Secret Telegram

November 1, 1971

From Amconsul, Hong Kong

To: Secretary State, Washington DC

 

Subject: Peking Policy in Indo-Pak Dispute

 

Summary: China's operational goal in South Asia at the present time is, we believe, to avoid an Indo-Pak war and to encourage a political settlement of the East Pakistan problem. Should, however, a full­scale war begin, the PRC, while supplying material aid to Pakistan, would probably support or even lead diplomatic efforts in the UN and elsewhere to halt the fighting. If Western Kashmir should be threatened, the Chinese might possibly intervene with the limited objective of restoring the military balance in this section and pre­venting the total defeat of the Pakistan government. End summary.

 

1. Peking has remained silent on the recent reported clashes on the Indian-Pakistan border and it has not reported the GOP's latest charges of Indian provocations. This restraint is in keeping with the PRC's cautious policy in regard to the growing crisis on the sub­continent and what we believe is its determination not to be directly involved and to encourage a political settlement. Following is our as­sessment of China's objectives and likely intentions in the area.

 

2. Peking hopes to maintain its present high-level of influence in Pakistan while eventually improving its relations with India. As Chou told a Yugoslav interviewer in August, the PRC hopes to pro­mote "the liberation of the Indian subcontinent from control by the two superpowers," meaning essentially the reduction of Soviet influ­ence. Main Chinese strategic goals in South Asia for avoiding war and securing its borders against encroachment or submersion by In­dia or by USSR acting through India, would not be served either by a regional war or by continuing hostility in Sino-Indian relations. Ei­ther development would only increase India's dependence on the USSR. Despite these strategic goals and although Pakistan today is not as important to Peking as it was in the years before the PRC's isolation was reduced, China still does not wish to be seen as reneg­ing on its pledge to "firmly support" Pakistan to oppose "aggression and interference."

 

3. Consequently, we believe that China's major operational goal at the present is to avoid an Indo-Pak war and to discourage the forcible detachment of East Pakistan from the west - the latter not because the Chinese have any vital interests in the unity of Pakistan but be­cause they wish to avoid a Pak humiliation which would indirectly embarrass China, boost India's confidence in its future dealings with the PRC, and make the Soviets appear to be the arbiter of events in South Asia. Given the numerical superiority of the Indian army over that of the Paks, the apparent Indian determination to support the guerrilla war in the East, the problems faced by the West Paks in subduing the Mukti Bahini, and the widespread unpopularity in the world of the Pak Government's policies in the East, China's interests would seem to be best served by a political settlement of the East Pakistan issue - even if it should lead in a rather short period to ef­fective independence for Bangla Desh.

 

4. Although the Chinese have largely ignored the Indian-Soviet treaty, as Gromyko suggested on August 13, Peking has drawn "appropriate conclusions" about the accord. The Chinese, we be­lieve, have from the beginning seen the treaty as directed at the con­tainment of China in line with Brezhnev's "collective security" ar­rangement. Chou told the same Yugoslav interviewer that the treaty has extended the Soviet threat to China's southern borders.

 

5. Beyond this, Peking also has probably interpreted the treaty as a Soviet effort both to exploit and to counter the impact of develop­ments in Sino-US relations. The Chinese may also believe that the treaty, if not actually designed for such purpose, will in fact be used to screen Indian support for the independence movement in East Pakistan and to checkmate Chinese moves on behalf of Islamabad should a Pak-Indian war break out. Either development would em­barrass the Chinese.

