Top Secret Sensitive
12
November 1971
Defense Intelligence Agency
The Prospects of War in South Asia
During the Next 90 Days
Purpose
To assess the likelihood of the outbreak of
hostilities in South Asia over the next 90 days, the possible courses of action
by India and Pakistan, and probable Soviet and Chinese Communist military reactions
to the range of possibilities.
Summary and Conclusions
The probability of war between India and Pakistan will remain high for the
next 90 days. Both sides have made extensive military deployments and are
prepared to react to an attack on their territory. A sharp increase in fighting
in East Pakistan is expected over this period which will further raise
emotions on both sides, escalating the possibility of war. Unless there is a
political breakthrough, the question is not whether there will be a war, but
rather when it will occur.
Neither India nor Pakistan desire war, and neither is
economically able to engage in a prolonged contest. However open hostilities
could result from an escalation of border clashes, a Pakistani attack on
guerrilla camps in India, a killing rampage in East Pakistan, miscalculation
of the other side's intentions, or a high flow of refugees. The more likely
causes would be escalation of the border clashes or miscalculation.
Internal politics in East and West Pakistan are pushing Pakistan toward economic disaster
and a military debacle. Pakistan in response to Indian provocation may attack
India and seek an early international solution if it sees no other way to
retain East Pakistan. In such case, Pakistan would attempt to bargain with any
territory it seized in the West against the loss of East Pakistan. India would
probably attack in the East if the Mukti Bahini encountered serious reverses.
The actual timing of an outbreak of hostilities is difficult to determine.
Certainly, Pakistan would move only in desperation.
International pressures on both sides and on-going
diplomatic actions have been increasing in an effort to prevent an all-ouwar.
They have not been successful, however, in persuading Pakistan to adopt a political
solution which would induce the more than nine million refugees to return to
East Pakistan.
The situation in the East could be resolved by Pakistan if India could be constrained from
direct intervention, but a political settlement there, acceptable to both India and Pakistan, will be required to reduce
tensions between them significantly.
During the next 90 days some important concessions
on the part of either side such as Pakistani negotiations with representatives
of Mujibur Rahman or Bangla Desh, a mutual withdrawal of some major forces
from the borders, or a measurable decrease in Indian support of rebel
activities could improve the situation. The danger of war, however, will
persist until an acceptable political solution is found and the refugees return
to East Pakistan.
Open conflict between India and Pakistan is likely to begin in East Pakistan and could well be initiated
by India. The balance of forces favors
India in this area, but the war would quickly spread to the West as Pakistan
would seek territorial gains to offset its losses in the East. An initial
Pakistani attack in the West would probably occur in Kashmir and be followed
by an Indian attack in the Punjab toward Lahore.
War would be fought primarily by ground forces. Air
actions would be more intense in the West than in the East but after three or
four weeks would be constrained by shortages of munitions, spare parts,
maintenance of aircraft and POL. A major naval engagement would be unlikely
although some individual ship actions could occur. India may establish a
blockade.
India is capable of launching a
two-front war and should prevail over Pakistan because of its greater
manpower and logistics strength. It is doubtful that Pakistan could sustain
large-scale military action for much more than a month; thereafter the
intensity of its effort would be reduced to guerilla-type activities. The
actual duration of the war would more likely be determined by international
political-economic pressures and the willingness of both parties to accept a
negotiated settlement.
It is not believed that either the Soviets or
Chinese Communists would commit their own forces in a military reaction to a
conflict in South Asia. Both, however, would probably continue to provide military supplies
and assistance. If China wished to cause serious concern in India, it could
take limited border actions but would probably not use major forces or seize
Indian territory to avoid a possible Soviet reaction or direct Chinese
involvement in the conflict.
Discussion
The probability of war between India and Pakistan remains high for the next
90 days. Open hostilities could result from: 1) An escalation of the present
border clashes: 2) Pakistani raids on guerrilla training camps in India: 3) a
continued high refugee flow with a cumulative total of over 9.500.000: 4) a
Pakistan Army killing rampage in East Pakistan: or ii a miscalculation of the
other side's intentions. Both sides have made extensive military deployments
and are prepared to react to an attack of their territory.
