Secret telegram
October 3, 1971
From:
Amconsul Calcutta
To:
Secretary State Washington DC
Subject: Contact with Bangladesh Reps
1. Summary: Qaiyum met Political
Officer October 3 to pass message from BD "Acting President" Islam
requesting speedy USG response to BDG
demarche presented to Poloff by "Fonmin" Mushtaq Ahmed September 28 (reftel).
Qaiyum noted that time of essence to BDG because of (a) increasing communist
infiltration in BD movement, (b)
fact that Indians and Soviets increasingly wresting initiative from BDG, (c) uncertain status of Sheikh Mujib
and (d) upcoming Awami League working committee meeting October 20, at which
major decisions of political importance will be reached. Separately, Qaiyum reported Mukti Bahini plans to inject 40
to 60 thousand armed men into East Pakistan by end of October
in effort to wreck GOP
administration. He noted BDG had been pressing GOI and USSR for political/military assistance in
recent days and suggested USG join forces
with USSR to push GOP to rational
political solution. He
quoted Islam as saying only Mujib can negotiate anything less than independence for BD and that in Mujib's absence BDG has
no choice but to demand complete independence. Finally, Qaiyum said he doubted that MB would find it possible to
prohibit or prevent attempts to disrupt
shipping to East Pakistan. End summary.
2. Poloff met Qaiyum
evening October 3 at tatter's request. Qaiyum said he wished to pass to Poloff
"urgent" request from "Acting President" Islam for
response to demarche made by Mushtaq September 28 to Poloff. Qaiyum said Islam did not inform him of details of BDG demarche
but did say list of "desires" given Poloff
had been approved by Cabinet, that
Islam had been led to believe USG response would be forthcoming by week
October 4, and that Islam wished impress
upon USG necessity for speedy
response. (Comment: Later, Qaiyum said only he, Islam, Mushtaq
and "two other members of
Cabinet" were aware of substance and fact of Mushtaq's meeting with Poloff. Qaiyum, who was in north Bengal September 28, did not rpt not
appear certain whether Poloff had met Islam or Mushtaq. Nonetheless, it
apparent that he privy to top level of BDG. End comment). Qaiyum said he
had not rpt not come for USG response himself, but merely to ask that it be passed to Mushtaq as soon as possible. He added that he would
prefer to keep his distance from "official" dialogue between
USG and BDG, saying "I only wanted to get things started between our two
democracies. Now it is up to you officials to
work it out". Poloff responded that he could give Qaiyum no rpt
no assurance that "speedy" USG response would be forthcoming.
3. Qaiyum said he understood that high
bureaucracy like USG might take some time to focus on "small problem" like
BD, but noted October 1 AP report carried in Calcutta press that Secretary
Rogers had discussed BD issue with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. He said BDG understanding of this report was that
USG and USSR had identity of views
on BD problem. Qaiyum said "confidentially"
that BDG had been pressing GOI and Soviets in past two weeks to either (a) increase
military and economic assistance to BD or (b) work to push GOP to come to
political settlement which would result in peaceful independence for BD. He
said BDG much preferred latter course, but that obviously all depended upon GOP. He said
he could speak for Islam and Cabinet in saying it would be of critical utility if USG could find it
possible to move in concert with Soviet Union to press GOP to agree
to peaceful political solution to BD problem.
4. In saying this,
Qaiyum stressed that Sheikh Mujib
would have to be party to any political solution, else it would fail. He
said Islam had told him October 1 that he and other leaders of BDG could negotiate gotiate independence for BD, but only Mujib
could negotiate anything thing less. Islam reportedly added, "if I tried
anything less, I could
'' never sell it to the people. They would kill
me." Qaiyum said, "only
the Sheikh has the people's mandate.
The rest of us are just his workers."
He drew Poloff's attention to recent statement by BD "High Commissioner" Hossain
Ali (Calcutta 2565) that Mujib only man qualified to negotiate with GOP. Qaiyum repeated proposal made in his first meeting with Congen officer (Calcutta 2230) that representatives of USG, GOP, GOI sit down at conference table with
Mujib to reach accord. He said to this he would now add Soviets, since they have
subsequently become involved, and argued that such a meeting could
settle issue in "one hour." As alternative, since he doubted GOI had
any influence in Islamabad, Qaiyum suggested that USG and USSR work together
behind scenes to push GOP to grant peaceful independence to BD. He said,
"You Americans claim you have influence with Yahya, but
then you say you don't have that much influence when we ask you to do
something. But surely both you and the Russians together do have enough."
