Secret telegram

11 November 1971

From: Amconsul Dacca

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

1. Several of our recent reports have referred to the assistance afforded Mukti Bahini (MB) activity inside EP by Indian shelling and probing of the borders of the province. This pins regular Pak Army troops to the borders and gives them plenty to think about while MB in interior have to deal mainly with Razakars, police, and other para-military forces less efficient than Army. At same time increasingly frequent combined In­dian Army-MB operations on border contribute to experience and strengthening of MB.

Given rate at which MB activity increasing inside province and appar­ently Growing organization and self-confidence of these forces, it begins to look as if India might achieve such possible major objectives as pres­sure on Islamabad govt, weakening of Pakistan, or even independent Bangla Desh by simply continuing its present activities without esca­lating them into actual warfare. If this idea is indeed in mind of Indian policy planners, it might explain provocative Indian tactics on border as well as vaguely menacing noises Mrs. Gandhi and other high Indian of­ficials continue to make without necessarily assuming any real intention to go to war.

 

Spivack

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 337