Secret Telegram

November 10, 1971

From: Secretary State Washington DC

To: Ambassador New Delhi

 

Sisco Discussion with Fonsec Kaul on East Pakistan Problem

 

Summary: While the President and Mrs. Gandhi met separately As­sistant Secretary Sisco met with Fonsec Kaul in cabinet room for two hours November 4. Also present on Indian side were Ambassador Jha, Rasgotra and Sathe, on American side were Ambassador Keat­ing, Ambassador Mosbacher, Van Hollen, Saunders, Hoskinson and Schneider. After detailed presentation of Kaul of Indian analysis of situation and policy conclusions which broke no new ground, Sisco urged that group examine where we go from here. Said US considers search for solution East Pak problem must include a number of inter­related elements, no one of which can be considered by itself. US had tried to help with material support for refugees, with effort to de­fuse situation by securing withdrawal of troops and with efforts to help seek political accommodation then reviewed recent series of talks with Yahya in regard to withdrawal of forces and negotiations with East Pak leaders, said Yahya willing consider idea some unilat­eral withdrawal Pak military forces. Yahya further indicated he was prepared to meet with cleared Awami Leaguer from Dacca, or, alter­nately with Bangla Desh representative from India, provided he was not charged with major crime. Sisco stated Yahya willing consider meeting with Bangla Desh leader designated by Mujib although Ya­hya had some doubts regarding proposals because he considered Mujib had been discredited. Sisco urged GOI support initiation Bangla Desh GOP negotiations without insisting upon involvement of Mujib at outset.

 

Kaul replied that Yahya talk with cleared Awami Leaguer is non starter if Awami Leaguer is stooge in regard discussion with Bangla Desh leader from India. Kaul doubted there would be major leader acceptable to Bangla Desh leaders who "not guilty of major crimes", also doubted any major leader would be in position to talk without contact with Mujib. In regard Yahya discussion with Awami Leaguer

designated by Mujib, Kaul remarked before Mujib could designate such person he should be free man. In response to suggestion by Ambassador Keating that Mujib designee might talk to Mujib while he is still in jail, etc both sides agreed carefully to consider proposals put forth by other and discuss them further.

 

1. During opening presentation Sisco stated US view that in South Asia Indian's role is primary. Said unless there stability, there no ba­sis for progress and no country in area more important than India.

 

2. Replying, Kaul made long presentation of Indian analysis East Pak situation and explanation Indian policy along lines previous public and private presentations. Said there no serious differences between US and India in regard to assessment of situation. Because of differ­ences in interests, there may be differences between US and India in regard to remedies. Welcomed Sisco's indication of importance US attaches to India, referring to time when US tried to equate India and Pakistan. Welcomed US initiative regarding China and said India was trying to normalize relations with China but has not made much progress. Also welcomed US efforts improve relations with USSR explaining friendly relations between India and Soviet Union partly due to geography and partly due to 10-15 years Soviet understanding of India's problems.

 

3. Kaul explained East Pak problem not of India's creation. India had welcomed election results in Pakistan, looking forward to normali­zation of relations. Kaul very critical of Yahya, "reign of terror" which followed March 25 and indicated their had been intensifica­tion of threats to stability caused by refugee influx. Said India wel­comed refugees but there was a limited time during which India could bear burden. Threats of war by Yahya forced India to do something to meet threat. Therefore, India signed treaty with Soviets which didn't change actual relationship but calmed Indian people and met items for Pakistan, not because US supply of military items for Pakistan, not because of their military significance, but because they symbolized US support for Yahya, as he himself indicated in Octo­ber 12 broadcast. Indicated he understood US policy was to retain in­fluence with GOP but GOI had seen no positive result of this influ­ence.

 

4. Kaul said India not directly involved in problem between East and West Pakistan. It did not wish suggest any particular solution. This depended upon West Pak regime and elected leaders East Pak. He concluded, however, that he did not believe Bangla Desh leadership could agree to anything less than independence unless Sheikh Mujib were released and agreed to some other formula. Concluded unless there were some such agreement refugees would not return and re­turn of all refugees was essential to GOL Kaul explained GOI rejec­tion of UN good offices proposal. Criticized proposal for mutual withdrawal of troops on grounds it was not made when Pakistan first moved its forces but only came after India had responded, said mu­tual withdrawal would create impression of action to deal with problem without actually getting at basis of problem. Said India had no intention or desire to provoke war or take Pakistani territory. Should Pakistan attack, however, India would retaliate. This time war would not be similar to that of 1965. It would be decisive with decisive results.

 

5. Kaul concluded that governments such as US can persuade GOP to reach some kind of political settlement acceptable to East Pak leaders. Mujib was only person who could produce acceptable for­mula. If Yahya could not negotiate with Mujib, then perhaps some­one else should be found who can.

 

6. In reply Sisco said he could agree with much of Indian assess­ment. East Pak problem was not of India's making. There had been discrimination against East Pak. Use of force after March 25 respon­sible for refugee problem. US also sympathizes fully in regard to refugee burden. US view was that solution to East Pak problem could not be obtained by pursuing one course of action in isolation. We should not consider exclusively refugee relief, withdrawal of forces, third party involvement, or political accommodation. All these elements should be pursued together. US view is stability which would come from political settlement cannot be achieved without cooperation of India; we do not accept that India has no in­fluence over situation. US also had influence, exercise of which hopefully has placed US in position where we can provide construc­tive help.

