Department of State

Intelligence Note

Bureau of Intelligence and Research November 3, 1971

 

Subject: USSR-India-Pakistan: Soviet view of the crisis in the Sub­continent

 

The bulk of the evidence indicates that the Soviets want to prevent war if possible but will support India if hostilities do break out. Such support would probably extend to Indian political objectives, in­cluding - if necessary as a result of hostilities - independence for East Bengal. As long as peace is maintained, however, Moscow's search for a "political solution" is focused on the problem of per­suading Yahya Khan to reverse his policies and to restore the status quo ante, i.e., to recognize the Awami League's popular mandate and to negotiate with Sheikh Mujib concerning autonomy for East Ben­gal within a united, though federated, Pakistan.

 

Two perceptions of the Special Relationship

The crisis in the subcontinent has caused both India and the USSR to emphasize the importance of their "special relationship"; at the same time, the crisis has brought out the differences in how the two parties interpret this relationship, and what advantage each hopes to derive from it. Both are being subjected to severe pressures of time, since the crisis offers little hope of early settlement by peaceful means, while its prolongation is unacceptable to India. For Moscow, the problem is how to demonstrate friendship and support for India without encouraging New Delhi to take actions likely to worsen the crisis. For the Indians, the problem is one of extracting the maximum possible advantage from the Indo-Soviet "special relationship" in the fastest possible time, including immediate diplomatic and material support, and specific commitments of continuing support in the event of hostilities.

 

Peace But Not Evenhandedness

The repression of the autonomy movement in East Pakistan by the government of Yahya Khan, the mass movement of refugees into In­dia, and the emergence of a crisis in the relations between India and Pakistan had the effect of arousing again Soviet concern to preserve peace and stability in the subcontinent. As in 1965, the problem in­volved the Soviet relationship with both India and Pakistan, although this time Moscow had less influence with Pakistan, and less to gain by an evenhanded posture. Nor was evenhandedness appropriate in a situation which, in the view of Soviet observers, was essentially a Pakistani internal problem rather than a dispute between India and Pakistan.

Even so, the Soviets avoided excessive damage in their relations with Pakistan, and for the time being chose to adopt a reserved position on the question of Bangla Desh - in part because prospects for the inde­pendence movement remained uncertain, and because Moscow tended to be cautious about supporting any kind of secessionist movement. The Soviets did retain enough flexibility to permit the expression of some sympathy and support for the Bengalis, their refugees, and their initial demands for autonomy.

 

The Role of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty

As the pressure of the refugee problem became acute in India, New Delhi looked to Moscow for effective relief and at the same time considered recognizing Bangla Desh. Moscow reacted by sending Gromyko on a quickly arranged trip to New Delhi to sign on August 10 a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Such a treaty had been proposed by Moscow two years earlier and had been under con­sideration by the two governments, but for various reasons neither side was prepared to act until the crisis in East Bengal had reached an acute stage.

 

Soviet media assessed the treaty as a "major political document" that provided a formal, legal foundation for Indo-Soviet "friendship." The treaty's key provision required both parties to consult in the event of attack; it also specified that the signatories would refrain from assisting any third party taking part in an armed conflict with the other party. The language of the treaty, however vague, carried the flavor of a defensive alliance. Beyond the immediate purpose of defusing the crisis, signing of the treaty reflected concern in both Moscow and New Delhi over possible Chinese intervention in the event of Indo-Pakistani hostilities.

 

The Soviets evidently concluded that the situation called for an ad­vance declaration of Soviet support for India in order to deter Paki­stan and China. In the larger context, Moscow may also have re­garded the treaty as a response to the challenge to the Soviet Union's role in Asia implicit in moves by China and the US to normalize their relationship.

 

For India, the treaty seemingly reaffirmed the "special relationship" with the Soviet Union, which had been modified by Moscow's even­handedness toward India and Pakistan during and following Tash­kent. It also raised questions about India's nonalignment, even though the treaty had explicitly expressed respect for this principle. In the weeks following the signing of the treaty, Moscow's failure to take any action on behalf of India raised some questions whether the treaty constrained India's freedom of action. Indian sources privately admitted that Mrs. Gandhi was not fully satisfied with the results of her visit to the USSR early in October.

 

Contingency Planning

As the crisis continued to drag and fester, Moscow had to consider its policy if the situation were to get out of hand in spite of Indian re­straint. The Soviets could hardly evade Indian desires to discuss this contingency, even though it tended to place Moscow in the position of making commitments instead of counseling restraint.

 

Following the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin to New Delhi at the end of October, the two sides disclosed that con­sultations had taken place under the terms of Article 9 of the Indo­Soviet Treaty of Friendship. The timing of the visit suggested that

Firyubin also came to obtain a new reading of Indian intentions in wake of the preparations for war and the high-level statements of concern from Indian leaders. Firyubin reportedly told the Indians to avoid war if possible, but to attain their military objectives quickly if hostilities did break out. He assured India of continued Soviet mate­rial support under all circumstances.

 

For their part, the Indians probably pressed Firyubin for commit­ments of greater aid to refugees, specific diplomatic steps aimed at a "political solution," and specific contingency planning involving a heightened level of military assistance and all related details: shop­ping lists delivery schedules, and airlift and overflight problems. The arrival of the Soviet Air Chief, Air Marshal P.S. Kutakhov, in New Delhi on October 30 for a six-day visit and the initial reports about his talks would appear to indicate Soviet willingness to discuss an emergency military supply program.

 

Waning Effort to Influence Pakistan

In the meantime, the Soviet posture toward Pakistan combined pri­vate assurances of goodwill with increasingly insistent condemna­tions of Pakistani repressive actions in the East Wing and demands, both public and private, that Yahya Khan reverse his policies and seek a "political solution." Moscow, however, refrained from pub­licly discussing the specifics of such a course, other than that it should take into account the interests of the East Pakistani population and create conditions to facilitate the return of refugees from India. While in New Delhi Firyubin reportedly met with Bangla Desh lead­ers and urged them to renounce their goal of independence, claiming that if they did so Islamabad would release Sheikh Mujib and begin to negotiate with the East Bengalis for autonomy.

 

Soviet advice to the Pakistanis has apparently been urgent but rela­tively temperate. Neither aid commitments nor economic relations have been interrupted, and although scheduled deliveries of major military aid continued to be held up, some spare parts were being supplied. The Pakistanis privately admitted they were concerned over the stiff Soviet attitude during the visit of Foreign Secretary Sultan Mohammad Khan to Moscow in late August, and Kosygin has publicly condemned Yahya's policies as "indefensible." Soviet President Podgorny, however, apparently attempted friendlier per­suasion during his meeting with Yahya Khan at the 25`h centenary celebration in Iran. These efforts have so far failed to produce the intended result.

 

The Quickening Soviet Involvement

With the cautious postures toward the crisis maintained by the US and China, the Soviets undoubtedly feel encouraged to play a domi­nant role, and Soviet involvement in both the political and military aspects of the situation has grown rapidly in recent weeks. It would appear that the USSR moves have been - and will be - based not only on its support for India and its desire to strengthen its influence on the Subcontinent but also, and more directly, on its own assess­ment that Yahya Khan is unlikely to succeed in securing his control of East Bengal. The immediate USSR objective, therefore, appears to be to minimize the extent of violence accompanying Pakistan's reor­ganization, whether it takes the form of federation or dismember­ment.

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 306 - 310.