Secret
November 7, 1971
United
States Information Agency
Washington DC
USIA
Informational Policy Guidance in event of an
Indo-Pakistan
War
Statement
of U. S. Policy on South Asia
The
United States considers it both desirable
and essential that peace
and
stability be preserved in South Asia as a prerequisite to the
continued progress and development of both India and Pakistan.
We
view the outbreak of hostilities in the area as inimical to the best interests
of both parties, and have continued to urge restraint and
peaceful
resolution of differences. The U.S. believes that neither party
will gain from an Indo-Pak war in terms of economic develop
ment,
human welfare, or political stability. On the contrary, a continued state of
war could very well presage the political disintegration
of
the subcontinent and long term instability in the area.
Information
Policy Guidance
-Give full play to official U. S. statements, and review U. S. initiatives to reduce
tensions prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The U. S. has worked and will
continue to work in a variety of ways to make a significant and responsible contribution
toward peace, stability and economic progress in South Asia.
-Emphasize that the U.S. is deeply concerned over
the present outbreak of hostilities, and will continue to search for ways to
halt hostilities and defuse the present crisis. It is our hope that clear
perception by all parties of the dangers inherent in an extended war in the
subcontinent will bring about an early cessation of hostilities.
-Point out that the U.S. attaches great importance
to long-term good relations with both India and Pakistan, and views the
present conflict in the broader context of restoring peace and stability in the
area, rather than seeing it through either Indian or Pakistani eyes.
-Stress the U.S. is not trying to interpose
specific ideas for reconciliation, nor is there an "American
Solution." The U.S. has been and will continue
to be in consultation with the U.N. and other governments in an effort to avoid
further
destabilization of the security situation on the
subcontinent.
Background
1.
The United Nations
India sees the U.N. effort
vis-a-vis the present crisis as ineffectual, and resents U.S. suggestions/initiatives
that by implication would equate India with Pakistan, which India views as the party responsible
for the present conflict. India has rejected U.N. proposals
to place U.N. observers on both sides of the boundary for on-the-spot study of
the refugee problem, and to lend its good offices for the settlement of the
differences between India and Pakistan. The U.N. Secretary General
is deeply concerned by what he considers a major threat to world peace, but in
the absence of cooperation from those directly concerned, feels constrained to
take further initiatives. Relations between India and the Secretary General
are not the best at the present time.
2.
Mrs. Gandhi's Visit to the U.S.
Prior
to Mrs. Gandhi's official U.S. visit Indo-American
relations were viewed as having reached an all-time low. The deterioration in
Indo-U.S. relations was attributed to India's view that continued U.S. military sales and economic
assistance to Pakistan and U. S. failure to censure Yahya
Khan over the military suppression in East Pakistan constituted U.S. preference for Pakistan in the latest Indo-Pak
crisis. The original hope in inviting Mrs. Gandhi to the U.S. was to review our mutual
relations in the light of gradual U.S. disengagement from Asia and India's aspirations for an
enhanced role of leadership in the area. The Indo-Pak crisis largely
pre-empted that original purpose, and the substance of the talks, therefore,
dealt primarily with the current low ebb of Indo-U.S. relations and a frank
exchange of views on the build-up of tensions in the subcontinent.
Mrs.
Gandhi's visit was credited with establishing a better basis of understanding
of each other's positions. The announcement of U.S. suspension of all arms
sales to Pakistan plus repeated U.S. reassurances that the U.S. does not equate India with Pakistan should help to reassure India regarding U.S. policy in the area.
3.
Indo-Soviet Treaty, 1971
Article
9 of the treaty specifies that if either party is threatened the signatories
shall enter into mutual consultation to remove the threat, and take measures to
insure peace and security. The U.S. has conferred with the USSR, and both agree it is in
our mutual interest that the peace and stability of the area be preserved.
Recent high-level visits by Soviet political and military leaders to India, however, make less clear
the exact role the Soviets ultimately will play in the conflict.
4.