 

7. Citing Kaul's comments that Indians had seen no results of US in­fluence, Sisco listed what US has tried to accomplish.

 

A. US had been principal supplier of material support for

refugees outside of India.

B. US has put forward ideas for defusing situation by with­

drawing forces.

C. As we have informed GOI, we have been quite active in seeking political accommodations. Said Kaul had sug­gested we establish contact with Bangla Desh leaders. We had done so.

 

8. Sisco then carefully explained that during last couple of weeks we had had series of talks with President Yahya in preparation for US­India talks in Washington. We have taken up proposal for with­drawal of forces. During the last several days Yahya has told us as further step he is willing to consider some unilateral withdrawal of military forces at his initiative. We wish to communicate this to GOI officially at this time.

 

9. Sisco said we had had further discussions with Yahya on political accommodation. In regard to negotiations with Awami League lead­ers, Yahya had told us:

 

A. He was prepared to meet a cleared Awami Leaguer leader who had approached US in Dacca. In doing this, he recog­nized discussion would include consideration of Mujib.

B. Alternatively, Yahya was prepared to meet Bangla Desh leader from India, providing that leader was not charged with major crime.

C. Yahya expressed willingness to consider meeting with Bangla Desh leader designated by Mujib although Yahya considered Mujib discredited.

 

10. Citing GOI insistence that negotiations start with Mujib Sisco said this was clearly not feasible and process of negotiation should be started without this precondition. If not necessary start process with Mujib in order to get settlement which would ultimately involve Mujib. What we have discussed with Yahya could mean sensible be­ginning. It is in interest of Indian, Pakistan and major powers to grasp this opportunity: use of force is no solution.

 

11. Referring to arms questions, Sisco commented we felt we had been made scapegoat. We have now informed Ambassador Jha pipe­line will now dry up. This happening partly to meet Indian require­ment.

 

12. Ambassador Keating said there no question Indian delegation was correct that Mujib was single person with great influence and must in some way be brought into picture if refugee flow to be re­versed. However, if Yahya talked with someone who had Mujib's blessings, Mujib might be brought in later. Sisco indicated USG was approaching crisis from standpoint both political settlement and withdrawal. We understand Indian position on withdrawal alone. USG also intends continue help India with refugee burden. Flow cannot be stopped without normalization in East Pakistan. What In­dia does will help determine whether stability in East Pakistan can return. Said we do not understand why India could not move along withdrawal and negotiations fronts at same time.

 

13. Addressing himself to possibility of negotiations, Jha remarked that Bangla Desh rep, speaking on behalf of Mujib, would need communications with Mujib, but Mujib, if still in jail would be out of touch. Without communications it would be impossible assure Bangla Desh rep was in fact Mujib's nominee. Furthermore, such ne­gotiations would run risk of pulling rug from under feet of Bangla Desh leaders. Remarked third alternative was getting closer to what Indians want but has these areas of great doubt. Asked for clarifica­tion, Sisco indicated questions of this sort still require clarification but talks along lines discussed could be beginning. Asked Indian delegation to reflect on suggestions before giving considered reply. GOI should also take this report of our discussions with Yahya as evidence of US influence and activity.

 

14. Kaul agreed USG had been active, then returned to theme that GOI had little influence over Bangla Desh leaders, citing great criti­cism of Swaran Singh's Simla speech, both within Bangla Desh gov­ernment and Congress party. Said Bangla Desh position now is they will settle for nothing but independence. If it settled for less Bangla Desh leaders would be thrown out and more extreme elements would seize control. Sisco took direct issue with this conclusion, saying we feel Indian attitude can have great influence over Bangla Desh.

 

15. Kaul reaffirmed lack of GOI influence and said Bangla Desh leaders with who USG had been in contact had lost their influence because of their consideration solution short of independence.

 

16. Kaul then addressed himself to alternative proposals for negotia­tions. In regard first alternative said if stooge of discredited Awami Leaguer were to talk with Yahya, this would be "non-starter". In re­gard second alternative concerning Bangla Desh rep from India, Kaul asked what meant here by India. Was this attempt to involve India? Sisco replied in negative. Kaul said proposals for negotiations must be considered in context political process Yahya has started. Yahya is trying to split Awami Leaguers. Kaul indicated he did not know who Bangla Desh rep "not guilty of serious crimes" might be. Did not think any Bangla Desh leader would be in position to talk with Yahya without contact with Mujib. In regard third alternative, Kaul said before Mujib could designate Bangla Desh leader he must be free man. If he were released and negotiation started with him or some representative of him, this might be different. Kaul suggested USG urge Yahya release Mujib. Then he could negotiate or desig­nate someone to negotiate on his behalf.

 

17. Sisco replied this not feasible. We believe process should begin short of this.

 

18. Ambassador Keating suggested if Yahya willing talk with desig­nated rep of Mujib, might it be possible for such designee to talk with Mujib while he still in jail? Kaul replied this might be worth trying but he could not say it would succeed. Repeated that this was worth exploring. Kaul and Sisco agreed not to carry this discussion farther but that each government would consider situation further and convey reactions later.

 

19. Concluding this portion discussion, Kaul said that during UK talks British had come around to view that Mujib was only person that could settle East Pakistan problem. British were going to attempt persuade Yahya to release Mujib and negotiate with him. (FYI: This contrary our understanding British position) Kaul then remarked that

Ambassador Keating's idea that Bangla Desh rep might make contact with Mujib and ascertain his views was worth considering.

 

Irwin

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 326 - 332