A sharp increase in fighting in East Pakistan is expected over this period
as the Pakistan Army seeks to defeat the Mukti Bahini rebels and put an end to
their military operations. This situation will further raise emotions on both
sides thus increasing the chances of war. Unless there is a political
breakthrough, the question is not whether there will be a war, but rather when
it will occur.
There are, however, a number of factors which
mitigate against the outbreak of open hostilities. Neither India nor Pakistan
desires conflict, and neither is economically able to engage in a prolonged
war without outside support. The prospects for substantial outside assistance
in the event of war appear less than encouraging for either party.
International pressures on both sides and on-going
diplomatic actions have been increasing in an effort to prevent an all-out war,
but none has yet been successful in persuading Pakistan to adopt a political
solution which would induce the refugees to return to East Pakistan.
The Situation in India
Although India's primary stated interest
has been the settlement of the refugee problem, New Delhi's support of the liberation
movement in East Pakistan continues to increase the chances of conflict with Pakistan. India has been providing
training and support for the East Pakistani guerrillas and soliciting
world-wide support for aid and for the return of the refugees. Nevertheless, New
Delhi has shown restraint in taking initiatives which might provoke open hostilities.
It would be to India's advantage to see that these matters are settled
peacefully, if possible. Further, a quick settlement would preclude the
radicalization of the masses in East Pakistan and the possibility of a
takeover by a leftist-oriented regime in the Bangla Desh organization, which
could be costly to the Indians in the longer term.
Although India has received support from Moscow,
Soviet officials have advised the Indians to exercise restraint. The
Indian-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (of August 1971) provides
for mutual consultations in case of attack or threat of attack against either
signatory. This treaty has quieted, at least temporarily, the New Delhi hawks.
The treaty provides for Soviet political and military material support in the
event India is attacked. It is less definite on Soviet assistance if India
should attack Pakistan. Prime Minister Gandhi appeared disappointed during her
27-29 September trip to Moscow when the Soviets refused to condemn Pakistan for
total responsibility in the Bangla Desh situation and, cautioned India against
over-involvement in support of the rebels. However, Moscow did express
confidence that it could influence Islamabad to accept a political settlement
which would permit the return of the refugees. We doubt, however, that Moscow
will be able to influence Pakistan to this extent.
The recent disclosure of India's strategy against Pakistan helps clarify its moves.
India believes that war is not inevitable but that the threat of war is
necessary to force Pakistan into an acceptable solution. New Delhi is
convinced that if its pressure in the West prevents Islamabad from reinforcing
its military efforts in East Pakistan, the province would be lost to the
rebels. The Indians believe that this, coupled with Islamabad's awareness of
the dangers of open conflict, should force Pakistan to negotiate.
Several Indian actions become clearer in the context
of this strategy. The recent northward movement of sizable forces toward West
Pakistan was presumably calculated to peak the pressure. In addition, New
Delhi has refused President Yahya Khan's proposal for a mutual troop
withdrawal from the border areas. The dramatic increase in propaganda,
particularly in regard to border crossings and clashes, has also increased the
pressure on Pakistan and focused world attention on the crisis.
Despite official statements to the contrary, India's reserve call-up in October
also increased the pressures and the chances of war. The activation of army
reserves and selected naval and air force personnel has been confirmed by New
Delhi. The contribution that these forces -- 44,000 effectives out of a total
of about 700,000 available -- could make, however, is slight. The vast majority
of the reserves, such as students, would require too much training to make them
of immediate consequence. Nevertheless, Islamabad undoubtedly concludes that
the call-up increases the threat.
Prime Minister Gandhi has emphasized that the
mobilization was precautionary. Her brief speech to the nation on the eve of
her departure for Europe and the US failed to mention the matter of reserves,
and its mild tone may have eased Pakistani fears. Moreover, in an address to
the Defense College shortly after she left, Defense Minister Ram asserted that
India would not take any step that could be regarded as aggression against
Pakistan.