The Role of the PRC
The
Pakistanis have turned to the Chinese as a counter-balance to the Soviet
relationship with India. The Chinese, especially
since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, have consistently supported Pakistan in her conflicts with India. These parallel
relationships are a function of the larger Sino-Soviet rivalry of recent years.
China's most current reaffirmation of her support for Pakistan took place in
early November, 1971, after a high level meeting in Peking with Pak civil and
military representatives. This, in turn, echoed recent close Indo-Soviet consultations
in accordance with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August, 1971.
5.
Arms Assistance to India
India has a sizable arms industry
of its own. Moscow has been India's principal arms supplier over recent years
supplying India with heavy/modern weaponry such as MIG fighter-bombers,
ground-to-air missiles and heavy tanks. India received U.S. military assistance
following the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. In 1965 at the time of the
first Indo-Pak war, all U.S. military assistance to both India and Pakistan was
suspended. Since 1967 under the Foreign Military Sales Program the U.S. offered
limited military sales items to both India and Pakistan, but India has not made
any substantial use of this option.
6.
U.S. Military Supplies to Pakistan
Pakistan's military production
capability is limited to small arms and ammunition. All major items and most
spares must be imported. Prior to 1965 the U.S. was the principal arms supplier
to Pakistan. Following the outbreak of India-Pakistan hostilities in 1965, the
United States embargoed all military equipment to both countries and ended all
grant military assistance. Since then we have not supplied Pakistan with guns,
tanks or combat aircraft, and the Pakistanis turned to other countries for this
kind of equipment. In 1966 and 1967 we modified the embargo to permit the
case-by-case sale of ammunition, non-lethal material such as military
communications, medical and transportation equipment and spare parts for
equipment we provided before the embargo. These sales to Pakistan have averaged
less than $20 million annually.
In
October 1970 the U.S. Government announced a one-time exception to the
continuing embargo on lethal weapons, authorizing sales to Pakistan of 300 armored personnel
carriers and about 20 aircraft. In April 1971, shortly after the outbreak of
fighting in East Pakistan, the United States held up any further new
authorization of arms for Pakistan. Specifically, we held up delivery of items
sold to Pakistan under our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program from Defense Department
stocks. We suspended both issuance of new export licenses and, renewal of
expired licenses for the export of items on the Munitions List of authorized
material. We also held in abeyance any action as no item in that offer has
been delivered to Pakistan or its commercial agents and none is scheduled for
delivery.
In
March, prior to the outbreak of civil war, however, the Government of Pakistan
or its agents had obtained legal title to and were in possession of some
previously licensed items still in the United States. Defense Department
commercial contractors under the FMS program and other commercial suppliers
have continued to ship items to Pakistan under licenses issued before March 25.
Most of these items were spare parts for previously supplied US military
equipment. No aircraft or weapons were included. Shipments of this material since
March 25 totaled less than $5 million. As of November 8 all outstanding
licenses were cancelled by mutual agreement of the U.S. and Pakistan
7.
U.. S. Refugee and Humanitarian Relief
(a) Refugee Relief for India - Out of the $225
million in refugee relief aid provided to India by the international community
the U.S. Government contributions as of November 1, 1971, was
$53,757 million in PL 480 food $35,500 million in
cash $89,257 million total.
Also, more than $5 million has been provided by U.S.
Voluntary agencies.
(b) Humanitarian Relief for Pakistan - The U.S. as
of November 1, 1971, has provided $154.6 million to Pakistan for humanitarian
relief in East Pakistan.
(c) The President also has requested an additional
appropriation of $250 million for refugee and humanitarian relief for South
Asia.
8. U.S. Economic Assistance to South Asia (1947-71)
(a) U.S. aid to India - The total amount of U.S. aid to India through FY'71 was $9.1
billion. In FY'71 the level of economic assistance including PL 480 was $434
million.
(b) U.S. aid to Pakistan - The total amount of
economic assistance to Pakistan through FY'71 was $4.63 billion. The FY'71
level including PL 480 was $172.4 million.
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim
and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 320 - 324