5. Returning to need for urgent action in
current situation, Qaiyum said
AL working committee
would meet October 20 and noted this only second meeting of working committee
since March 25. (Comment: First meeting was held in Shiliguri
in early July; see Calcutta 2232. End
comment). He said working committee composed of 31 AL members,
including Cabinet, and that it empowered to make and enforce all major decisions for
party, both political and administrative. He said possibility of political
settlement of current crisis would be discussed and that party would probably take
"final" decision which would guide Cabinet thereafter. He urged that USG
do its utmost to arm Cabinet with response to Mushtaq's demarche that "` would enable it to withstand moves
for undesirable hard-line decision. "Otherwise," he warned, "there is
no other choice but war - a war that will harm 700 million people in South Asia."
6. Qaiyum also warned that other actions were about to take
place. He said BDG had just sanctioned MB plans to inject 40 thousand
: armed men into East Pakistan by October 15.
He said another 20 thousand would follow by the end of October. MB strategy would
be to slip past Pak army units, which are heavily concentrated along Indian border, and
go after small and relatively isolated units in interior of province. Qaiyum said bulk of army would be kept in position along border by
actions of Indian army, which would not actually engage Pak army, but make feinting
movements to keep Paks off balance. Aside
from minor Pak army units, MB targets would be communications lines and routes,
with concentration on shipping ° until monsoon waters receded and on bridges
and electric transmission lines thereafter.
7. Poloff inquired whether MB could be induced to
avoid attacks on vessels carrying UN humanitarian relief supplies, pointing out
that many of AL's constituents might depend on such supplies for their lives. Qaiyum said he could not answer question until he spoke to
MB commander of "frog men." Then he asked, "if
you were in his shoes, what would you do?" Poloff
replied that he preferred not rpt not respond to hypothetical question, but
added on personal basis that if he were in such position, his decision might be
influenced by verifiable guarantees that (a) ships chartered by UN would be manned by
non-Pakistani crews, (b) cargoes would consist only rpt only of humanitarian
relief supplies, (c) no rpt no Pak troops or officials would be aboard vessels and
(d) cargoes would be always under control of UN relief agency and not RPT not
under GOP jurisdiction. Qaiyum said he would put
question to MB commander, along with Poloff's
"interesting personal observations," but doubted that MB would be
responsive because it making "all-out" effort to frustrate GOP.
8. In passing, Qaiyum told
Poloff MB had team of 31
"frogmen," all of whom were Bengalis trained at Pak navy diving
school. He noted that navy essentially Bengali, since West Pakistanis did not
know how to swim, and "like all inhabitants of deserts" feared water.
He said
frogmen are commanded by Awami Leaguer named Alam, who was named in Agartala
conspiracy case and is close to Sheikh Mujib. He said frogmen
are assisted by Indian navy in way of equipment and mines, but that all
operations are carried out entirely by East Bengalis.
9. Qaiyum said, "all we want is
to return to our homeland in an honorable way." He said he and members of BDG are unhappy
that Soviets have taken initiative on BD in recent weeks, especially since East
Pak communists had, as a consequence, come out of obscurity
and
were making their voices heard in a number of important ways. He dismissed "Bangladesh liberation coordination
committee" statement to press that
appeared in Calcutta papers October 3
(which decried any political settlement with GOP as "total betrayal"
of people of BD) as "unimportant." He said BDLCC was "nonorganization" seeking publicity, but warned that
communists, in league
with CPI, were busily infiltrating MB ranks. He said BDG was not rpt not happy
with Kosygin's statement during Mrs. Gandhi's
recent visit to Moscow or Indo-Soviet
statement prior her departure. They had issued denial of press stories to that
effect as result GOI pressure (see Calcutta 2584). He added,
"it was undiplomatic of us to have said
such a thing while we are living on Indian soil. We realized that,
and withdrew our remarks." However, he said BDG was pleased with Podgorny's remarks on BD during his Delhi stop October 1 (see
Calcutta 2602).
10. During course
of conversation, Qaiyum also noted: (a) his experience had taught
him that GOP far more concerned with Kashmir than East Bengal; this led him to
believe Pak army might make "life or death" military strike in near
future to capture Kashmir as lastditch effort to
save face of nation, (b) Bhutto as Prime Minister of Pakistan would be
acceptable neither to Bengalis nor to Pathans and (c) original Rs 266 million (over 554 million at official rate) BDG had brought from
Dacca had now shrunk to "much less than half that amount."
11. Qaiyum
noted that he planned to depart for Tripura October 6
as part
of BDG effort to keep in tough with and give guidance to MB commanders. He
would be gone for 8 or 10 days and had just returned to Calcutta from similar trip
to north Bengal. He asked Poloff
to
meet him again evening October 5 to give him outline Congressman
Frelinghuysen's impressions of GOP attitudes, and reaction of MB commander to
USG concern about relief shipments. He repeated that, in BDG eyes, time is
complicating factor, saying, "every day they
(Indians?) find something new to force on us." He
expressed fervent hope that at October 5 meeting Poloff
would ask him for appointment with Mushtaq to pass
USG response to Fonmin's September 28 demarche.
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the
Nixon White House 1971, p.231 - 235