India will continue to keep
pressure on Pakistan by assistance to the guerrillas
and appeals to the world for aid to the refugees. However, should large-scale
communal strife develop in the refugee areas, Pakistan attack guerrilla bases
in India, or widespread killing occur in East Pakistan, New Delhi would
probably seek a military solution to the problem and attack Pakistan within the
next 90 days.
The Situation in Pakistan
Islamabad's suppression of East Pakistan's independence efforts on 25 March 1971 gave rise to serious internal military and economic
problems. The arrest of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the outlawing of the Awami
League, the military suppression of East Pakistan and the proclamation of the
Independent Republic of Bangla Desh by guerrilla leaders in India have added to those
problems and caused a heavy flow of refugees to India. However, some remedial
actions taken by the government such as the amnesty proclaimed in early
September, the appointment of a civilian governor in East Pakistan, and the
announcement of by-elections in East Pakistan in December may reduce tensions
in the longer term. While these remedial actions have been somewhat
encouraging, they have yet to attract any significant popular support toward a
settlement of the situation. Further genuine moves on the part of West Pakistan
will be required before prospects for a settlement can be seen.
Although the deterioration of the economy has been
discouraging, the threat of famine is subsiding in East Pakistan now that the critical
inter-harvest period is drawing to a close and programs to distribute imported
food grains are progressing. Economic support from China and the Muslim states
as well as assistance from the US and other Western countries have tended to
relieve the pressing economic situation, but the country's foreign exchange
position has substantially declined in the past year. Moreover, the loss of
production and exports in East Pakistan is affecting even West Pakistan
businessmen.
The West Pakistan military forces retain de facto
control in East Pakistan, although the government there has been officially
returned to civilian hands. The administration is almost paralyzed by the
military situation and social turmoil. Security deteriorated further during the
rainy season. Government forces have been unable to prevent harassment,
terrorism or sabotage throughout the countryside, or even in major urban areas,
by Mukti Bahini rebels.
As the monsoons come to an end, a sharp increase in
military actions in East Pakistan is expected over the next two months. Government
military leaders will be able to launch major actions to suppress the
guerrillas and should be able to contain them if the Indians do not intervene
and if they do not permit excesses by government troops against the population.
Continued Pakistani attacks in the border areas or an attack against rebel
training areas in India, however, would likely precipitate an Indian
retaliation that could result in full-scale war.
On balance, internal politics in East and West Pakistan are pushing Pakistan toward economic disaster and
a military debacle. The situation in the East probably can be resolved if India
can be constrained from direct intervention, but a political settlement in East
Pakistan, acceptable to both India and Pakistan, will probably be required to
reduce tensions between them sufficiently to preclude a war.
During the next 90 days some important concessions
on the part of either side such as Pakistani negotiations with representatives
of Mujibur Rahman or the Bangla Desh, a mutual withdrawal of some major forces
from the borders, or a measurable decrease in Indian support of rebel
activities could improve the situation. The danger of war, however, will
persist until an acceptable political solution is found and the refugees return
to East Pakistan.
Scenarios Which Might Escalate to War
The key issues which could spark a full-scale war
include 1) seizure of East Pakistan territory by India; 2) Pakistani raids on
guerrilla training camps in India; and 3) a continued refugee flow which could
force New Delhi to take military action because of social and economic
problems. Other events which could escalate into open warfare, although less
likely, involve 1) Indian recognition of Bangla Desh guerrillas, 2) a Pakistan
Army killing rampage in East Pakistan, 3) Islamabad's decision on the ultimate
fate of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; and 4) famine in East Pakistan or communal
unrest in the refugee areas of India.
Mrs. Gandhi's return to New Delhi on Saturday and the
reconvening of the Indian Parliament on Monday, November 15, will cause pressures
to mount rapidly for a decision on India's future actions. In making
a decision, Mrs. Gandhi will be influenced strongly by her assessment of her
western visit and advice from certain trusted advisors, particularly General
Manekshaw, the Indian Army Chief of Staff.
