Secret Telegram

October 14, 1971

From: Secretary State Washington DC

For Ambassador Farland, Islamabad

 

Subject: Dialog with Yahya: Future of Mujib and political accom­modation.

 

1. As we indicated in demarche on current Indo-Pak military con­frontation (reftel) we believe that long-term resolution of current cri­sis can only be found through progress toward political solution in East Pakistan. Yahya's response to mutual pullback proposal was immediate and positive and we are gratified by this. Whatever comes of this aspect our demarche, however, political element involved will remain, and on this point Yahya's response was essentially to restate to us serious problems he felt would be involved in going beyond political timetable he has spelled out publicly.

 

2. Against this background we are convinced that Yahya must find ways, within this timetable, privately to get across to exiled Awami Leaguers and BD leadership that he recognizes not only the strong autonomous sentiments of East Pakistan but also that he has not closed his mind on Mujib as key to political evolution of kind that will permit GOP extricate itself from current impasse East Pakistan. We suspect Yahya may be more aware himself of these imperatives than he has suggested even privately to you. In any event, we were encouraged by intent and tone of discussion reported reftel with Ya­hya about Mujib and believe we should take him up on his request for suggestions on dealing with problem (Islamabad 9599).

 

3. If you agree with above, suggest you take early opportunity after Yahya's return from Tehran to speak frankly and in some detail with Yahya about political timetable he has now outlined, specifically possibilities that might present themselves within this timetable to get across to BD and Mujib clear signals that Yahya does not ex­clude major realignment East-West Pakistan relationship and even­tual participation by Mujib in this process. Yahya knows we under­stand complexity his political problems and that we have no desire further complicate them by moralistic pronouncements or public ad­vice. You should say frankly, however, that our judgment is that our capacity to help initiate talks between BD and Yahya now depends heavily on his readiness himself to signal, through us or otherwise, his willingness engage in substantive dialogue with BD. The longer this dialogue is delayed the greater the depth of alienation of BD (not to mention MB) and the less reason to hope for any kind of negoti­ated settlement.

 

4. What we have outlined below is illustrative of what might be con­ceivable and is not intended as any American blueprint. You will have other ideas to use yourself with Yahya to get our concerns across that time is rapidly working against political accommodation East Pakistan.

 

5. With respect Mujib himself, optimum signals would obviously be in such things as public suspension of trial, release of Mujib and/or his departure for exile outside Pakistan. Short of these there is possi­bility of indefinite extension of trial proceedings. Finally, we wonder whether Yahya should not reconsider his idea of publishing full tran­scripts Mujib trial. Exposure of evidence against Mujib can only en­flame Bengali opinion and, as Yahya had already noted, reaction in ,, West Pakistan "could well be explosive". Publication, therefore, might jeopardize admittedly slender chance of accommodation using Mujib as key piece. Should trial come to point of conviction and an­nouncement of sentence, some thought might be given to have sim­ple statement from defense attorney Brohi that trial was fair rather than full exposure of record that could make subsequent granting of clemency difficult or impossible.

 

6. You might also want to discuss with him whether there is appeals procedure available which would both soften international criticism and provide further time to see whether some ways for negotiated settlement involving Mujib might be found should Yahya consider it desirable at that time.

 

7. Regarding broader issues, you might sound out Yahya as to whether constitution he intends to promulgate will include maximum feasible autonomy for East Pakistan and some method for eventual constitutional review that would allow for evolutionary political de­velopment. While we have formula on this point, it seems to us as sympathetic observers of Pakistan dilemma that, over long run, con­stitutional arrangements which are flexible and workable enough to provide for future re-examination of relationship between two wings would go a long way towards satisfaction Bengali needs. We would see such review provisions as providing basis for dissident elements within East Pakistan come forward and join in political process. Such measures could also provide useful signal to BD reps Calcutta that positive basis for negotiation with GOP exists.

 

8. In terms of present situation, and recognizing all problems in­volved, you might say that we wonder whether it would be feasible to convey to BD Calcutta that Yahya does not exclude re-entry at some point of Awami League into political life in East Pakistan, with an amnesty extending to all Awami Leaguers. In this connection, are there not steps Yahya could take now that would encourage in some way Awami League sympathizers to enter and contest scheduled by­elections as independents. If these thoughts create major problems, what about possibility fresh elections within two years so that those now frozen out of process (by charges against them or by own choice) would see opportunity for their own eventual reintegration into political life East Pakistan?

 

9. If you find Yahya in receptive mood on any of these "thoughts", you should use opportunity to probe more deeply Yahya's ideas on mechanics getting dialogue with BD started, reminding him that we have urged Indians and Soviets to get behind idea of open-ended political dialogue and that we continue to detect some signs of interest on part BD reps. You should say, however, that in our view this in­terest can best be exploited by Yahya himself finding ways through suggestions indicated above or otherwise to signal BD directly that possibilities of dialogue exist.

 

10. For Dacca: You may wish to provide Embassy with your thoughts on these suggestions or with additional ideas that might be discussed with President Yahya. If Yahya asks about President's re­ply to his letter, you should reaffirm that it is being given careful consideration, but we believe it preferable to delay formal response' pending outcome our current demarches regarding pullback pro­posal.

 

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971, p.256 - 259