Secret telegram

November 16, 1971

From: American Ambassador Moscow

To: Secretary State Washington DC

 

Subject: Call on Kuznetsov Re Gandhi visit to US

 

1. Summary: I called on Kuznetsov Nov 16 and provided him with briefing on Gandhi visit and Sisco talks with Jha and Raza. Kuznetsov particularly interested in aspect concerning various modalities for talks between Yahya and Bangla Desh representatives. He said Soviets were continuing efforts with both Indians and Paks to avoid military conflict which was one purpose of Firyubin trip to India. He felt, however, that Pak administration was not doing enough to bring about political solution. When I raised subject of arms deliveries to area, Kuznetsov replied that Pak policy was root cause of problem and all influence should be used to convince Yahya to accelerate po­litical solution rather than diverting attention to peripheral problems. End summary.

 

2. Gromyko being unavailable, I called on First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov Nov 16 and provided him with full oral briefing on Mrs. Gandhi's recent visit to US and on Sisco's recent conversa­tions with Jha and Raza including points cited Para 2 reftel. I noted inter alia that in our conversations with Mrs. Gandhi we had ex­pressed understanding for India's problem which we recognized was caused by others. We had dried up military supply pipeline to Paki­stan. We accept the Indian position that we should not equate India and Pakistan and in fact we never have, we had asked Yahya Khan if he could unilaterally withdraw some of his military forces. He said

that he could. We recognize this is not just a military problem but a political one also.

 

3. Kuznetsov expressed particular interest when I noted we had had active discussions on one political problem with Yahya Khan and members of the Awami League and that Yahya had agreed to meet with cleared Awami Leader, with Bangla Desh representative from India, and even to consider meeting with Bangla Desh leader desig­nated by Mujibur Rahman. He returned to this point several times for clarification during our meeting. First he wished to know name of cleared Awami League representative. I said we did not have this in­ formation in Moscow. Second, he inquired why Yahya could not re­lease Mujibur and talk with him directly if he was willing to consider meeting freely designated Rahman representative. Direct talks would be shortest way to solution since representatives could not express opinions as exactly as real leaders. He added that for direct talks it would of course be necessary to release Mujib from jail.

 

4. I said we had considered these factors and in fact Mrs. Gandhi had asked same question. USG was not in position to force Yahya to re­lease Mujib, who had been accused of serious crimes. Nevertheless, we felt we had made important if small beginning by getting him to consider talking to representative freely designated by Mujib. We felt it would be difficult to drive Yahya much further at this stage.

 

5. Thirdly, Kuznetsov said it would be helpful to know which Bangla Desh reps in India might be considered acceptable. What was their political stand? Could they really represent the genuine interests of the Awami League or were they committed to different program for settlement in East Pakistan? On what basis did they think settlement could be achieved? I said I could not answer such specific questions but important thing was that Yahya had agreed to consider various approaches to beginning dialogue with representatives of East Pak population.

 

6. At conclusion my briefing, I asked Kuznetsov what he could say about steps Soviets might have taken to deal with present crisis. He first expressed appreciation for measures undertaken by USG to re­lax Indo-Pak tensions. Soviet side was also doing its best to forestall military conformation, as Gromyko had noted in my last meeting

with him. Following that meeting, Soviet government had sent Dep­uty Foreign Minister Firyubin to India with instructions to stress So­viet view of situation. Firyubin had appealed to Indian government to do all possible to avoid military clashes. He had been told by In­dian officials including the Prime Minister that India was not looking for a conflict, would try to avoid one, and would not launch attack. At same time, Indian govt was deeply concerned by both economic and political consequences of unchecked flow of refugees and fact that progress not being made toward political settlement in East Pakistan or toward removing causes for refugee outflow. Kuznetsov expressed view that Yahya did not appear ready to meet East Pak de­sires as expressed in Dec 1970 elections. Instead he was still playing games without taking political steps necessary for solution. This was main cause for current dangerous situation. Soviets were also doing their best with Pak side through Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad. They were urging Paks not to bring situation to deadlock and to avoid military confrontation. They would continue efforts but Paks should do more for political solution. Otherwise, it was difficult to believe that movement could be made from tension to stabilization.

 

7. As regards Indian attitude, I noted that our talks with Mrs. Gandhi had been very good and had helped clear up lots of misunder­standings. We had noted, however, that in her subsequent talks with other leaders she appeared to be quite fatalistic in her attitude as though nothing could be done to prevent war from ultimately occur­ring. Kuznetsov said it would be great blow to cause of peace if war resulted.

 

8. 1 then noted that the arms problem was relevant to this question. Our role as an arms supplier to the area had essentially stopped in 1965. Nevertheless, there were still lots of arms there. We considered it advisable for additional arms to be kept out of area. This directly involved Soviet Union in view of visits there by their military reps and press reports of arms deliveries.

 

9. Without responding directly to this point, Kuznetsov noted that in analyzing current situation, we should look at root cause of problem, which in Soviet opinion lay in policy of Pak administration headed by Yahya Khan. Efforts of all peace-loving nations should be di­rected at this root cause. All influence should be used to convince Yahya to accelerate political solution. In present tense dangerous situation to divert attention to other peripheral problems should not play useful role in facilitating political solution, which must be un­dertaken by Pak administration.

 

10. 1 said that we too were concerned that progress be achieved on the political side. But pressures were building toward a military con­frontation and the situation was dangerous. We were trying to com­bine search for political solution with efforts relieve pressures. In our view, it would be helpful to separate two forces in dangerous state of confrontation. Kuznetsov noted in reply that Soviet side would con­tinue its efforts to avoid military conflict. He again expressed appre­ciation for info I had provided.

 

Beam

 

 

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 368 - 371