There are at least four options available to India:
1) continue the present policy of pressuring Pakistan into a political
settlement; 2) recognize Bangla Desh hoping to provoke a Pakistani attack; 3)
provoke Pakistan through greatly increased Indian-supported Mukti Bahini
operations; or 4) launch an Indian attack. It is believed Mrs. Gandhi favors
the first option, but her advisors and internal pressures could move her toward
one of the others. If she is convinced that all hope for negotiation has
passed, she may feel justified in a decision for
military action. If so, we believe she would decide
that the best option would be to increase Indian-supported Mukti Bahini
operations to pressure Pakistan into a military reaction. Either side could be
irrational.
If open conflict should break out it may be
difficult to determine which nation initiated the attack. It is likely
hostilities would result from an escalation of the present border clashes in
East Pakistan, or by miscalculation. It is less likely to result from air or
naval incidents.
There have been border clashes between Pakistan Army
units and Bengali guerrillas in which, Pakistan army units have also engaged
Indian Border Security Force and regular army units in small arms, mortar and
artillery exchanges. Although occurring frequently, the clashes have been brief
and have involved only small units (squads, platoons or companies). Should
these actions involve larger forces such as brigades or even a Division, they
might well escalate into open hostilities. There have been reports that the
guerrillas are infiltrating larger numbers of personnel into East Pakistan.
Such action is likely to precipitate larger-scale actions by the West Pakistan
forces and could lead to brigade or Division actions.
A miscalculation of the other side's intentions
could occur if either maneuvered present forces in a feint or took such other
military action as might be interpreted as preparations for an attack.
Additionally, should the Pakistan Army go on a killing rampage in East Pakistan
to counter guerrilla actions, it could arouse Indian sympathies to the extent
New Delhi might feel compelled to intervene. A miscalculation of the other
side's intentions is considered a likely way in which the current situation
could evolve into a full-scale war.
Possible Courses of Action
East Pakistan
Open conflict between India and Pakistan is likely to begin in the East Pakistan and could well be initiated
by India. India could commit the Infantry
and 9th Mountain Divisions and the 50th Parachute Brigade from the
Calcutta area without seriously
jeopardizing its defense of the West Bengal state border. The 3rd
Independent Light Armored Brigade, with 135 PT-76 light amphibious tanks could spearhead
brigade of the 20th and 23d Mountain Divisions in an attack from the north,
while the 57th Mountain Division and elements of the 8th Mountain Division
could attack from the East. Regular Indian Army forces immediately available
are some 92,500 combat personnel and approximately 200 tanks supported by an
additional 23,000 Mukti Bahini guerrillas. Additional troops could be quickly
brought to the area if not needed in the West or if a Chinese attack failed to
materialize. (See Map I for opposing forces).
To avoid overcommitting Indian forces in East Pakistan, the Indians could elect to
attack initially from the Calcutta area and from the north.
This would permit them to draw Islamabad's forces into a holding
action prior to an attack from the East. The Indians' principal problem would
be to avoid becoming tied down in a prolonged engagement. At the same time,
however, these forces would be expected to seize maximum territory for
bargaining purposes. Pakistani forces in the East number approximately 60,000
regular combat personnel and 12,000 paramilitary and police. But, while the
strength of the opposing forces favors the Indians, the terrain in the south
would be likely to channelize their efforts and assist the Pakistanis in the
defense of the area. Indian transportation and logistics problems could also
slow the advance significantly. On the other hand, the Pakistani forces are
widely dispersed and require time to organize an effective defense. An
additional factor would be their lengthy and vulnerable supply line from West Pakistan.
India should be able to defeat
the Pakistan forces in East Pakistan within four to six weeks.
West Pakistan
Should hostilities break out in East Pakistan, Islamabad would be likely to initiate
an attack in the West, most likely in the Kashmir area. The Pakistani
objective would be territorial gain in this disputed area for use as a
bargaining point in the event India takes East Pakistan.
Initial Pakistani attacks across the cease-fire line
would probably be conducted by the 12th and 23d Infantry Divisions in company
with the 8th and 15th. The 12th Division would most likely thrust into Kashmir from the northwest, fully
aware that the 25th Indian Division would move to counter. They also would
know that the 19th In-
than Division to the north would send elements to
reinforce the 25th. The 23d Pakistan Division would move against the 26th
Indian Division. (See Map 2 for dispositions of forces).
