Department of State

 

TELEGRAM

 

SECRET 593

 

 

ISLAMA 11278 01 OF 02 171005 Z

12

ACTION NEA-11

INFO : OCT-01 RSR-01 EUR-14 10-12 SR-02 ORM-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-

            02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-IOP-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 AID-20

            E­11 / 133 W

                                             ……….. 115400

R 1212102

FM    :      AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO    :       SECSTATE WASHDC 1470

INFO:      AMCONSUL BOMBAY

    AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

    AMCONSUL DACCA

    AMEMBASSY KABUL

    AMCONSUL KARACHI

    AMCONSUL LAHORE

                AMEMBASSY LONDON

                AMCONSUL MADRAS

                AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

                AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

                USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET SECTION lOF 2 ISLAMABAD 11278

CORRECTED COPY (CALCUTTA ADDED AS INFO ADDEE)

SUBJ  :   ATTITUDES REGARDING ROLE OF MUJIBUR RAHMAN IN POLITICAL

               SETTLEMENT IN EAST PAKISTAN CONFLICT

REF    :   ISLAMABAD 10861

 

1. SUMMARY: What was unthinkable six months ago in West Pakistan may have become acceptable today-regime could probably survive opening of negotiations with Shiekh Mujibur Rahman provided latter agreed to support unified Pakistan. Public opinion in West would now generally acquiesce in such development and some would welcome it. Reaction within army likely be more mixed, but with army discipline maintained. In East Pakistan, Mujib has become symbol of Bengali nationhood. However, to retain credibility with Bengalis Mujib in any negotiations probably could not settle for less than Awami League Six Points, certain of which are still anathema to Pak military and still carry with them seeds of eventual secession. Even if Six Points compromised, any negotiated settlement acceptable to Bengalis would probably require withdrawal of army at least to cantonments, again opening door to secession. END SUMMARY.

 

2. With participation of four constituent posts, embassy has recently examined present potentialities and limitations concerning possible role for Shiekh Mujibur Rahman in negotiated political settlement of East Pakistan conflict.

 

3. Congens Lahore and Karachi report West Pakistan public would, in general, welcome regime's re-opening negotiations with Mujib provided Mujib accepted maintenance of unified Pakistan. Both posts indicate that growing public weariness with political and economic uncertainties has led to willingness to accept the unacceptable of few months earlier.

 

4. Karachi comments that acquiescence and relief would likely be dominant themes in Sind and Baluchistan. However, refugee and conservative groups would raise objections to any movement which former would perceive as diluting concept of unified Pakistan with strong Center and contained regional aspirations and which latter might see as endangering their personal political ambitions. Congen observes that regime has current ability to impose its policies in Sind/Baluchistan. Opposition to regime remains fragmented with masses inert or concerned with specific grievances. Local public has proved capable of accommodation to whatever regime line is pushed.

 

5. Congen Lahore comments that it would expect initial outburst of criticism in Punjab to any negotiations or release but that such criticism could be contained. Consul Peshawar believes that public in NWFP would be opposed to any deal with Mujib and to his release.

 

6. For present, at least, regime's overt reopening of negotiations or talks with Mujib would probably be acceptable only in context of Mujib's specific renunciation of secession of East Pakistan and reaffirmation of concept of unified Pakistan. There has been no apparent weakening in army's resolve to nynvent dismemberment of country and fears that independence for East would revive latent but strong regional chauvinism in West Pakistan. Any talks with Mujib without Mujib's prior agreement to accept solution within framework of unified Pakistan would likely lead to serious repercussions in army because talks would be interpreted as signaling future independent East Bengal-which neither public nor army yet prepared concede.

 

7. Likely reactions within military establishment to new negotiation with Mujib on basis his acceptance one Pakistan still unclear. Lahore believes that traditional hierarchal discipline would prevail in army although it conveivable Yahya might be asked to step down. Council Muslim League leader Daultana told Congen he believed major upheaval within army unlikely so long as release of Mujib contingent on his commitment to unified Pakistan. Karachi estimates that military, now emotionally convinced of Hindu responsibility for East Pak developments, would react with reservations and puzzlement. More farsighted individuals within military might rationalize treating with Sheikh better than Indo/Pak conflict in which military as institution likely be damaged or economic infrastructure of country jeopardized. Peshawar believes army would react negatively because of its conviction that Mujib guilty of both secession and subversion with India.

 

 

 

Source:  The American Papers – Secret and Confidential India.Pakistan.Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973, University Press Limited, p.709-710