 

6. We do not know if any contingency planning for an Indo-Pak con­flict has taken place between Islamabad and Peking, but we doubt that it has. President Yahya Khan has privately said that in the event of fighting, "China will support us" (Islamabad 9848) and Chou En­Lai recently told authoress Han Su-Yin that Chinese "support" would follow external aggression against Pakistan. But the vague wording of Chinese pledges of "support", the reserved treatment of the crisis in Chinese public media, the failure of Chou En-Lai to dramatize Pe­king's support with a visit to Pakistan, and Chinese avoidance of a "meaningful dialogue" with Pakistani officials on the developing situation (Islamabad 9848) have apparently been intended to dis­courage Pak expectations that the PRC will intervene with military force in Indo-Pak war. The Chinese apparently hope that their re­served expressions of support for Pakistan, while retaining the PRC's position as number one friend of the Paks, will discourage the GOP's taste for war and promote its resignation to a political face-saving settlement. Peking has reportedly treated coolly a GOP probe about the possibility of a Sino-Pak treaty similar to the Soviet-Indian ac­cord (HK 5888). And although the PRC won Pakistan's acclaim with its early relief and rehabilitation assistance and it has reportedly agreed to assist the Paks in equipping two newly-raised divisions (replacing units transferred to East Pakistan), the Chinese have ap­parently been dragging their feet on actual deliveries (HK 5818).

 

7. Meanwhile, the Chinese are apparently attempting to restrain the Indians from precipitous action by holding open the door to im­proved Sino-Indian relations and by intimations that Indian subver­sion in East Bengal could lead to serious problems in West Bengal. Moreover, the Chinese may expect that India's uncertainty about the nature of the Chinese "support" will, despite the Soviet treaty, still tend to deter Indian aggression. Chou En-Lai in recent interviews has

stated China's interest in a "mutual understanding" with India, but he has also stressed that the East Pakistan issue is an internal Pak prob­lem and that Peking is concerned only with the question of foreign interference. On the other hand, Peking has avoided the subject of the East Pakistan refugees and so far as we know it has made no of­fer to help solve this problem, which is the major provocation of In­dian impatience.

 

8. Should a full-scale Indo-Pak war begin, the PRC, we believe, would probably support or even lead diplomatic efforts to halt the fighting. For this purpose, the PRC's new position in the UN would be very useful in mustering world support for a ceasefire. Whether or not hostilities break out, Peking may push for a UN solution to the problem. In this way Peking could further the GOP's objective of in­volving the UN in a peace-keeping role on the Indo-Pak border.

 

9. Should the fighting, however, continue, the Chinese will very likely do what they can to help supply the Pak forces in both the East and the West. Although the ability to freely cross Burmese air space would be of value to the Chinese for immediate logistic support to the East, supply by sea would seem to be the only practical way for the Chinese to move large amounts of materials to either East or West Pakistan. PRC capabilities for such sea re-supply would seem to be adequate.

 

10. In the event of Indo-Pak hostilities, Peking might make threat­ening noises in order to divert Indian attention, but given the direct Soviet commitment, and the improved defensive position of the In­dian army, the Chinese are likely to be more cautious in such verbal action than they were in 1965. The only danger of direct Chinese in­tervention, we believe, might be in the event that Indian forces either threatened the Pakistani-controlled portion of Kashmir, an area which of course borders on the PRC, or seemed on the verge of top­pling the Islamabad Government. Direct Chinese military action within West Pakistan would generally be seen as defensive and therefore presumably less likely to spark Soviet retaliation against the PRC.

 

11, There has been no indication of recent military shifts by the Chi­nese in anticipation of hostilities. The latest OB carries a PLA strength of 47,000 men in the Sin-Kiang military region but the existence of 600,000 to 1,000,000 PLA production and construction corps personnel in the region may provide a capability for rather rapid mobilization of additional support and logistic forces in the Ti­bet military district, where there are only about 76,000 PLA forces. Although this is a relatively small number, it should be remembered that in 1962, Chinese attacks across the Northeast frontier agency were carried out by only 20,000 men.

 

12. If western Kashmir was threatened and the Chinese did actually elect to send volunteers into West Pakistan, they would presumably do so to restore the military balance in the Western sector, and to prevent the total defeat of the Pakistan Government. At the same time, the PRC would very likely accelerate its diplomatic activity for an immediate ceasefire.

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 298-302.