Pakistani 8th and 15th Divisions would most likely
direct their efforts towards the Banihal Road in an effort to sever this
only Indian major land LOC in Kashmir. Logistics support is furnished to four
Indian Divisions (one of which is along the India-China border) and the XV
Corps Headquarters over this road.
Backing up this Pakistani force would be the 17th
Infantry Division as well as the 6th Armored Division. The latter would be of
little use within Kashmir because of the rugged mountainous terrain. It could, however, be
effectively employed should the 26th Indian Division attempt to cross the
cease-fire line.
The five-Division Pakistani infantry force is
composed of approximately 75,000 personnel. The 6th Armored Division has 237
tanks plus some 13,000 personnel. The three-Division (excluding the
China-border unit) Indian force in Kashmir consists of about 60,000
troops.
India, on the other hand, would
likely attack Pakistan in the Punjab in response to offensive
operations by Islamabad. Two Divisions - the 7th
and possibly the 15" - and an independent armored brigade would initially
attack along an Amritsar-Lahore axis to outflank defending Pakistan forces, with
Lahore as their objective. Forces
attacking toward Lahore would be confronted with
concrete-banked irrigation canals which cannot be crossed by tanks without
bridging equipment.
The movement of the Indian 1 st Armored Division,
the 36th and 54th Infantry Divisions, and the 2nd Independent Armored Brigade
north from base areas in central India has significantly increased India's
options in the area. At a recent Indian Army Commanders conference, the Indian
Army Chief of Staff, General Manekshaw, stated that the primary Indian targets
would be Lahore, Sialkot and other Pakistani border
towns. Should Pakistani resistance prove stubborn, a supporting Indian attack
would be launched in Kashmir. Two Pakistani infantry Divisions, the lOth
and l lth, defend at the canals. Behind them, the 6th Armored and two infantry
Divisions could serve as reserve and defend Islamabad against a possible Indian
breakthrough. The 7th Infantry Division at Peshawar could also be used. (See
Map 3 for opposing forces).
Pakistan would probably not choose
to attack across the IndoPakistani border in the Lahore area of Punjab, in part because of the
strength of Indian forces in the area and its logistical problems, especially
ammunition shortages. The 10th and Ilth Divisions, headquartered at
Lahore, can be expected to
maintain a defensive posture around the city and to defend the approaches to
Islamabad.
The initial Indian attack force would be composed of
approximately 41,000 troops and 150 tanks. Reinforcements in the area would increase
the force to at least 100,000 troops. Pakistani troops defending
Lahore number 30,000 men. The
defenders could be reinforced by about 50,000 troops.
Naval Actions
A major naval engagement is unlikely. Individual
ship actions could occur and would probably include encounters by ships on
patrol, submarine attacks on targets of opportunity, and isolated shore bombardment
missions. (See maps 4 & 5 for disposition of the naval forces).
Due to the numerical superiority of the Indian
fleet, ships would be available to protect major Indian ports and shipping. In
addition, naval units could be used off South India and in the Arabian Sea for
shipborne air surveillance since shore-based early warning radar in this area
is lacking. Sufficient ships are based in Vishakhaputnam to blockade East
Pakistan. A less likely possibility would be an attempt to blockade Karachi
with Indian OSA class boats and submarines operating out of West coast ports. A
blockade, however, could put India into a confrontation with third countries
and might not be considered worth the risk of an incident.
The Indian aircraft carrier VIKRANT, with its
limited propulsion capabilities, is not presently capable of launching
aircraft except in an emergency and would probably be positioned in southern India at Cochin or Madras to avoid any possible loss.
Pakistani naval activity would probably be confined
to the area south of Karachi, and then only in small or single unit forays or
patrols.
DAPHNE-class submarines could attack patrolling
Indian ships, but would probably not venture far from Karachi. In the East, Pakistan has
only four motor gunboats located in East Pakistan to counter India's Eastern
Fleet. They would probably not engage Indian ships.
Air Actions
Air activity, both strategic and tactical, would be
more intense in the West than in the East. Both air forces would probably be
used initially to strike airfields to establish air superiority and
subsequently provide support to ground forces. Strikes against major population
centers could be expected during the early stages of the conflict for their
psychological value.
