Secret telegram

10 November 1971

From: Amconsul Dacca

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: Journalist visits Mukti Bahini-held areas

 

1. Summary: DPO and Poloff debriefed Arnaud De Borchgrave, (protect) senior editor of Newsweek, after his return from trip to Gopalganj subdivision of Faridpur district, where he visited Mukti Bahini (MB) held area. De Borchgrave also gave his impression of Pak Army.

 

2. Views of MB leaders and civil administration activities: De Borchgrave and Claire Hollingsworth of Daily Telegraph left Dacca November 6. They passed through Faridpur town, noting that no gasoline available there as MB had blown up petrol pump. Reporters proceeded to mission at Jalirpar, Faridpur, and were placed in contact with MB by priests at mission (protect). MB leaders were Abdul Mannan, civil administrator of MB controlled area, and Captain K.M. Shehjahan, commander of unit of 75 MB operating near mis­sion. Mannan educated at Willesden College in London and was su­perintendent of automobile workshop in Chittagong before crisis. Shahjahan was college student. De Borchgrave asked Mannan his attitude toward the United States. Mannan replied: "We are opposed to the United States that went into Vietnam and in favor of the United States that is withdrawing from Vietnam." Apparently, Man­nan did not comment on US policy in East Pakistan crisis. Mannan was at pains to make clear that Mukti Bahini not Marxists and that Bangladesh would not be a communist country, saying that Naxalites would bet their fair share of power but that their share would not be large as they were tiny minority. Mannan stated that MB's war aim was simply to have Awami League's victory honored. As regards substance of civil administration, De Borchgrave observed Awami League courts in operation. He was told that MB who take food, etc., without payment are subject to trial in such courts.

 

3. MB organization and operations: De Borchgrave was informed that commander in the Gopalganj area was Major Hemayat. (Comment: Hemayat has considerable reputation in Gopalganj and has been known to Congen as leader of guerrillas in that area for some time.) Hemayat's force allegedly numbers about 1,100 men, in­cluding group De Borchgrave met. Shahjahan's men armed with stenguns, grenades, Lee-Enfields and one LMG. Group was short of ammunition, having recently been involved in fire fight, but expected to be re-supplied from India. Unit had neither radios nor mortars. Lack of radios keenly felt. But communications maintained through use of horse and country boat relays. This system, at its best, can move messages ... in 24 hours. De Borchgrave had definite impres­sion that this unit in contact with higher authority. For example, he was told that unit had requested policy decision on question of whether or not it should attempt cut off food shipments to cities. (Decision had not been received by time of De Borchgrave's depar­ture.) De Borchgrave struck by freedom with which MB moved from village to village, making no attempt at concealment. He was told MB not afraid of Army because Army hardly ever enters area: one launch comes in weekly and is regularly ambushed. MB claimed to have killed 19 Paks in recent encounter which used up their ammu­nition and De Borchgrave inclined to believe claim. MB suffered some wounded who are being treated in Catholic Mission Hospital (strictly protect). De Borchgrave left area via MB countryboat, guer­rillas again making no effort conceal their identity. When De Borchgrave left guerrilla encampment, unit was preparing ambush for two Army food barges.

 

4. MB offensive: While visiting MB, De Borchgrave was informed MB planning "mini-Tet" to commence within next month. This would involve, among other things, greatly increased operations in Dacca. De Borchgrave believes MB realized they would lose such a campaign but will undertake it in hopes of pulling Pak troops away from positions in the field and of provoking a repetition of events of March 25. Purpose of provocation would be to create worldwide re­vulsion at Pak brutality, thereby weakening foreign support for GOP. De Borchgrave felt plans also a response to Indian pressure for quicker victory.

 

5. Impressions of Pak Army: On return trip, De Borchgrave saw Army only twice, both times at checkpoints. Troops at first check-point appeared unfamiliar with their equipment and troops at second checkpoint were drunk. He also met Deputy Commissioner in Farid­pur who freely admitted being sympathetic to MB. DC informed him that Army continues executions in Faridpur town, but did not say who were being executed. Overall, De Borchgrave had impression Paks were losing. Back in Dacca, De Borchgrave dined with General Niazi. Niazi appeared to be misinformed about conditions in the province, showing no understanding of true situation. De Borchgrave also met with Governor Malik who more or less apologized for ac­cepting governorship, claiming he had done so with Awami League approval. Based on conversations with Niazi and Brigadier Hateef (?) in Comilla, De Borchgrave concluded Paks had no understanding of revolutionary warfare in general or of current happenings in East Pak in particular. De Borchgrave was obviously impressed by extent of insurgency and stated belief that Bangladesh victory only a ques­tion of time.

 

6. Comment: This information confirms our impressions that MB has established civil government in certain areas and that some MB units, at least, are operating on orders from higher authority rather than as independent bands. Fact that veteran correspondent of De Borchgrave's caliber is convinced that Pak high command actually does not grasp facts of situation here must be given weight. If in fact Paks do not realize how badly they are hurting, chances of peaceful settlement obviously reduced. We are uncertain how to treat De Borchgrave's report of plans for mini-Tet: He is hardly likely to swallow such a story without cause, but we have heard many reports of this type before, all of which proved false.

 

Spivack

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 332 - 334