Telegram
from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted
on October 7 by Laingen and Schneider; cleared in
draft by Davies (EUR), Noyes (DOD/ISA), Acting Secretary Johnson, and Saunders;
cleared in substance by Jack C. Miklos, Director of
the Office of Iran Affairs; and approved by Van Hollen.
Also sent to
Tosec 100/185010. Subj:
Risks of War in Indo-Pak Confrontation.
1. We are
deeply concerned over increasing risks of war in current India/Pakistan
confrontation over
/2/
Dated October 7.
(Ibid.)
2. For
A. We have
heard reports for some time of possible large-scale cross-border effort by Mukti Bahini to coincide with end
monsoon season. We now have specific report (Calcutta 2605/3/-protect source)
to effect that Mukti Bahini
plans to inject as many as 40,000 armed men across border by October 15, with
additional 20,000 to follow by end October. This action reportedly would be
accomplished with support of diversionary actions by Indian Army to keep Pak
Armed Forces off balance while infiltration took place. We are not convinced
that intensified guerrilla activity will achieve results compatible with
/3/
See footnote 3, Document 159.
B. You
should make clear to GOI our concern about any MB effort of this dimension
which could not be accomplished without support of GOI. It is our concern that
Pak Armed Forces would not acquiesce in this cross-border operation and would
make military response directed against
C. In
short, this situation has large potential for major confrontation and conflict
which we must continue to assume
D. We
would, therefore, strongly urge that GOI act immediately to reduce these risks
by efforts with MB to restrict cross-border operations. While we recognize that
major responsibility for maintenance of India-Pak peace rests with GOP, GOI
also bears major responsibility keep present situation from deteriorating into
war or prolonged insurgency. Should such cross-border operations lead to
conflict with
E. If
dangers of immediate conflict are to be meaningfully reduced,
we believe there must be reduction in level of military confrontation by
accomplishing both (1) curb by all parties involved in cross-border operations,
and (2) pullback by military forces of both
F. You
should point out that we fully recognize major responsibilities resting on
3. For
Islamabad: Chargé should seek immediate appointment with Yahya
in
A. We have
carefully noted assurances given by Yahya to you
following Frelinghuysen conversation with Yahya that
Pakistan would not be first to initiate hostilities and that it recognized
destructive costs to both countries of any conflict developing out of present
crisis./4/
/4/ This exchange between President Yahya
and Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen (R-New Jersey) took place on September 30.
(Situation report on India/Pakistan from Eliot to Kissinger, October 7;
National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK)
B.
Nonetheless, we remain deeply concerned that present situation has elements in
it that could cause conflict to break out despite best intentions both sides.
We continue to hear reports of strong
/5/
Dated October 6.
(Ibid., POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK)
/6/ The telegram citation is inaccurate and has not been further
identified.
C. While
we recognize that major responsibility for degree of military confrontation
along East Pak borders rests with Indians, we believe GOP must share responsibility
for reducing risks of conflict in that area. Any military action initiated by
D. You
should tell Yahya that we fully recognize major
responsibilities resting on
E. Given
dangers for conflict that are present along both East and West Pak borders in
simple fact of present face-to-face confrontation by military units along
borders, we are also proposing to both GOI and GOP that they consider mutual
withdrawal of troops and armor some distance from their respective borders. We
believe this kind of mutual effort should be feasible in military terms for
both sides without detriment to their military preparedness and would be
positive and constructive step toward beginning de-escalation present crisis.
F. Finally,
however, you should make clear to Yahya that we
continue to believe that the only long-term resolution of current danger can be
found through progress toward political solution and accommodation in
/7/ Chargé
Sober responded on October 9 that he had a meeting scheduled with Yahya on October 11 and he would make the points put
forward in the Department's instruction at that time. He anticipated that the
proposal for a mutual force withdrawal would present difficulties for Yahya, at least with regard to
4. For
Moscow: We continue to assume, particularly in light reports from both Moscow
and New Delhi assessing Mrs. Gandhi's visit Moscow, that we and Soviet Union
have strongly shared interest in reducing risks of conflict in present South
Asian crisis. Ambassador requested, therefore, to seek earliest opportunity
convey our current concerns to Gromyko if possible or
to highest available M.F.A. official. Ambassador should inform USSR of
approaches we are making including proposal for mutual withdrawal regular
forces along Indo-Pak borders, and urge USSR act in ways open to them help
accomplish both immediate requirement of reduction in military confrontation
and longer term objective of political solution East Pakistan. Ambassador
should also seek Soviet assessment of situation, particularly in light of
recent Soviet contacts with Indians.
5. For
Tehran: Ambassador should see Shah soonest to inform him of our concerns re
dangers inherent in current situation and our approaches to Pakistanis,
Indians, and Soviets as stated above. Ambassador should also solicit Shah's
continued support in our common effort to damp down situation and obtain
political settlement. If Shah unavailable Ambassador should
pass message through Alam. In your
conversation with Shah or Alam you should avoid any
detailed specific reference to prospect of more than 40,000 Mukti
Bahini crossing border this month (Para 2A above).
6. For
/8/ See
Document 161.
Johnson
Source: Document 160, volume XI,