The air war would probably be constrained after a
few weeks by shortages of munitions, spare parts, POL, and maintenance
problems. The logistics situation would definitely favor India, while
individual pilot capabilities would probably favor Pakistan, although their
pilots would be outnumbered.
Indian air supremacy in the East should be quickly
achieved. If India launched a preemptive airstrike in the West, it should gain
air superiority within two weeks. However, a Pakistani preemptive air strike
would degrade the Indian air capability in western India. If neither side
elected to initiate hostilities with a preemptive air strike, the air war would
be prolonged. The Indian Air Force should eventually win, and the remnants of
the Pakistan Air Force would be grounded by logistic/maintenance problems.
The Indian Air Force has four squadrons of Hunters
in Eastern India in a fighter/bomber role, and three squadrons of MIG-21's and
three squadrons of Gnats for air defense. After initial attacks on East Pakistan
these fighters would resume their defensive posture against a possible attack
from China. The Pakistan Air Force has only 18 F-86 aircraft in the East and
could offer only token resistance. (See map 6 for opposing Air Forces in the
East).
In the West, India has five squadrons of
SU-7s, two squadrons of Hunters, and one squadron of Mysteres immediately
available in the fighter/bomber role. (See map 7 for Indian Air Force
dispositions). A squadron of Canberra light bombers is also available as well
as five squadrons of MIG-21s and four squadrons of Gnats deployed in an
air defense role. In reserve are two squadrons of
Canberras, one squadron of SU-7s, a squadron of Mysteres and two squadrons of
HF-24s.
In the West, Pakistan has five MIG-19/Mirage III-E,
two Sabre M-6, four F-86s, one F-104, one B-57 squadron and one IL-28 squadron,
the latter consisting of only four aircraft. (See map 8 for Pakistan Air Force
dispositions). Aside from preemptive air strikes and bomber raids for
psychological purposes, the Pakistan Air Force would be forced to fight
primarily in an air defense role, although some initial support could be
provided for the ground forces.
Probable Outcome
India is capable of launching a
two-front war against Pakistan. Assuming no foreign
military intervention, India should prevail over Pakistan in either a one or
two-front war. But, since any major conflict between the t%\ o countries would
be supply-limited, both parties would probably be willing to negotiate an early
end to the conflict.
duration of the war is difficult to assess. From a
milltary standpoint it is doubtful that Pakistan could sustain military action
for much more than a month: thereafter the intensity of its effort would be
reduced to guerrilla-type activities. India should be able to defeat the
Pakistani forces in East Pakistan within four to six weeks. In the West, both
sides would probably reach an initial standoff within two weeks, but in a
prolonged conflict, India's greater strength and stronger logistic position
should prevail. The actual duration of the war, however, would more likely be
determined by international political and economic pressures and the
willingness of both parties to accept a negotiated settlement. Neither side can
afford a war of attrition.
Major limitations on India's offensive capability are:
I) the shortage of spare parts for modern weapons systems, 2) an inadequate communications
system, 3) a transportation system which is marginal in certain critical areas,
and 4)a limited industrial base to support a major military effort. India is
believed to have a 30-day supply of ammunition and other expendable items. The
military POL reserve is estimated at 30-45 days. India can probably double the
output of its war-production facilities and this, together with foreign
assistance, should sustain Indian forces for two or three months.
The ability of the Pakistan Army to logistically
support either offensive or defensive operations is limited. The logistics
system has been taxed severely by the necessity to supply the effort in the
East. The wide variety of equipment further aggravates the repair and supply
problem. In West Pakistan, we can expect the army to be a formidable force for
about 30 days. Beyond this, restrictions on imports and dwindling supplies
would probably stop offensive action. In East Pakistan, immediately available
supplies are believed to be small and re-supply extremely difficult.
About 85 per cent of the Pakistani crude oil
requirement is imported from Iran through Karachi. India could impose a
blockade and Pakistan would be restricted to its own meager resources.
