Secret telegram

29 September 1971

From: Secretary State Washington DC

To: American Embassy, New Delhi

 

Sub: South Asia crisis - Pak-Bangla Desh Contacts

 

1. Summary: Asst Secy Sisco discussed with Indian Ambassador Jha September 27 the current situation in South Asia and in particular possibility of direct negotiations between Bangla Desh representa­tives and GOP. Sisco stressed desirability of finding ways to get both sides talking without pre-conditions and indicated we thought there some possibility that a dialogue might now be feasible. Jha re­sponded that dialogue could not take place if Mujib excluded and Awami League unable to play political role to which it entitled as re­sult of elections. Sisco noted that if discussions had to be between Mujib and Yahya there would be no discussions and hence we be­lieved it important to find other channel for political communication between the two sides. End summary.

 

2. Asst Secy Sisco in September 27 discussion with Indian ambassa­dor Jha reviewed current situation South Asia. Jha accompanied by minister Rasgotra and Verma. Schneider and Quainton present from NEA/INC. Sisco noted that UN operation now under way in East Pakistan but refugee flow continues and stability has still not been achieved in East Pakistan. We are hopeful that idea of keeping relief above the battle has gotten through. We have noted political steps and amnesty announced by Yahya. Sisco said however that we could not point to any major improvement or any particularly decisive event in last few weeks. We are doing everything we can to support the international community's role and to make it effective. We would also like to see what else can be done to facilitate progress on the political side. We recognize international aid is only ameliorative and palliative and does not get at fundamentals. Referring to Jha­Irwin conversation (reftel) Sisco said it would be a good thing if we could find some way to get President Yahya and Bangladesh leader­ship talking. We continue to believe GOI has considerable influence and capacity in current situation to encourage Bangla Desh leaders in this direction.

 

3. Jha responded that India's principal concern was to see refugees go home. This in turn requires political conditions in which they can go back. This is not merely matter of cessation of conflict or civilian rather than military rule but the coming into being of a government in which entire refugee community has confidence. In GOI's judge­ment such a government must be Awami League government. Only an Awami League government will keep firm the commitment of the East Bengali people to democratic processes. It was not in India's national interest that radical elements take over.

4. Jha noted with respect to question of dialogue that GOI had been "clamoring" for it all along. However, not possible to have a dia­logue which by-passed Mujib particularly when he is facing trial. Equally there can be no dialogue if majority of elected people are .­disqualified and are not in position to perform role for which they were chosen, i.e. as representatives of people. Jha asked why USG felt it was in GOI power to promote a dialogue. He acknowledged dialogue was in GOI interest but argued only Yahya could make dialogue possible. USG, he said, has influence on Yahya which is greater than GOI's on Bangladesh.

 

5. Sisco responded that US assessment different. If no dialogue pos­sible without Mujib then dialogue will not get started. It ought to be possible to start dialogue with people who are reasonably represen­tative and who have Bangla Desh interests in mind without insisting that it be between Yahya and Mujib. No one can tell where dialogue will lead once talks get started. Once process begins it will be very

difficult to limit it and all political questions will undoubtedly come up. Problem is how and where to begin.

 

6. Sisco noted USG has been in touch with Bangla Desh representa­tives and had purposefully told GOI of these contacts. If USG and GOI work in tandem, we can get process started in everybody's in­terest. We are both politically realistic and pragmatic.

 

7. Jha inquired who would be next best people to contact if Mujib excluded. Sisco replied we would leave that to GOI. We would hope Secretary and Swaran Singh can talk about this subject in New York. Once we agreed that a dialogue was desirable objective, we would both undoubtedly have ideas to throw into the pot. In our view very beginning of process of dialogue would have salutary effect and would facilitate creation of conditions in which refugee flow would stop and begin to be reversed.

 

8. Rasgotra asked whether Bangla Desh leaders had said anything positive to US on subject dialogue. Sisco replied that speaking very candidly we had received a mixed response. It depended on person to who we were speaking. He noted that just as India had played crucial role in establishment of Bangla Desh Coordinating Committee it now had significant capacity to influence situation. Jha said it would be helpful to GOI if USG could clarify whether Mujib is only "point of no contact" or whether there is a circle of others with whom Yahya would not deal. Sisco said this was fair question which we would have to address.

 

9. Under Secretary Irwin raised subject same evening with Finance Minister Chavan following ambassador Jha's dinner for Chavan. While acknowledging obstacles in path of negotiations, Irwin sug­gested there might be merit in initiating talks between Bangla Desh representatives and GOP as way to break current impasse and avoid radicalization in area. Chavan's reaction was that Bangladesh repre­sentatives, who called for independence, would be unwilling con­sider discussions with GOP. Furthermore, no fruitful discussions could take place without Mujibur Rahman. Irwin agreed Mujib might

prove key to ultimate settlement, but said it was unrealistic to assume that Yahya was in political position to deal with him at this time. Consequently, preferred course might be to begin talks with Bangla Desh representatives, some of whom reportedly prepared to speak with GOP. If some progress achieved, involvement of Mujib at later date would still remain possible option.

 

Rogers

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971, p.228 – 231