Confidential

4 November 1971

From: Deputy Secretary of Defense

To: Honorable U. Alexis Johnson

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Department of State Washington DC

 

Dear Alex:

I can assure you that we, in Defense, share the desire you expressed in your 8 October letter to have before us a fully clarified overview of our actions with respect to military supply for Pakistan.

 

Let me review for you the steps we have taken to comply with what we viewed as the progressively more restrictive trend of policy toward Pakistan. From the outset, our understanding of policy guidance ema­nating from the National Security Council on the subject has been that no sanctions should be taken against Pakistan that would shut the door to our continued dialogue with the Yahya Khan government. In this prohibited category were such steps as a total and public embargo or similar measures to isolate or quarantine Pakistan.

 

With these provisos in mind, Defense made the first move in response to an oral, working level request from State on 11 April, asking us to slow the release of military supplies pending a full-dress review of the issues involved. On that date, ISA informally instructed the Services to delay until more formal guidance could be issued. On 23 April, we for­malized the directive, suspending delivery of all end items, all ammuni­tion and all spare parts for lethal end items under accepted FMS cases from DOD installations.

 

On 2 July, the suspension was broadened to encompass all material emanating from DOD depots regardless of lethality. At the same time, we informally advised the Services to cut back negotiations that might result in unwarranted costs to the U.S. Government over the short run. A 12 August directive instructed the Military Departments and Defense

Supply Agency to process no additional FMS letters of offer, to take no new implementing action on accepted letters of offer and to place no additional procurement contracts. These restrictions were reaffirmed earlier this month. At no time has Defense sought to suspend the ship­ment of military supplies from civilian contractors (either under FMS or commercial arrangements) whose deliveries were to be made directly to Pakistani shipping agents in this country.

 

I should also point out the deliberate omission in our April directives of a prohibition of release of non-lethal spare parts. This narrowly re­stricted area of supply was left open in the belief that Pakistani military assets might be redirected from their use in suppressive action to civil relief in East Pakistan where the civil transport net had for all practical purposes ceased to exist. These two exceptions to what would otherwise have been a total embargo were closely coordinated with the NSC staff.

 

Within the last several weeks, reports from within our supply system coupled with feedback from the investigations of the GAO have indi­cated that leakage of some spares, both for lethal and non-lethal end items, has occurred. At my direction, a rapid but fairly sweeping inquiry was begun requiring data checks down to the depot level. The task has required a manual check of some 14,000 normally automated line items by the Air Force alone with lesser amounts by the other two Services. While the results of this check are still by no means complete, the evi­dence to date is sufficient to confirm the leakages. I had hoped to be able to provide you with a more comprehensive overview of the situa­tion, but time will not permit this in view of the imminent visit of the Indian Prime Minister.

 

Our research to date shows that the U.S. Army shipped 149 line items from its depots between 3 May 1971 and 30 June. The shipments repre­sented spare parts for machine guns, tanks and artillery with a total value of $83,000. The material was released against only two of the numerous active sales cases. Neither of these two cases bear valid ex­port licenses and a check of the material held in the warehouses of Paki­stan's shipping agents has indicated that the bulk if not all of these shipments are still held in those facilities.

During the same time frame, the Air Force continued routinely to re­lease spare parts for aircraft in two of its 89 then active sales cases for Pakistan. The two affected cases comprised the so-called depot supply support plan (DSSP) under which the purchaser was afforded direct automated access to the USAF logistical system. It appears that while shipments were stopped in the 87 other cases, releases were continued in this instance in response to a clause in the sales contract requiring 180-days' notice for cancellation. Under the DSSP some $2.4 million worth of lethal as well as non-lethal spares were shipped during the May-June period. This included parts for F-86 and F-104 fighters and B-57 bombers as well as Pakistani transport and trainer aircraft. The automated inputs made no differentiation in terms of lethality and it is likely that a majority of the releases (still being checked) were in sup­port of the combat aircraft. A cut-off was initiated apparently as a result of our 2 July directive.

 

Within the narrow limits of these cases, it appears that a still indefinite quantity of "emergency" spares were transported to Pakistan aboard the weekly MAC Embassy Support Flight, thus bypassing the U.S. Cus­toms export license check. Licenses for these two cases, however, were valid until late July and mid-August respectively.

Our analysis of inputs from the Navy is still incomplete, but we estimate that shipments amounting to about $61,000 in value have been made contrary to our directives. Releases of lethal spares constituted some $36,000 out of this total. Initial checks have made it clear that in at least a few cases covering spare parts for ships and Pakistan's one US­supplied submarine, releases continued as late as mid-September totally contrary to all instructions issued by Defense.

 

Reports reaching me to date indicate that the leakages were uninten­tional and inadvertent. I am, however, asking the Secretaries of the three Military Departments to look into the matter personally so that we can establish the positive control necessary to prevent lapses of this sort from occurring in the future.

 

In accordance with your request for copies of the various directives we have issued on military supply for Pakistan, ISA has provided this ma­terial separately to NEA directly. I am informed that no procurement action or other activity that would result in either the movement of sup­plies or increase of USG financial entanglement has proceeded from any of the 24 letters of offer processed by the Services between April and mid-August 1971.

The problems evident in reducing the flow to Pakistan have arisen in large part from the sheer size of a system designed to run rather than stop. We have recognized the changing requirements some time ago and over the last several months have taken what I believe were the re­quired steps to adjust to the new direction in our policy approach. Cen­tral to our efforts was the establishment on 1 September of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Its mandate includes the close and detailed supervision of our military assistance and sales efforts that until now have been decentralized among the three Services to expedite our re­sponse to foreign country requirements.

 

In closing, let me reiterate that we will continue to pursue this matter to its final conclusion. I will personally insure that the results of our in­quiries are passed to you on as timely a basis as possible. In the mean­time, I believe we need jointly to consider the Congressional relations and public affairs aspects of this problem, particularly in anticipation of Prime Minister Gandhi's forthcoming visit.

 

Warm regards.

 

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 311 - 314.