps in effort determine "mind of Americans." End summary.

 

2. Poloff received urgent call from BD "High Commissioner" Hossain Ali September 28, who asked if Poloff wished to talk to BD "Fonmin" Mushtaq Ahmed. Poloff responded that he would be agreeable to do so if Mushtaq wished to talk to him. Ali said Mushtaq did, and scheduled evening appointment at BD "High Commis­sion". Poloff was met by All, whom he had known previously, and introduced to Mushtaq, who arrived about five minutes after Poloff. Ali then left Mushtaq and Poloff alone for hour's private discussion outlined below, and rejoined for last thirty minutes.

 

3. Mushtaq opened conversation by asking Poloff for precise outline of USG policy vis-a-vis BD, and said "why are you killing us?" Poloff replied that he had not come to argue USG policy with Mushtaq because that would merely involve long wrangle and po­lemics. Rather, he had come to hear from "Fonmin" latter 's views of present BD policies and situation, as well as his estimate of prospects for future. Mushtaq quickly agreed that "propaganda arguments are useless", and added that he was practical and realistic man.

 

4. Mushtaq said he had wanted to talk to USG rep for some time, but had been unable to think of suitable way to do so. During his inter­view with Time correspondent Coggin September 26 (see Calcutta 2564) he had questioned him about US policy. Latter had tried to give Mushtaq brief outline, but strongly suggested that if Mushtaq really wanted to know, he get in touch with US Consul General or Poloff. Mushtaq said he had decided this might be useful and asked Hossain Ali to call Poloff.

 

5. Poloff asked what BDG expected from USG. Mushtaq replied, "Stop helping Yahya. Stop helping kill my innocent people. You have practically forced my people into the lap of the extremists. What is our crime? You must put pressure on Yahya to stop. You have minimized my population, one million of them are dead. An­other nine million have been forced to flee to India and Burma, where they are not wanted. You have done this with your arms, your money, your food, your transport, your medicines - all of which have been used by Yahya's troops against us. I don't like to speak this way to a representative of my old friends, but you asked me what we expect from the great democratic United States. I hope you don't mind if I speak frankly. I have studied your policy. You are not weak. You can tell Yahya 'don't use our arms,' only you can do that." "When Poloff demurred that Pakistan had bulk of arms from China, Mushtaq replied, "the Chinese say you have supplied most of the arms to Pakistan."

 

6. Mushtaq continued that he was not rpt not a communist, "nor a communist sympathizer". He said, "I am a conscious anti­communist. That means I am a much more dedicated anti-communist

than ordinary anti-communists." He said USG could, by following present policy, help extremists win out in BD and deny all its demo­cratic victory. He said, "it is the United States upon whom Yahya now leans. If you want to, you can make him see what is the right thing to do."

 

7. Turning to recent events, Mushtaq said BD was forced into ac­cepting communists on consultative committee. He said first notion was to form war council, which he and other leaders rejected. "Next, they wanted to form a liberation front, which I also resisted as hard as I could", he said. But he was "forced" finally to accept "lowest common denomination" - the Consultative Committee. He said committee was only advisory body at present time, but added, "we will have to accept more in the next six months if you don't inter­vene." He said, "we want your shoulder to lean on."

 

8. Poloff at this juncture reviewed sequence of events as we knew them, i.e. we were informed by BD source that BDG (and specifi­cally Mushtaq) had wanted to speak to USG in early August and had expressed desire to talk to GOP in mid-August. Poloff said Congen had reported all this to Washington, and that in late August substance had been conveyed to Yahya, who had expressed interest. In passing word of this interest to Mushtaq, Poloff was merely acting as mes­senger, not proposing negotiations. He would be willing relay any word from Mushtaq.

 

9. Poloff's remarks caused Mushtaq to pause and think for a moment, and then he replied that he had always wished to talk to "United States, our great friends," as was evident by his presence, in hopes that it is still not too late to ask US assistance. He said, "we wanted you to help us preserve our democratic structure." He said BDG wanted USG protection from Pakistanis and "others," as well as help in assuring that "no one interferes in our affairs." Poloff said he thought BDG and others might have exaggerated notion of how much influence USG had with GOP and doubted that USG could ever "tell" Yahya what to do. He repeated that he had only come to hear Mushtaq's views, and to offer, if Mushtaq so desired, to report those views to Washington and ask that they be transmitted to Ya­hya. Mushtaq replied that he saw no value in his talking to GOP be­cause it not necessary. He said, "I know Yahya, I know him to be a

good man and I think he knows that I am a good man, but only you  can influence him. I never thought he would do this. He will not lis­ten ten to me now. "He added that Yahya might not be "his own man" right now and said he suspected Yahya may be somewhat circum­scribed by certain people and events. Nevertheless, he said, he be­lieves USG can influence GOP to see reason.

 

10. In discussing BDG desire have Sheikh Mujib freed, Poloff re­minded Mushtaq USG had made public appeal to GOP. Mushtaq re­plied that he aware of this, but added, "Moscow is also claiming in New Delhi that they kept the Sheikh alive. Even others are making the same claim. We do not know whom to believe but we do know t only you can free him. He asked that USG make fresh effort to push j GOP to release Mujib.

