White House Washington DC

National Security Council

Secret November 11, 1971

Memorandum for The President

From: Henry A. Kissinger

 

Subject: Military Supply to Pakistan

 

The following is the general background to the drying up of the pipeline of military supply to Pakistan.

 

Following your guidance, I made clear from the beginning that no ac­tion should have been taken by State or Defense that the Pakistanis might interpret as pressure that might close the door to our continued constructive dialogue with them or that would jeopardize your special relationship with President Yahya. This, of course, has ruled out any ef­fort to use our military supply as a sanction, the imposition of an official and public embargo or similar measures to isolate or quarantine Paki­stan.

 

You will recall, however, that the WSAG meeting, soon after the fight­ing broke out in East Pakistan in late March, felt that it would be pru­dent to establish close control over equipment going to the area until the situation clarified. As a result, a series of in-house measures were qui­etly taken in late March and early April that permitted us to hold up in­formally any dramatic and controversial shipments (ammunition, major items, spare parts for lethal equipment) from Defense stocks. The issu­ance of new or renewal of old export licenses for Munitions List items was suspended. No effort was made to reach out into the commercial market or to stop export at customs since this would have given the ap­pearance of an embargo and conveyed the wrong political signal to the Paks. This meant that equipment going direct from manufacturers to Pakistani shippers still continued to flow.

 

Some of the early confusions in our policy arose at this point. Defense said at an early WSAG meeting that there was no major problem in holding shipments because no significant items were scheduled for de­livery until June. This was my understanding of our policy in April that we did not have a problem for 6-8 weeks.

 

As time passed, State persistently pressed Defense to tighten the restric­tions that had been established. On June 24 State sent a memo to you recommending that the export of arms be stopped altogether.

 

This recommendation was overruled, and State and Defense were in­structed to continue exports under then existing guidelines. During this period, a recent review now shows some equipment was released from Defense stocks as well as directly from manufacturers.

 

The passage of time also made it necessary to get a more precise picture of where all the equipment involved was, and I asked Defense for list. The procurement system is intricate and it was not until mid-July that a

comprehensive list was established. Only then did it become clear what effect the restrictions against new licenses was having in reducing the pipeline.

 

The Pakistanis did not make an issue out of the restrictions that had been established even though they had the practical effect of reducing the pipeline as old licenses expired. They recognized that our resisting embargo in the face of strong and increasing Congressional criticism had the virtue of avoiding public condemnation of them. They also made the judgement that it was more important to keep the Congress from cutting off economic assistance.

 

Nevertheless, despite the slowing flow (about $5 million worth of pri­marily spare parts), military supply became a major issue in our rela­tions with the Congress and with India, where it was widely interpreted as US support for Pakistan and an anti-Indian move, in part this was be­cause of mishandling by State which, until a story broke in the press right after Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's visit here, was implying that nothing was going to Pakistan. They explained the restrictions that had been put into effect but did not explain what equipment was still free to move.

 

Under these circumstances, Assistant Secretary Sisco in late August be­gan on his own to explore with Ambassador Hilaly the possibility of hastening the final drying up of the pipeline with a minimum loss to Pakistan. The idea was that since it was gradually being reduced under existing guidelines anyway, this might help stave off Congressional moves to cut off economic assistance. This was started without my clearance. We were informed after the initial approach Yahya accepted this suggestion and subsequently sent his head of Defense Procurement here to examine the issue and status of military shipments at first hand. Again, the general was in town and had seen Secretary Rogers before we knew he was here. State urged him to try to clean up outstanding shipments by October 1, and I told him to take two more weeks if he needed it in order to ship all they could under the existing ground rules.

 

The Pakistanis went along with this exercise. The substance of the final response to press queries was cleared by State through the Pakistani embassy here with President Yahya.

After the Paks had gathered all they could, they agreed to the termina­tion of some $3.6 million in outstanding licenses which could not be used. Some $160,000 worth of spare parts remain at dockside in New York for immediate shipments to Pakistan after the dock strike ends.

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 334 - 337