Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

 

SECRET 219

 

 

 

ISLAMA 09833 01 OF 02 290034Z

89-45

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT - 01 /026 W

……… 006405

R 281039Z SEP 71

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 794

INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL DACCA 8281

AMCONSUL LAHORE 5847

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 9833

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (NUMBERED PARA 2).

SUBJ : U.S. LEVERAGE IN CURRENT EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS: U.S. POLICY

REF : ISLAMABAD 9113

FOR SECRETARY AND ASST. SECTY SISCO FROM AMBASSADOR.

DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.

 

1. For some time I have been concerned, as I know you are, about the problem of explaining USG policy toward Pakistan. It is a real problem which Dave Abshire and I talked over at some length during his visit here earlier this month. This cable is, to a marked extent, an outgrowth of that conversation.

      2. The central element of our strategy in Pakistan, as noted in reftel, has been the maintenance of sufficient leverage with the GOP to encourage actions on its part designed to lessen the danger of an Indo-Pak war, hasten the return of displaced persons, and enhance prospects for the restoration of normality and stability in East Pakistan. These have been the major purposes of the generally sympathetic, non­reprehending attitude we have maintained toward Pakistan. This we have expressed in such ways as refusing to join in the worldwide chorus of public condemnation of GOP actions in East Pak, citing economic rather than political factors when suspending new development aid commitments, and tempering our cut off of military sales by permitting already-licensed shipments to go forward.

      3. In judging how successful this strategy has been, the yardstick is not the application of leverage as such but rather the effectiveness in using it to bring about desired changes in GOP policy and practices. Measured by this standard, I believe, US strategy has been reasonably successful-more so than generally realized within

the USG, and most certainly immeasurably more than understood by the press. 'IX; have used our position to urge a number of specific suggestions on the GOP, and the GOP has adopted a surprisingly large proportion of them. We are under no illusion: that their adoption has brought the East Pak crisis to the verge of solution; there is no question that the situation there remains tense and perilous for all concerned, and the coda thereon is yet to be written. The weight of evidence suggests, however, that measures taken at our prodding have had a beneficial effect on developments and have forestalled what otherwise would have been an even more grim situation. In short, a convincing case can be made that our strategy has "worked" in that we have probably accomplished as much as any outside entity could reasonably expect to achieve in this complex, altogether tragic situation once the GOP committed itself to the course of military action begun on March 25-26.

      4. The problem in presenting this case lies in the fact that an essential aspect of US strategy is its confidential nature. Our advice has been acceptable to GOP leaders largely because it has been given in a manner designed not to humiliate them, i.e., informally in private meetings with President Yahya and his top advisers. (For example, I have met with Yahya for private substantive conversations 11 times in the past four months.) The need to preserve this confidence makes the defense of our strategy before Congressional and other critics an especially difficult question, for which there is probably no fully satisfactory answer.

      5. It occurs to me, however, that it might be helpful to you and to those others charged with explaining our Pakistan policy if you and they had for background use a brief compilation of specific examples of how leverage has been used to help defuse or ameliorate the crisis. Some examples are mentioned in the text of reftel. The following list is intended as a supplement to reftel. It is by no means a comprehensive list of our activities in this regard, since we have been working with (and on) the GOP at multiple levels, but it does provide eleven specific examples of the applications of our leverage to bring about desired results:

      (1) Civilian Governor for East Pak: I first suggested the need for return to civilian rule in East Pak during my May 22 meeting with Yahya. In a later meeting on July 15 I broadened this suggestion into a specific proposal that he consider naming a Bengali civilian as Governor of EP, and noted Dr. A. M. Malik as a likely candidate. When I called on him with Maury Williams on Aug 19, Yahya told me he had decided to follow our advice and appoint Dr. Malik as East Pak Governor. The appointment was announced Sept. 1.

      (2) Transfer Tikka Khan from East Pak: In conjunction with my suggestion to appoint an EP civilian Governor, on several occasions I conveyed the thought that it would be advisable to transfer General Tikka Khan (who had become a symbol of Army repression) out of East Pakistan. When Yahya acted on the Malik appointment. he announced simultaneously Tikka Khan's transfer to West Pak. This was done over the objection of army field commanders and, according to Yahya, was predicated on my demarche.

 

FARLAND

 

 

 

 

Source: The American Papers - Secret and Confidential India. Pakistan. Bangladesh Documents 1965- 1973, The University  

                 Press Limited, p. 681-682.