Pakistan has only an in-country production capability of about 10,000 barrels
per day. Available jet fuels would support the air force in the West for
approximately 35 days and in the East for about 25 days.
The Chinese Threat
Chinese ground combat forces immediately adjacent to
the SinoIndian border are roughly estimated at about 60,000 combat personnel
and about 10,000 support personnel. The major combat units include three
infantry Divisions, one independent infantry regiment and five border defense
military internal security regiments. (See Map 9). Support units include one
independent artillery regiment, one AAA regiment, two engineer regiments, two
motor transport regiments and one signal regiment.
Although there are no tactical aircraft deployed
near the Indian border at this time, there are five airfields in southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet which could accommodate
tactical jet fighters. These could support a ground effort against India to a
range of about 300 nautical miles beyond the border. Two of the five bases are
suitable for IL-28 operations. A"mix" of light bombers/fighters could
be employed. A further 300 fighter aircraft could be employed from four bases
in southwest China for operations against eastern India. Two other bases could
support up to 150 IL-28s. China's TU-16/Badger medium jet
bombers could strike any target in India from interior bases, but
would probably be held in strategic reserve.
In an all-out effort, a maximum force of 150,000
ground combat personnel supported by 300-350 tactical aircraft operating from
airfields in Tibet and southwest Sinkiang
could be logistically supported. Current ground force units can be reinforced
by nine infantry Divisions within 30 days. Five Divisions could be drawn from
the Chengtu area and four Divisions from the Hsining/Lanchou area.
To oppose these forces, India normally employs eight
Divisions to protect the Sino-Indian border. East of Nepal, New Delhi maintains
six Divisions, three in or near Sikkim and three in the North East Frontier
Agency (NEFA). Two Divisions are located in Ladakh west of Nepal. In addition.
the 3d Independent Light Armored Brigade, equipped with 135 PT--6 tank,, is
located in the Siliguri Gap.
AIthough an Indian invasion force into East Pakistan would include some elements
drawn from units currently in reserve against a Chinese invasion, to ensure
adequate protection along the Sino-Indian border India would probably maintain
six Divisions and elements of two other;.
Soviet and Chinese Communist Reactions
It is not believed that the USSR would commit its own
personnel in an overt operational role in the subcontinent except in the
unlikely event the Chinese joined Pakistan in an attack on India or other major powers
became militarily involved against India. None of the potential
conflict situations on the subcontinent would involve hostilities in direct
proximity to Soviet borders or threaten the USSR.
The Soviet-Indian Treaty is probably judged by the
Soviets as one means of deterring conflict in the area. It also provides a
basis for continued Soviet interest in and military and economic assistance to
India. Soviet support is predicated on India being the victim of aggression.
Should hostilities occur, however, it may be impossible to establish the
aggressor with both Islamabad and New Delhi claiming self-defense. The Soviet
response in this situation would probably be based on other considerations,
including an assessment of China's likely course of action.
From the beginning of the crisis, the Soviet Union has preached restraint to
both India and Pakistan. If a conflict should
develop, India would probably not request
Soviet forces to fight Pakistan in view of India's relative strength unless
the Chinese intervened militarily. Peking is not expected to do so. On
balance, a direct Soviet military reaction would be highly unlikely, although
the Indians probably would receive military assistance.
Although the Chinese Communists would have the
capability to attack India directly, due to their
common border, they would not be likely to become involved beyond providing
some supplies and assistance to Pakistan. Current Chinese efforts
toward improving their world image, and gaining acceptability as a world power
would be seriously jeopardized if they entered a conflict on the subcontinent.
An Indo-Pakistani war would not threaten the Chinese directly, while the
possibility of a confrontation with the Soviets would provide a strong
deterrent to,Chinese military action.
If the Chinese wished, however, to cause serious
concern in New Delhi and to make India reluctant to commit
additional forces to the conflict with Pakistan, they could deploy
additional units and aircraft to the Indian border area, carry out a show of
force, or launch limited probes or harassing actions along the border. These
border actions would not involve major forces or the seizure of Indian
territory. They would be designed to avoid a possible Soviet reaction or direct
Chinese involvement in the conflict.
Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur
Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 341 - 356