 

11. Mushtaq said he would like to inform USG of desires and princi­ples of BDG, to "hear what USG has to say" about them as soon as possible. He said he would like to give Poloff list of BDG "desires," and requested that list be prefaced with statement that it is merely general statement of BDG principles and not rpt not carefully con­sidered. Precise wording to be quibbled about latter. He said he would not rpt not wish to be held accountable for his precise wording because he is inexperienced in diplomacy and would have to obtain Cabinet approval for exact wording at later date, if circumstances warranted. List of BDG desires follows:

 

(a) full independence for BD;

(b) release Sheikh Mujib;

(c) after independence, massive, long-term economic assistance from USG to help reconstruct nation and quick input humanitarian aid from USG to get people back on feet;

(d) after independence, establishment of normal diplomatic and business relations with Pakistan;

(e) details and modalities of plans for handing over nation to BD leaders and withdrawal Pak army to be worked out in con­sultations between BDG, USG and GOP;

(f) preliminary steps to be discussed with GOP via USG;

(g) sole channel at present to be Fonmin to Poloff via "High Commissioner."

 

12. Mushtaq capped outline of list by saying USG "must take the lead, otherwise the Russians will do so." He said he and other BDG leaders preferred that USG take active role and that most of them were apprehensive of Soviet role, "although confidence in the United States is now a little shaky." He said if it turns out to be impossible to reach peaceful settlement, BDG would pursue war for independ­ence until it won, "despite your guns." He said he realized prospects for radicalization of BD movement in such an eventuality and knew Soviets now trying to take it over but said BDG had no other choice.

13. In response Poloff s remark that he noted Mushtaq had welcomed Indo-Soviet treaty, Fonmin said, "you only read the first sentence. Read the last one." (Last sentence says, "We ardently hope that this treaty will be helpful in fulfilling the aspirations of the small and emerging nations despite the crude bellicosity of men like Yahya Khan of Pakistan.") He added, "1 am a realistic man. I can live with whatever is necessary for us to win."

 

14. At this juncture, Mushtaq called in Hossain Ali and asked him to note down list of BDG "desires" he had given Poloff and read them back, "so that we understand each other fully". When Ali had fin­ished, Mushtaq said, "All this boils down to one central point. If the United States wants to do it, it can do it. The onus is on the United States, if the United States is interested in helping us achieve our democratic freedom. Time is running against us, but first, the United States must make up its mind whether it wants to help Bangladesh." He noted (but suggested ..... need not report) that in effect BDG is asking for compensation for its losses from USG rather than GOP, "which is too poor".

 

15. Mushtaq and Poloff agreed that discussion, and any others which might be held in future, would be considered private and confiden­tial. (Mushtaq told Ali, "make all this top secret.") He said USG should use Poloffs report of conversation in any way it thinks best. If USG wishes convey list of BDG desires to GOP, it should feel free to do so if it believes it will serve useful purpose. He said he hoped he could be provided with USG reaction to his remarks at earliest possible moment. He said he knew Washington is sometimes too big to see small things (read BD), but hoped that in this case sympathetic high-level attention would be focused on 70 million people and 55 thousand square miles of BD.

 

16. Mushtaq expressed hope he could maintain direct contact with Poloff via Hossain Ali "conduit." He said he had authorized no rpt no other channel to USG and that if he did so, he would so inform Poloff. He added that he aware that number of other well-intentioned leaders of BD had made contact with USG reps, but that they not of ficial channel. He felt certain others had made contact in effort to gain general impression of USG policy. He asked if USG had authorized anyone else to talk to BDG and Poloff responded in negative, saying he would inform Mushtaq when and if Dept did so. Poloff noted, however, that American officials might encounter BD reps in variety of places, such as delegates' lounge at UN, and that he expected normal exchange of views would take place. Mushtaq said that is why he wanted to go to UNGA; he had hoped he would find occasion there to meet Secretary Rogers. However, USG had "kept him from going." Asked to elaborate, since Poloff had heard of no visa application from Fonmin, Mushtaq said he had been told USG would find his presence in New York highly embarrassing. Since he did not wish to embarrass "our old and great friend," he had decided not to go.

 

17. Mushtaq said he believed use of BD HC as meeting place was most feasible from all standpoints, noting that major consideration was ability to talk "where they (read Indian intelligence personnel) can't look over our shoulders." (Comment: Poloff s arrival and de­parture were handled discreetly. He was met at gate by Hossain Ali and gave his name to no one else. We agree with Mushtaq on desir­ability of locale in light remarks of Qaiyum's messenger noted reftel. End comment). In parting Mushtaq tightly grasped Poloffs hands with both his and said, "I hope we meet again soon. I hope the United States will come to our aid".

 

18. Comment: Mushtaq's remarks were much the same as reported by Time correspondent Coggin, and represent just about what might be expected from first meeting with USG rep. Mushtaq impressed Poloff as intelligent, clever, pragmatic, basically friendly and rea­sonably articulate; certainly not as hazy as reported by British MP Shore (Calcutta 2438) but admittedly handicapped by inexperience in foreign affairs. He apparently places considerable reliance on growing staff of professional foreign service officers. It interesting ; that Mushtaq never admitted use of Qaiyum or others in New Delhi as channel to USG, though his comments implied he has sought use both those sources and perhaps others to gather knowledge about US intentions and policies", and that he obviously wishes to steer clear of Indians and Soviets in attempt to find solutions. On basic purpose of meeting to ascertain whether BDG interested in negotiating set­tlement directly with GOP Mushtaq's statement and far-reaching list of demands revealed distinctly to try involve USG in settlement ef­fort and post-settlement problems, rather than as channel to GOP, de­spite Poloffs emphasis that US role only that of listener and messen­ger. This again may reflect "first meeting" syndrome, and establish­ment in bargaining position, but apart from his reference to Yahya as "good man" conversation elicited no rpt no indication that BDG pre­pared talk with GOP at this stage.

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971, p.222 - 228